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fellowships, it helped bring people together whose combined knowledge, 
skills and resources had the power to cure disease, feed the hungry and  
give hope to the poor and vulnerable. 
As we celebrate the centennial of the Rockefeller Foundation, we  
realize how much the past has to offer the future. Today’s global issues  
are rooted in history. The lessons learned—often by trial and error—by 
those who came before us at the Rockefeller Foundation, help us to under-
stand the deep patterns in our organization and, indeed, in the field  
of philanthropy. 
In Lewis Carroll’s novel Through the Looking Glass, he wrote that “it is 
a poor sort of memory that only works backwards.” With that thought in 
mind, as we celebrate our centennial, we are determined to use memory to 
help us see into the future. Thus Beyond Charity is not a history of the Rock-
efeller Foundation. Instead, it uses the history of the Foundation to explore 
deep and abiding themes in the field of philanthropy. It looks at how the 
evolution of our philanthropic practice has helped to shape the pattern of 
innovation over a hundred years. 
We hope Beyond Charity sheds light that will help guide us and our 
partners as we move into our second century. We also hope that it offers 
our colleagues and future colleagues, including budding philanthropists 
and future foundation professionals, a fascinating window into the world 
of philanthropy.
By Dr. Judith Rodin
President of the Rockefeller Foundation
In 1913 the U.S. Congress was considering a bill to grant a federal charter to establish the Rockefeller Foundation. After three years of negotiations, the original plan had been modified substantially. To try and win passage, John D. Rockefeller’s advisors had agreed to 
amendments that would have given high public officials the right to veto 
appointments to the board of trustees and limited the life of the Founda-
tion to one hundred years. Despite these amendments, Congress failed to 
approve the bill. Instead, Rockefeller turned to the New York legislature to 
incorporate the Foundation. With Governor William Sulzer’s signature on 
May 14, 1913, the Rockefeller Foundation was established.
The history of the Rockefeller Foundation, and much of modern philan-
thropy, might have been very different if the bill before Congress had been 
approved. It would have made the largest private foundation in the world 
a stepchild of the government from the outset. With this precedent, the 
philanthropic sector in the United States might have developed, if it had 
developed at all, with much less autonomy and freedom. 
Instead, with its New York charter and under a system of laws that en-
couraged private philanthropy, the Rockefeller Foundation developed as a 
remarkably flexible and innovative organization. Over one hundred years, 
it has learned by listening to the voices of those crying out for change and 
supporting visionaries with new ideas and profound insights into the 
nature of the world. Long before the birth of computers and the Internet, 
the Foundation created an extraordinary global network. Using grants and 
p r e fa c e b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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The Foundation sought to align the actions of governments with those of 
schools and industry, and they backed research into nutrition and agriculture, 
mental illness, and health delivery systems. The academic study of public 
health owes its origins to Rockefeller, who financed the earliest programs at 
institutions like Johns Hopkins and Harvard. 
The Foundation built networks, too. The Rockefeller Fellowships 
supported brilliant men and women in their research and linked them to 
others working in the same or different fields. They kept track of the activities 
of Rockefeller Fellows and others engaged in similar work, trying, before 
anyone else was doing so, to understand the levers that turn intelligence and 
good intentions into measurable progress. 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission was from the beginning 
international, working to advance Chinese medical education and universities 
in Ghana and Uganda, among others. All of us who work across borders today 
do so in the Rockefeller Foundation’s footsteps.
Here at home, Rockefeller philanthropy has always aimed to support the 
poor and marginalized in our society and to enhance American pluralism.  
The Foundation made several early investments in schools and model farms 
in black communities in the American South. It bolstered the arts and helped 
to found policy organizations that guide our leaders even today.
Not many people can give what Rockefeller gave, but all of us can learn 
from his generosity. His extraordinary record of giving shattered the limits of 
By President Bill Clinton
Like most people who hope to make our world a better place,  I owe much to John D. Rockefeller.The chartering of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913 marked the dawn of modern American philanthropy. 
Although America’s tradition of community service and generosity is older 
than the republic itself, Rockefeller envisioned philanthropy on a global 
scale unlike anyone before him. He believed that the relentless focus on 
innovation and efficiency, which had helped to make Standard Oil the 
largest company in the world, could also move giving beyond charity to 
address the root causes of our shared challenges.
The Foundation’s trustees and staff, working with the Rockefeller 
family, created systems of governance and grantmaking that they 
hoped would achieve the founder’s dream “to promote the well-being 
of mankind throughout the world.” They also developed principles that 
would prioritize their efforts, and they had to refine ways of working with 
others—including governments—that would ensure their charitable 
dollars helped as many people as possible. 
The Rockefeller team started with science, medicine, and health.  
Foundation researchers identified a vaccine for yellow fever, battled 
malaria and other tropical diseases, and helped bring penicillin to the 
wounded of World War II. They eliminated hookworm as a widespread 
health problem in the American South, and made similar gains in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
f o r e w o r d b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts to fight hookworm and yellow fever in the 
early twentieth century. 
I’ve also had the privilege of working directly with the Rockefeller 
Foundation and its president Dr. Judith Rodin through the Clinton Global 
Initiative.  Each September in New York around the opening of the U.N. 
General Assembly, we bring people together from all over the world: heads of 
state, business leaders, philanthropists, and non-governmental pioneers, and 
we ask everyone who attends to make a specific commitment to solve one of 
the world’s most pressing problems. The Rockefeller Foundation has been an 
important partner of CGI, and I continue to be inspired by the commitments 
they’ve made and are keeping to empower women and girls, build sustainable 
capacity in the developing world, and promote entrepreneurship.
The Foundation’s continuing commitment to innovation offers  
valuable examples to other NGOs wrestling with questions of mission, 
longevity, tactics, and operations, including how best to risk resources on  
uncertain ventures, and how to maximize leverage and partnership in 
philanthropic giving.
As Beyond Charity shows, John D. Rockefeller and his advisors embedded in 
the Foundation a deep commitment to processes of continuous improvement 
designed to ensure that its capacity to do good would not be derailed by 
carelessness, complacency, or inability to adapt to changing challenges.
All of us committed to advancing the promise and reducing the perils of 
the twenty-first century should be grateful for the long legacy, lasting lessons, 
and continuing activities of the Rockefeller Foundation. We can learn a lot 
from them.
what anyone thought philanthropy could accomplish, and it has inspired 
and guided others to give back in their own lives.
Like John D. Rockefeller, who created a remarkable second act in 
the “giving business” after a lifetime in the “getting business,” I knew 
that once my career in politics was over I wanted to spend my time and 
energy helping others as a private citizen. I thought there were still many 
problems facing the world where I could continue to make a difference, 
and, in the tradition of Rockefeller, I wanted to go beyond charity to 
address the root causes of our challenges—to help build systems so that 
people can lift themselves up, and to work with governments, the private 
sector, and NGOs to make positive changes faster, better, and at lower cost.
That’s why I started the Clinton Foundation. We work with 
communities and partners on six continents to improve global health, 
promote economic opportunities, reduce childhood obesity, and reverse 
climate change. Over the past eleven years, I’ve found that much of 
what we do and how we work owes a debt to John D. Rockefeller and the 
generations of philanthropists at the Rockefeller Foundation who showed 
how private wealth, scientific research, and government support can be 
harnessed to solve problems and save lives.
Today, we stand with farmers in Malawi and small business owners 
in Haiti, just as Rockefeller program officers worked with African and 
Caribbean communities a generation or more ago. Our work makes it 
possible for millions of people with HIV/AIDS to access affordable, life-
saving antiretroviral medicines. Our efforts are in the tradition of the 
f o r e w o r d b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
W hen John D. Rockefeller decided to direct his vast fortune to the promotion of the well-being of humankind, he and his advisors did not intend to provide char-
ity to ease human suffering for a day; they wanted to address 
the root causes of hardship. To do so, they had to invent a new 
kind of institution, one capable of handling the challenges of 
modern large-scale philanthropy.
From its earliest days, the Rockefeller Foundation was 
remarkably modern: global at birth, disciplined in its study of 
problems and formulation of strategic solutions, collaborative 
in its work with governments and local communities, scientific 
in its approach to the development of new knowledge, focused 
on the development of human capital to create long-term 
capacity, deliberate in its openness to new ideas, relentless in 
its efforts to disseminate new information to specialized and 
general audiences, and always idealistic in its belief that its 
initiatives, staff, and trustees could enhance the well-being  
of humankind.
From the beginning, the Foundation also wrestled with ten-
sions that confront every modern philanthropic organization. 
The Foundation’s leaders, in myriad and imperfect ways, strug-
gled to understand how to focus the Foundation’s resources to 
be effective, identify and address problems as they were emerg-
ing, work with grantees without making them dependent, 
build political support where authority was often ambiguous or 
contested, admit failure when noble goals seemed unreachable, 
and persist when problems seemed intractable. 
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y i n t r o d u c t i o n
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Throughout the past century, trustees, staff, fellows, grant-
ees, governments, and philanthropic partners have contributed 
to shaping the character and effectiveness of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s philanthropy. During these years, the Foundation’s 
champions have struggled to define and understand the role 
and legacy of the donor, and to establish a system of governance 
and coherent and relevant programs that would earn the 
public’s trust. Persistently, they aimed to build and nurture 
an innovative organization that partnered effectively with 
grantees, governments, and other philanthropic organizations, 
and to steward the founder’s gifts to ensure that resources for 
this work will be available for future generations. 
Meeting these challenges has rarely been easy. Crisis 
often became the incubator of innovation. In each case, the 
institutional response reflected the personality, prejudices, 
and personal histories of the individuals to whom John D. 
Rockefeller, decades earlier, had confidently entrusted the 
future of his Foundation and so much of his fortune. 
Early on, the Foundation’s leaders sought to create a culture 
that was decisive and opportunistic; able to collaborate with a 
wide range of people, communities, and organizations; willing to 
fight to achieve its vision; and able to adapt in response to chang-
ing circumstances and situations. They struggled to shape and 
maintain an organizational culture that would promote effective 
philanthropy. They worried constantly about becoming stale or 
bureaucratic. These efforts helped to sustain in the organization a 
habit of innovation that defies cliché. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has never had sharply defined 
organizational boundaries. Its founding reflected the culmination 
of decades of philanthropy by John D. Rockefeller. During its first 
fifty years, the Foundation’s work and management were deeply 
connected to the efforts of sister institutions founded by John D. 
Rockefeller and his family. Although pools of secretaries in New 
York typed correspondence, compiled reports, and assembled the 
extensive diaries of program officers, much of the Foundation’s 
work took place in villages and cities around the world as staff 
visited scientists, policymakers, community leaders, and organiza-
tions. In their diaries, these program officers recorded their casual 
shipboard conversations; discussions with government officials, 
academic leaders, and community members; and even exchanges 
over the course of a simple meal, as they searched the globe  
for ideas and individuals capable of creating the change the  
world needed. 
i n t r o d u c t i o n b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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P hilanthropy begins with a donor and some measure of surplus wealth—from the coins in a child’s piggy bank to the shares of a great corporation. And it 
begins with a donor’s desire to give. 
Around the globe and for many reasons, people give 
time and money to make the world a better place. One 
donor hears of an earthquake or a flood and is moved by 
empathy to make a quick contribution by text over his 
mobile phone. Vision and hard work enable an entrepre-
neur to build a fortune, inspiring a desire to give back to 
the community that made that fortune possible. Another 
individual spends a lifetime helping a charitable organiza-
tion and leaves a substantial portion of her estate to 
ensure that its work continues for generations. 
Behavioral psychologists, cognitive scientists, econo-
mists, and a range of other researchers have tried to 
explain why people give. Some believe that philanthropy 
is about what the donor wants, not what others need. 
One person gives to cancer research hoping she might 
be saved by the development of a cure. A fan of music or 
dance gives to make sure that the symphony or perfor-
mance group he enjoys will continue to perform. As some 
economists have discovered, however, the rational choice 
argument does not fully explain donor behavior.
What motivates  
donors to give?
 A second group of researchers understands humans 
as moral beings: “They enjoy doing what is right. They are 
also emotional, empathetic and sympathetic—they enjoy 
gratitude and recognition, they enjoy making someone 
else happy, and they feel relieved from guilt when they 
become a giver.” From this point of view, philanthropy 
fulfills the “expressive needs” of the donor. The “warm 
glow” from giving is an act of personal consumption. As 
economist James Andreoni points out, this motivation 
explains why people make contributions to people in need 
they do not even know.
Because most philanthropy seeks to change society, 
it is inherently political. To some people, philanthropy 
may represent a cynical gesture by the rich designed to 
perpetuate the position of the ruling class by dulling the 
edges of class conflict. A simpler, more utilitarian view is 
that a contribution to a foundation or nonprofit system-
atizes the effort to change society and relieves a wealthy 
donor of the burden of evaluating and responding to 
more direct appeals from people in need. (As we shall see, 
this was an important factor for John D. Rockefeller.) 
Research in the United States shows that poor  
people are likely to be the most generous, giving more 
than 4 percent of their income to charity. As incomes 
grow, the rate of giving declines to 1.3 percent at an  
income of $50,000, but then increases again as additional 
wealth provides an extra margin for generosity. On aver-
age, the wealthy give 3 percent of their income to charity. 
People tend to give more as they age as they do with 
more education.
What motivates donors to give?
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Levels of giving are also shaped by society. Tax incen-
tives stimulate philanthropic giving. But if government is 
a major player in a certain sector, or a large philanthropy 
plays a dominant role, other donors and institutions can 
be “crowded out.” They feel they do not need to give or 
cannot make a difference. 
One typology divides donors into seven types: com-
munitarians, devout donors, investors, socialites, altruists,  
repayers, and dynasts. Communitarians give out of a 
sense of belonging to a community, using their gifts to 
reinforce collective efforts to help one another and the 
community as a whole. Devout donors are motivated 
by faith, adherence to religious teachings, and loyalty to 
religious institutions. Investors are pragmatists who view 
money as a means to create social change. Socialites 
participate in philanthropy as a social activity. Altruists 
see philanthropy as a way to fulfill their life purpose. 
Repayers, in contrast, give out of a sense of gratitude— 
to a school, a community, or even the nation. Finally, 
dynasts are born into families with deeply embedded 
traditions of philanthropy. 
Although these labels help us to think about types 
of motivation, in reality most generous people combine 
different aspects of all these traits, which is why, in the 
end, generosity remains one of the most enigmatic and 
marvelous of human behaviors.
What motivates donors to give?
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John D. Rockefeller Sr. With the funding he gave  
to found the University of Chicago, Rockefeller 
began a new era of major philanthropic gifts. This 
portrait by Eastman Johnson was commissioned 
for the university and presented in 1894.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
A head of the Aval anche
Frederick Gates was not afraid to speak his mind, even to one of the richest men in the world. As John D. Rockefeller’s chief advisor on philanthropy, Gates was blunt: “Your fortune is rolling up, rolling up like an avalanche,” he warned at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. “You must keep up with it! You must distribute it faster than it grows! If 
you do not, it will crush you, and your children, and your children’s children!” 
Gates knew what he was talking about. At the office, in church, on the 
road, and even at his dinner table, Rockefeller was besieged with requests for 
charity. Letters arrived by the hundreds in Rockefeller’s offices at 26 Broadway 
in Manhattan. “The good people who wanted me to help them with their good 
work seemed to come in crowds,” Rockefeller later remarked. According to 
Gates, “Mr. Rockefeller was constantly hunted, stalked and hounded almost 
like a wild animal.” 
Gates also reminded Rockefeller of his moral duty. Both men had been 
raised in devout Christian households. Gates was trained as a minister, and 
Rockefeller had tithed since he earned his first paycheck. Beyond a “decent 
provision” for his family and heirs, Gates suggested, Rockefeller’s great fortune 
should be dedicated to “the service of mankind.” Any other alternative would 
be “morally indefensible.” According to Gates, “In the eyes of God and man” 
this wealth had to be “devoted to the promotion of human well-being.” But 
how? Never before had a donor practiced philanthropy on this scale.
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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and his partners began a relentless series of acquisitions. In 1882, they 
consolidated these various companies to form the Standard Oil Trust, with 
Rockefeller as the major shareholder.
Disciplined, tough, and even ruthless, Rockefeller “colluded with railroads 
to gain preferential freight rates, secretly owned rivals, bribed state legisla-
tors, and engaged in industrial espionage,” according to the biographer Ron 
Chernow. All the time, Rockefeller was a regular and devout member of a 
Baptist congregation. 
Rockefeller’s perspective on capitalism and industrialism in the late nine-
teenth century influenced his thinking on philanthropy. From his Puritan 
roots, he reacted strongly against the destructive qualities of unbridled com-
petition. He often justified the creation of Standard Oil’s monopoly as a way 
to rationalize the market for oil and, in the process, benefit society as well as 
the company’s investors. A wasteful system of competition offended his desire 
for efficiency. After the public reacted violently against his efforts to restrain 
competition, he asserted: “It was right. I knew it as a matter of conscience. It 
was right between me and my God.”
The success of Standard Oil made Rockefeller 
rich beyond imagination. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, his net worth was $200 
million. Only Andrew Carnegie was richer. To the 
frustration of his antagonists, when the government 
broke up Standard Oil in 1911, the subsequent rise 
Founded in 1870, Standard Oil became the 
largest oil refiner in the world and provided  
the basis for John D. Rockefeller’s vast 
fortune. For decades, shares of Standard 
Oil accounted for a significant share of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s endowment.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Portr ait of the Founder
John D. Rockefeller was perhaps the most reviled as well as the most generous man in America when Gates wrote to him in 1905. As a founder of Standard Oil, the largest and most valuable company in the world, he 
 epitomized the colossal wealth of the Gilded Age. Newspapers and  
magazines across the United States painted a caricature of his personality—
tight-fisted, ruthless, and avaricious. Congressmen questioned his motives 
and worried about his long-term plans. Meanwhile, he gave millions of dollars 
to found and develop the University of Chicago, support Baptist missionary 
activities at home and abroad, finance medical research, expand educational 
opportunities for poor children in the American South, and further the efforts 
of a host of other charitable initiatives. His closest confidantes sought to form 
an institution that would allow him to do even more.
The son of a patent-medicine salesman and entrepreneur and a deeply 
devout, strong-willed mother, Rockefeller was born in 1839 in the town of 
Richford in the Finger Lakes region of New York. He grew up in a household 
that reflected the nation’s Puritan origins and its westward migration, as the 
family drifted eventually to Strongsville, a suburb of Cleveland. According to 
his biographer Allan Nevins, Rockefeller inherited from his mother his “self-
discipline, reticence, patience, inner equanimity and a somewhat unloving 
austerity.” From his father he inherited a sense of “enterprise, adventurous-
ness, energy and tenacity.”
Launching his career at the age of sixteen, Rockefeller spent weeks search-
ing for a job in the sweltering summer of 1855 in Cleveland. When he landed 
a position as a bookkeeper with a commission merchant and shipping firm, 
he was overjoyed. He worked at this job for more than two and a half years. 
Then, at the age of nineteen, he found a partner and launched his own busi-
ness buying and selling produce.
 After Pennsylvania entrepreneurs conceived a way to pump oil from the 
ground, a local chemist approached Rockefeller and his partner to invest in 
a new system for refining kerosene. Although he and his partner continued 
to operate their commission business, Rockefeller was increasingly drawn 
into the developing oil industry after 1863. As the industry grew through 
rapid cycles of boom and bust and oversupply, Rockefeller looked for a way to 
rationalize and stabilize the industry. In 1870, he founded Standard Oil. 
Often described as the first major multinational corporation, Standard Oil 
grew to dominate the refining industry. Initially, the company relied on its 
superior refining technology to speed up production and lower unit costs. As 
prices fell due to increasing production throughout the industry, Rockefeller 
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in the value of the stocks of the companies created by the breakup made him 
even richer. His wealth peaked in September 1916, when he became the first 
person in history to amass a fortune worth $1 billion. At one point, his wealth 
was estimated to be equal to 1.53 percent of the United States economy. In 
2012, a fortune equal to this percentage share of U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
would be worth nearly $231 billion. To the great masses of Americans, most 
of whom struggled to make a living from meager farms or low factory wages, 
Rockefeller’s wealth was something mythical. 
Rockefeller Phil anthropy
Years later, critics would charge that Rockefeller’s philanthropy represented a cynical effort to buy public goodwill. The evidence sug-gests otherwise. His giving was rooted deep within his character and 
faith. From his first paychecks as a clerk in Cleveland earning $3.50 a week, 
Rockefeller gave to his church and church-related charities including foreign 
missions and the poor. “From the beginning, I was trained to work, to save and 
to give,” he said. By 1860, the recipients of his donations included a Methodist 
church, a German Sunday school, an African American church, and “Catholic 
orphans.” In a small notebook known as “Ledger A,” Rockefeller even recorded 
an early gift to an African American man to help him “to buy his wife.”  
His giving “freely crossed lines of creed, nationality and color,” writes  
Allan Nevins. 
Rockefeller’s interest in the welfare of African Americans at an early stage 
in his philanthropy was no doubt strengthened by his marriage to Laura 
Celestia Spelman in 1864. “Cettie,” as her friends called her, had grown up in a 
deeply religious Congregationalist household in Cleveland, where her parents 
were active abolitionists and supporters of the Underground Railroad. She was 
an early supporter of the temperance movement as well. 
As his fortune grew in the 1870s and 1880s, Rockefeller’s charity and phi-
lanthropy increased. By 1882, his annual giving had risen to $65,000. In May 
1889, he made a single gift of $600,000 (worth more 
than $14.5 million in 2011) to establish the University 
of Chicago. His reputation for giving combined with 
growing public awareness of his fortune increased the 
number of appeals to his generosity. 
Rockefeller did not take these appeals lightly. 
Indeed, he said that the effort of investigating the 
capacity and quality of the organizations nearly 
overwhelmed him. “I investigated as I could,” he said, 
Depicted as “the king of the combinations” 
by Puck magazine in 1901, Rockefeller 
was widely criticized for Standard Oil’s 
monopolistic control of the petroleum 
industry. Ironically, the court-ordered 
breakup of the company in 1911  
increased the value of Rockefeller’s  
shares tremendously. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
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Andrew Carnegie sold his steel company 
in 1900 for $480 million. His influential 
essay written in 1889 and known as “The 
Gospel of Wealth” was praised by John D. 
Rockefeller. The essay emphasized the duty 
of the successful entrepreneur to lead by 
philanthropic giving. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
organizations, and communities. But by 1905, when Frederick Gates sent his 
warning, principles alone were not enough to keep up with what Rockefeller 
called “this business of benevolence.”
Scientific Phil anthropy
Rockefeller was not alone in either his generosity or his effort to formu-late principles for his philanthropy. A month after Rockefeller made his first major contribution to the University of Chicago, his fellow 
industrialist Andrew Carnegie published an article titled “Wealth” in the North 
American Review. Already worth more than $30 million in 1889, Carnegie had 
concluded that it was a disgrace to die rich. After achieving a certain level of 
income (in 1868, he figured $50,000 per year—about $833,000 in 2011 dollars), 
a man should give the rest to charity. The pursuit of wealth for personal 
benefit beyond this point would make money an 
idol that would debase him and others. With the 
great success of capitalism, and particularly mass 
production, Carnegie asserted, “The problem of our 
age is the proper administration of wealth, that the 
ties of brotherhood may still bind together the rich 
and poor in harmonious relationship.” 
In “Wealth,” Carnegie asserted that there were 
three options for great fortunes: (1) bequeath 
everything to the rich man’s heirs, (2) leave the 
great fortune to charity, or (3) actively spend the 
surplus on projects that would benefit the public. 
Carnegie dismissed the first option, suggesting that 
it represented “misguided affection … for it is no 
longer questionable that great sums bequeathed 
often work more for the injury than for the good of 
the recipients.” He also wrote that it was a mistake 
to leave great fortunes to charity to be administered 
by others. There was “no grace” in these gifts. 
In fact, they reflected an abdication of moral 
responsibility. The genius of the man who built 
the fortune should likewise see to the expenditure 
of that fortune for benevolent purposes. For this 
reason, Carnegie cheered the growing prevalence 
of estate taxes. “Of all forms of taxation this seems 
the wisest,” he wrote. “By taxing estates heavily at 
“and worked myself almost to a nervous breakdown in 
groping my way, without sufficient guide or chart, through 
this ever-widening field of philanthropic endeavor.” As one 
of his associates described the situation, the tasks of deciding 
wisely on an ever-increasing number of applications and, 
even more important, of providing the constructive imagina-
tion necessary for intelligent philanthropy became more and 
more onerous. 
Ever the system builder, Rockefeller developed a set of principles to guide 
him in his philanthropy. Gifts should be made to organizations with a track 
record. Grantees had to have a plan to use the money economically and 
efficiently. The gifts should support good work by organizations that were 
clearly vital; Rockefeller did not want to contribute to dying causes. The work 
should never be dependent solely on Rockefeller’s contributions; his gifts 
should always complement and stimulate contributions from others. Most 
important, his gift should support a path to self-reliance—for individuals, 
Influenced by his Baptist faith, 
Rockefeller began contributing to 
charity at an early age. In small ledger 
books, including “Ledger A,” he kept 
track of his expenses and charitable 
gifts. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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John D. Rockefeller Sr. and Jr. in 
New York. A fierce advocate for his 
father’s legacy, Junior dedicated 
his career to effective philanthropy.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
John D. Rockefeller Jr .
A s the primary heir to his father’s vast fortune and the devoted keeper of his father’s legacy, “Mr. Junior,” as he was called by his staff, often stood in for his father to articulate the vision of the founder 
and donor. Coming of age as his father’s fortune reached its apex and public 
criticism became most shrill, John D. Rockefeller Jr., would spend most of his 
life striving to repair his family’s public image and spend his father’s fortune 
according to the dictates of his own conscience. Although his financial contri-
butions to the Rockefeller Foundation were not substantial, he played  
a leading role in convincing his father to create and endow the institution  
and then, for nearly a half century, took an active role in shaping its program  
and administration.
Junior, born on January 29, 1874, shared many of his 
father’s traits but also was profoundly influenced by his 
mother’s homeschooling. As the only son among four chil-
dren who survived infancy, Junior learned from his mother 
the spirit and precepts of the New Testament. The family 
prayed, read the Bible, and recited verses 
on a daily basis. Every Friday night they 
attended prayer meeting. They respected 
Sunday as a day of rest and devotion. 
The household was not without joy and 
laughter. Junior would remember swim-
ming, skating, riding, and playing blind 
man’s bluff with his father. Yet overall, the 
children’s upbringing reflected the Puritan 
and Baptist traditions of New England that 
aimed to curb the will of the child, instill 
awe and reverence for parents and elders, 
and cultivate an ethic of service. 
Junior was modest, if not humble, in 
his dealings with others. He spoke in a low, 
easy manner and never raised his voice. 
His diction was careful, and he rarely used 
slang. He did not smoke or chew tobacco, 
drink alcohol, or play cards. Unlike his 
father, he loved to dance. From his father 
he learned to account for every dime, keep-
ing elaborate records of his expenditures 
death the State marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s unworthy 
life.” Indeed, he believed that large inheritance taxes would remind the 
rich man “to attend to the administration of wealth during his life.” But 
inheritance taxes, in Carnegie’s view, were only the second-best option. It 
was far better for the rich man “to consider all surplus revenues which come 
to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to administer, and 
strictly bound as a matter of duty to administer in the manner in which, in 
his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for 
the community.” Carnegie’s advice was anchored in his sympathy for the 
ideas of social Darwinism articulated by his friend Herbert Spencer. Having 
triumphed in capitalist competition, the industrialist represented the leading 
edge of civilization, and it was appropriate that he should control and direct 
the reinvestment of this surplus for the public good.
Years after reading Carnegie’s essay, John D. Rockefeller offered his support 
for Carnegie’s position in a letter: “I would that more men of wealth were 
doing as you are doing with your money, but be assured, your example will 
bear fruits, and the time will come when men of wealth will more generally 
be willing to use it for the good of others.” 
Over the next quarter century, Carnegie and Rockefeller would endow 
foundations that would take lessons learned from a variety of charitable 
initiatives in the post–Civil War era and consolidate them into modern 
philanthropic practice. As donors, they were remarkably different. Carnegie 
played a strong personal role in the early years of the organizations he 
founded, receiving criticism in some quarters that his philanthropy played 
too much to his ego. Rockefeller, on the other 
hand, genuinely empowered others to direct 
his philanthropy. At times, he seemed distant, 
even indifferent, to the effect of his giving. But 
his demeanor did not reflect his feelings. On one 
occasion, he suggested that philanthropy pro-
vided the greatest and most enduring personal 
satisfaction that money could buy.
But giving away money also became an 
overwhelming chore. Increasingly, Rockefeller 
searched for ways to systematize and institution-
alize the process. Frederick Gates became  
his chief advisor, but Rockefeller also gave  
more and more responsibility for this process  
to his only son.
1903
General Education Board established 
to promote education within the 
United States and especially in the 
American South "without distinction 
of race, sex, or creed."  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Rockefeller regularly attended the Euclid 
Avenue Baptist Church (later renamed 
the Second Baptist Church) in Cleveland. 
Rockefeller’s faith played a major role in his 
philanthropy. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
religious indoctrination of his youth and the example set by his father, but 
also in his educational experience at Brown University, which almost seems to 
have been designed to give young men of wealth a social conscience.” 
Near the end of World War I, Senior began a process of transferring 
much of his wealth to his son. Within a few years, he had gifted nearly a half 
billion dollars. With these resources, Junior began a philanthropic career of 
his own that included the creation of national parks and the preservation of 
environmental resources; the promotion of historic restoration at Colonial 
Williamsburg and elsewhere; and support for medical research, public health 
and social hygiene, low-income housing and urban renewal, ecumenical re-
ligion, the arts and the humanities, civil rights, and education at all levels. At 
almost every turn, his philanthropy was motivated by a belief that a reasoned, 
scientific approach to problem solving could make the world a better place. 
Yet it was also deeply anchored in his religious faith.
The Role of Faith in Rockefeller Phil anthropy
S enior and Junior were both moved to philanthropy by religious views derived from the Puritan traditions of New England. In the Puritan view, the faithful were bound to one another by God’s love. Charity was 
a manifestation of that love. The Puritans of New England held tightly to the 
idea that their lives and their communities should be models for others. In his 
shipboard sermon to the Puritans bound for the New World in 1630, titled “A 
Model of Christian Charity,” John Winthrop famously imagined the Puritan 
settlement in Massachusetts as “a city upon a hill” with “the eyes of all people 
upon us.” In this sermon, Winthrop also articulated ideas about wealth and 
class that would be reflected in John D. Rockefeller’s worldview: “In all times 
some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in power and dignity; 
others mean and in submission.” High status or wealth, however, did not 
accrue to the individual, but to “the glory of his Creator and the common good 
of the creature, man.” Thus the wealthy and the powerful were seen by the 
community and should be seen by themselves as God’s stewards. 
In the course of his life, Rockefeller frequently referred to his great wealth 
as something given and entrusted to him by God. Similarly, John Winthrop 
reminded his shipboard congregation in 1630 that every man had a duty to 
help others in want or distress, but that each man should provide this assis-
tance “out of the same affection which makes him careful of his own goods.” 
In other words, charity should not be given without bounds or conditions, 
but with the same kind of prudence that people should bring to all of their 
worldly activities. This attitude was at the heart of Rockefeller’s approach to 
from the time he was a 
boy. As an adult, these 
practices reflected his 
sense that he was a 
steward of his father’s 
fortune. 
In college at Brown 
University, Junior was 
transformed socially 
and intellectually. He 
overcame his shyness 
and enjoyed dancing, 
parties, the theater, 
and dating. He learned 
to be comfortable 
speaking before an 
audience, and was even elected junior class presi-
dent. Intellectually, he was profoundly influenced 
by classes in political economy. He even took a 
course devoted to the study of Karl Marx’s Capital. 
Meanwhile, Brown University’s president, Elisha 
Benjamin Andrews, cultivated a sense of civic duty among the students and 
fostered a modern, sociological understanding of politics and economics. A 
risk taker and an idealist, Andrews inspired Junior with his passion and cour-
age. Although Junior remained true to his Christian beliefs, and his strong 
support for the temperance movement reflected his Baptist origins, he gradu-
ated from Brown in 1897 more socially at ease, with his mind open to big ideas 
and his heart committed to social change. All of these characteristics would 
contribute to his remarkable success as a philanthropist, but they did not help 
him adjust to the world of commerce.
Soon after his graduation, Junior went to work in his father’s office. Over 
the next decade, he helped manage his father’s investments and joined the 
boards of a number of companies. But he soon realized that he did not like the 
competitive world of business and, unlike his father, he had no burning desire 
to make money. For Junior, according to Raymond Fosdick, “The only question 
with wealth is what you do with it. It can be used for evil purposes or it can be 
an instrumentality for constructive social living.” 
As a philanthropist, Junior built upon his father’s principles with extraor-
dinary commitment and creativity. As writers John Enson Haar and Peter 
J. Johnson point out: “He was conditioned for this not only in the constant 
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philanthropy. As writer Albert Schenkel observes, “The Rockefellers believed 
that the same moral principles that created wealth were also essential to 
managing it.” 
But the exercise of prudence and judgment was not an excuse to limit 
philanthropy. As Winthrop said, “There is a time when a Christian must sell 
all and give to the poor.” 
Junior was profoundly influenced by his parents’ faith as well as the crisis 
of Protestantism in the late nineteenth century that was prompted by the 
second scientific and industrial revolution. In the context of the challenge 
raised by Darwin and others, believers sought to reconcile the Bible with the 
understandings of science. A liberal or “natural” theology saw the Bible in-
creasingly as metaphor and rejected denominationalism because it separated 
Christians from one another on interpretive issues. Rather than focusing on 
the divine, liberal theology focused on the humanity of Christ and his good 
works in the world. Science in this new theology was not opposed to God or 
religion. It was a path to discovery of the miracles of God’s creation. This was 
the same impulse that led English Puritans to study nature and that gave the 
birth to modern science. 
Like their Puritan forefathers, Senior 
and Junior worked assiduously to turn their 
high ideals into ordinary realities. Both men 
subscribed to the Puritan notion of two callings: 
one to a godly life and the other to a specific 
vocation. For Junior, especially, that vocation 
was philanthropy. 
The institution that his father endowed 
and that Junior worked so hard to shape would 
struggle in its first sixty years to define its role 
in society independent of the influence of 
the founder and his family. Historians would 
later conclude that the tension between the 
role of the donor and the independence of the 
Foundation was, in this case, inherently creative 
and helped foster the Foundation’s innovative 
approach to philanthropy. But in 1910, when  
the founder announced his intention to create 
the Rockefeller Foundation, Congress and  
the American people greeted this news with 
suspicion and hostility. 
1909
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission is 
created to fight hookworm disease  
in the American South.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
A  Continu ing  Connect ion
When David Rockefeller Jr. became chair 
of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 2010, he succeeded his uncle, 
grandfather, and great-grandfather in 
the role and provided new life to the vital 
connection between family and philanthropy 
that has been an important part of the 
Foundation’s history. Like his forebearers, 
Rockefeller often speaks modestly about his 
family’s role in the Foundation’s work, giving 
major credit to the collaboration between 
staff, grantees, and partners over a hundred 
years. Historians of philanthropy, however, 
note that the family’s continuing involve-
ment over decades has played a significant 
part in the Foundation’s long-run pattern of 
innovation and success.
David Rockefeller Jr. says that his great-
grandfather’s gifts to the Foundation drive 
his own philanthropy. He hopes they inspire 
new generations of philanthropists as well. 
Similarly, his grandfather, John D. Rock-
efeller Jr., who served as chairman for more 
than three decades, provides a model for his 
own leadership on the board. According to 
Rockefeller, poverty, disease, the explosion 
of cities, and environmental degradation 
pose major issues for the world. His 
forebearers trusted future generations “to 
see and address the persistent and fresh 
challenges we face.” For Rockefeller, that 
trust and generosity inspires his own sense 
of duty and faith in the future.
50
foundation
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
51 Beyond Charity 52
G iving away money is not easy. Wealthy donors often create foundations to manage a process that has become personally overwhelming. They 
want a buffer between themselves and those seeking 
assistance. They want someone to perform due diligence 
and assess the effectiveness of their philanthropy. 
Since the early twentieth century, donors in the 
United States alone have created more than 120,810 
foundations, with assets of $582.5 billion in 2010. Most 
of these foundations were established by individuals or 
families, but some have been founded by companies or 
corporations. Most are primarily grantmaking institutions, 
although some operate their own charitable programs. 
Private foundations vary in character and form with 
the culture, economy, and politics of each nation. In China, 
for example, although private philanthropy is deeply 
rooted in Chinese culture, foundations have only recently 
emerged to become a primary source of charity. In India, 
where the number of millionaires has increased by an av-
erage of 11 percent per year since 2000, charitable giving 
has risen to .6 percent of gross domestic product (com-
pared to 1.3 percent in the U.K. or .3 percent in Brazil). 
Meanwhile, in Brazil, the number of private foundations 
How do institutions 
shape philanthropy?
increased 300 percent over two decades. In 2008, these 
Brazilian foundations gave away more than $5.5 billion. 
New donors around the world are reshaping the way that 
governments and nations solve problems.
The legal innovations that gave rise to broadly 
purposed, endowed philanthropies in the early twentieth 
century also continue to evolve. Many of the issues that 
philanthropists face are akin to those that confronted 
John D. Rockefeller and his advisors: How much influence 
will government have over the foundation? Will the assets 
be taxed? How will the institution be accountable to the 
public? Will the foundation be authorized to continue its 
work in perpetuity? What will happen to the assets if the 
foundation is dissolved?
Donors today have more options, a reflection of 
the continuing process of institutional innovation. With 
donor-advised funds at a community foundation or public 
charity, for example, philanthropists effectively pool 
their resources to hire staff to perform due diligence and 
administration. They can enjoy the benefits of a named 
fund that provides the same level of recognition that 
would come from the establishment of a private founda-
tion. By collaborating, donors lower the overall costs of 
administration. Meanwhile, a new generation of donors is 
redefining the boundaries of philanthropy. Employing the 
tools of “philanthrocapitalism,” they are looking for in-
vestment opportunities that leverage market mechanisms 
to create a product or service that improves the quality of 
life in a given community. 
How do institutions shape philanthropy?
53
Some call this “venture philanthropy.” Like Rockefeller 
and Carnegie, these new philanthropists hope the tools 
and strategies that fueled their success in the market-
place will also change the paradigm in civil society. By 
investing in good ideas, they hope to strengthen manage-
ment and operational skills to make charitable initiatives 
more effective and efficient. Meanwhile, they search for 
innovations —new inventions, new ways of working and 
new ways of delivering social services—that will unleash 
productivity in the philanthropic sector and enhance the 
well-being of communities and nations.
Though the tactics may be different, today’s donors 
share a common purpose with the earliest leaders of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and other modern philanthropies 
—to address the root causes of social problems and  
make lasting changes for the well-being of humankind. 
They also face a common challenge—to find or create  
the right institution that will help them achieve their 
philanthropic goals.
How do institutions shape philanthropy?
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become a pastor at the Fifth Avenue Baptist Church. 
Married and widowed within sixteen months, 
after his new bride succumbed to an undiagnosed 
illness, Gates remarried two years later. Through 
his involvement in mission activity of the state’s 
Baptist organization, Gates met George Pillsbury, 
the flour magnate, and got his first taste of advising 
the wealthy on their philanthropy when Pillsbury 
came to him regarding a bequest he intended to make to support a Baptist 
academy in Minnesota. In 1888, Gates was picked to lead the American  
Baptist Education Society, with a primary goal of developing a great  
university in Chicago. 
Let ting the Wild Beasts Fight
Frederick Gates was ready for a fight. For years John D. Rockefeller had taken a beating in the press and the court of public opinion. The serialized chapters of Ida Tarbell’s 1904 book The History of the Standard Oil Company had portrayed Rockefeller as a cold-hearted 
monopolist. State attorneys general, officials with the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and politicians accused the founder and the company of illegal efforts 
to restrain trade. When Congregationalists received a $100,000 gift from 
Rockefeller, there was an uproar over accepting his “tainted money.” In the 
middle of these attacks, Rockefeller received little credit for his philanthropy, 
and Gates was fiercely loyal to his boss.
Outwardly, Gates was distinctly unlike Rockefeller. In demeanor, he was 
outspoken and dramatic where Rockefeller was taciturn and demure. “He 
combined bold imagination and large horizons with shrewd business capac-
ity and driving energy,” wrote Raymond Fosdick, who would later become 
president of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Born in 1853, Gates was the son of a New York Baptist preacher. At age 
fifteen, he had become a schoolteacher to help his family pay its bills. Gates 
confessed to being repulsed by the repressive Puritan faith of his parents when 
he was a boy. Yet for Gates, like Rockefeller, this Puritan heritage would have 
a profound influence on his view of the world. Graduating from the Rochester 
Theological Seminary, a Baptist institution, Gates moved to Minneapolis to 
Ida Tarbell’s book The History of the Standard 
Oil Company (1904) revealed tactics used 
by the company to dominate the petroleum 
market. Rockefeller rejected Tarbell’s 
characterization of Standard’s history, but 
subsequently resolved to communicate more 
directly with the public. (Harris & Ewing, Library 
of Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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Gates was astonished to discover how many individuals wrote to 
Rockefeller seeking money for themselves. “These appeals came in multitudes 
from every part of the United States and, after Mr. Rockefeller became widely 
known, from nearly all foreign lands and the islands of the sea.” They came “in 
a flood” each time the newspapers reported on a Rockefeller donation or gift. 
At one time, Gates counted 50,000 such requests within the space of a month. 
“Few were answered, but every one was opened for a glance as to its character. 
Our office force was swamped with them.” 
Rockefeller increasingly recognized that 
even with Gates he could not keep pace with 
the need to give money away. As Rockefeller 
biographer Ron Chernow points out, he was 
often vilified in public for hoarding his money. 
Newspapers noted that his giving did not keep 
pace with that of Andrew Carnegie. 
Nevertheless, Rockefeller was focused on 
the problem. In 1899, speaking on the ten-year 
anniversary of the founding of the University 
of Chicago, he called on men of great wealth: 
“Let us erect a foundation, a trust, and engage directors who will make it a life 
work to manage, with our personal cooperation, the business of benevolence 
properly and effectively.”
Until the late 1890s, and during the early years of his association with 
Gates, most of Rockefeller’s giving was devoted to religious missions and 
traditional charity. The University of Chicago benefited substantially from 
Rockefeller’s philanthropy in these years. In the summer of 1897, however, 
while on vacation with his family at Lake Liberty in the Catskills, Gates 
immersed himself in an unlikely book for beach reading—William Osler’s 
Principles and Practice of Medicine, a 1,000-page textbook used by the College 
of Physicians and Surgeons in New York. By this time in his life, Gates was as 
skeptical of physicians’ curative abilities as he was of the miracles described 
in the Bible. Osler confirmed Gates’ skepticism by asserting that of all the 
diseases known to man, medicine at best knew how to cure only four or five. 
Although Pasteur had developed his germ theory, Osler pointed out that only 
a few germs had actually been isolated and identified. Using Osler’s work, 
Gates made a list “of the germs that we might reasonably hope to discover.” 
Reading Osler also prompted the realization that the commercialization of 
medical education had divorced it from the academic process of scientific 
research. “It became clear to me that medicine could hardly hope to become a 
science until medicine was endowed, and qualified men were enabled to give 
Leaders of the society hoped that John D. Rockefeller, who had already 
given hundreds of thousands of dollars to Baptist initiatives, would make a 
lead gift to launch the project. Rockefeller was ambivalent about the project, 
which he perceived as initially grandiose. When Gates wrote to him seeking 
support for a more modest beginning, Rockefeller invited him to lunch. 
Clearly impressed with Gates, Rockefeller suggested that they travel together 
the next day on the train to Cleveland (with Gates heading on to Minnesota). 
In March 1891 Rockefeller confessed to Gates that the appeals to his phi-
lanthropy and charity had become overwhelming. He was incapable of giving 
without the due diligence to reassure himself that the money would be well 
spent, but he didn’t have the time or energy to investigate the organizations 
to which he was inclined to give—to say nothing of the hundreds of appeals 
to which he was not interested in contributing. He needed to either shift the 
burden of giving to someone else or “cease giving entirely.” Rockefeller asked 
Gates if he would be willing to move to New 
York to help. 
“I did my best to soothe ruffled feelings, to 
listen fully to every plea, and to weigh fairly 
the merits of every cause,” Gates wrote in later 
years, but as he began to direct the enormous 
flow of Rockefeller’s benevolence, he confirmed 
Rockefeller’s frustrations at not being able to 
exercise sufficient due diligence with all of his 
beneficiaries. Gates discovered “not a few of Mr. 
Rockefeller’s habitual charities to be worthless 
and practically fraudulent.” 
Working with Gates, Rockefeller transi-
tioned to a practice of “wholesale” philanthropy. 
For example, rather than give directly to local 
appeals from Baptist congregations or pastors, 
he increased his giving to state and national 
organizations and let them do the due diligence 
on local projects. Internationally, Rockefeller 
had been giving to a host of foreign mission-
ary projects, each one seeking his assistance 
individually. Working with Gates, Rockefeller 
“cut off every one of these private missionary 
appeals” and referred them back to the Baptist 
Foreign Mission Society, which Rockefeller 
strengthened with larger contributions.
1918
With tuberculosis raging in  
post-World War I France, the 
Rockefeller Foundation sponsors  
a prevention campaign.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
“Those appeals came in 
multitudes from every 
part of the United States 
and … from nearly all 
foreign lands and the 
islands of the sea.”  
Frederick T. Gates, 1927
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Hopkins, the first president of the Institute, and Dr. Simon Flexner, a professor 
of pathology at the University of Pennsylvania, the first director.
The creation of the Rockefeller Institute marked the beginning of a new 
pattern of Rockefeller philanthropy. In 1903, the General Education Board 
received a federal charter and was incorporated to enhance education in 
the South “without distinction of sex, race or creed.” With a series of gifts, 
Rockefeller endowed the GEB with $43 million by 1907. After the work of 
the GEB revealed that widespread infections with hookworm impaired the 
ability of many southern students to learn, and the parents to earn a living, 
Rockefeller endowed the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in 1909 to wage a 
public health campaign in the South to cure the infected and prevent further 
infections. To support this effort, Rockefeller pledged $1 million.
Despite these initiatives, Gates 
realized that Rockefeller’s philanthropy 
was not keeping pace with his income. 
Although all of these institutions 
worked to practice wholesale philan-
thropy, the scale needed to be greater 
still given the continued growth of 
Rockefeller’s fortune. In 1905, he had 
advocated a broader approach, a series 
of organizations that would go beyond 
science to address cultural issues 
including ethics and citizenship. Gates 
suggested that Rockefeller create a se-
ries of “great, corporate philanthropies” 
to deal with the promotion of scientific 
agriculture, the enrichment of rural life 
in the United States, the development 
of fine arts and refinement of taste, 
the promotion of Christian ethics and 
civilization around the world, and the 
development of intelligent citizenship 
and civic virtue in the United States. 
But Rockefeller had begun to think about creating a single 
foundation with a very broad mission.
Gates wanted a federal charter. Although Rockefeller’s 
attorney, Starr Murphy, had concluded there was very 
little consequential difference between a New York and a 
federal charter, Gates believed a federal charter was more 
themselves to uninterrupted study and inves-
tigation, on ample salary, entirely independent 
of practice.” Gates recognized that “here was 
an opportunity for Mr. Rockefeller to do an im-
mense service to his country and perhaps  
the world.” 
Upon returning to New York from his 
summer respite, Gates dictated a memo for 
Rockefeller making the case for an American 
institution devoted to research in medical 
science. In one sense Gates aligned himself and 
Rockefeller with a growing movement in the 
United States to give new emphasis to research 
as opposed to teaching or practice. At the same 
time, he was inherently a pragmatist, resisting 
what some were calling “pure science,” a move-
ment toward the pursuit of knowledge without 
the burden of practical application. Gates 
wanted research that would make a difference  
in the world.
Gates recruited attorney Starr J. Murphy to 
visit leading physicians and medical researchers 
to promote the idea, but found little support. 
Most preferred small subventions for their 
own work. Despite this lack of imagination in 
the field, Murphy and Gates pushed ahead. As 
Murphy wrote to John D. Rockefeller Jr., a sepa-
rate institute was needed to “take up the problems where 
the medical schools leave them, and treat them in their 
broadest aspect.” He envisioned a dynamic and cooperative 
relationship between research and teaching reflected in the 
institute’s relationship with medical education. “[H]ospitals 
and the medical schools, so far as they carry on research 
work, will lead up to and be feeders for the Institute, which will be the crown 
of the whole system.” 
In 1901, the Rockefeller Institute was launched in a loft building on 
Lexington Avenue in New York. Rockefeller promised $20,000 a year for ten 
years to pay for salaries, lab equipment, and rent. Several men who would play 
a leading role in the overall development of Rockefeller’s philanthropy be-
came leaders in the new institution, including Dr. William H. Welch of Johns 
Physician and scientist Simon Flexner 
served as the first director of the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical 
Research. As a trustee for the 
Rockefeller Foundation, he was a 
strong supporter of medical science. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Attorney Starr J. Murphy played a key 
role in helping to establish several 
Rockefeller philanthopies. Murphy 
joined Rockefeller’s staff in 1904 and 
drafted the charter for the Rockefeller 
Foundation. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
Chapter Two: Foundation 6362 Beyond Charity
The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission was created to 
cure and prevent the spread of hookworm disease in the 
American South. The Commission’s county dispensaries 
provided medicine and sought to educate the population 
about the disease. The organization was absorbed by  
the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Board  
in 1914. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
appropriate given Rockefeller’s desire to give to na-
tional and international projects. Gates recognized that 
some representatives in Congress would be hostile to 
anything that Rockefeller proposed, but he announced: 
“I would not hesitate to throw this charter right into 
the arena and let the wild beasts fight over it if  
they like.” 
Gates thought the issues were on Rockefeller’s 
side. “Will Mr. Rockefeller’s enemies make a bitter 
fight against his right to give away his own money 
as he deems fit? If they do, will they win or will Mr. 
Rockefeller win?” He thought that if Rockefeller’s 
enemies sought “to prevent his doing good to his 
fellow men,” it would backfire against them. “Mr. 
Rockefeller has given away vast sums of money; he 
is using the great fortune which he has acquired for 
the promotion of human welfare. That is a feature of 
his character and life which is never mentioned by 
his enemies.” He hoped the charter fight would get 
reporters to pay attention to Rockefeller’s generosity. 
“Even if the bill suffers defeat,” he wrote, “it cannot 
but raise up friends to Mr. Rockefeller.”
John D. Rockefeller Jr. thought the timing was 
right. By 1907, the impulse to create an institution 
with a very broad mission had begun to build 
momentum. A panic on Wall Street that year 
was reversed by the actions of several New York 
capitalists, including Rockefeller, earning them 
some measure of goodwill in Washington. The 
following year, a chance encounter between John D. 
Rockefeller and Senator “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman of 
South Carolina gave Rockefeller an opportunity to 
charm a potential critic in Congress. 
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be difficult to have it acted upon at an early date.” Weeks more passed. Since 
the bill proposed to create the Rockefeller Foundation as a corporate entity 
in Washington, D.C., Rockefeller’s advisors pressed New Hampshire Senator 
Jacob H. Gallinger, the Republican chairman of the District of Columbia 
Committee, to sponsor the legislation. After Junior wrote to Gallinger, Starr 
Murphy went to visit the senator in Washington. Gallinger promised that he 
would introduce the bill and call Murphy as a witness. He introduced the bill 
as S. 6888 on March 2, 1910. 
According to the Washington Post, there would be no limit to the “sphere 
of usefulness” of the new foundation. In the world of philanthropy, the 
Rockefeller Foundation would “become what the Standard Oil Company has 
long been among corporations,” and the Rockefellers planned to gradually 
merge all of their other philanthropic endeavors under 
the umbrella of the new foundation. The day after the 
bill was submitted, John D. Rockefeller Jr. announced 
that he had retired from the board of Standard Oil so 
that he could run the Foundation and take charge of his 
father’s philanthropy. 
On the strength of these events, Junior turned to 
his father-in-law. Junior had met the charming and 
self-confident Abby Aldrich when they were both 
students at Brown University. They were married 
in October, 1901. Abby was the daughter of Nelson 
Aldrich, the senior U.S. Senator from Rhode Island. 
Described by McClure’s Magazine as “the political 
boss of the United States, the power behind the 
throne, the general manager of the U.S,” Aldrich 
knew how to move legislation through Congress. 
Junior talked to his father-in-law about a bill to 
create a foundation to promote the development 
of Christian civilization. He suggested that he 
and Abby might travel to Washington to visit 
with members of Congress. Junior also talked to 
Albert Shaw, the editor of The Review of Reviews 
and a member of the GEB, who offered to talk to 
President Theodore Roosevelt about support for a 
Congressional charter. 
But the bill, crafted by Starr Murphy, was not 
submitted. A year later, in January 1908, Junior 
sent a draft to John Spooner, a former U.S. Senator 
from Wisconsin who had recently left politics to 
practice law in New York City. Junior wanted Spooner’s advice on “the wisdom 
of undertaking to secure a Federal charter.” Spooner advised Junior to avoid 
references to religion because they might spark “covert” opposition. He also  
suggested some other minor changes and offered to quietly test the waters. 
Junior continued to press his father-in-law, but no bill was introduced. 
Meanwhile, the campaign to pick Roosevelt’s successor heated up, and 
William Howard Taft was elected in November 1908.
With these discussions in the background and the election over, there was 
some optimism that eventually a bill would be introduced and passed. John 
D. Rockefeller signed a deed of trust to turn over 72,569 shares of Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, stocks worth more than $50 million, to a newly created entity 
to be known as the Rockefeller Foundation. He named three trustees: his son, 
his son-in-law Harold McCormick, and Frederick Gates. Before the end of 
the year, Junior and Gates were appointed as a committee of two “to prepare 
and present to the Congress of the United States a bill for the incorporation 
of The Rockefeller Foundation.” With a draft of the Act already written, 
Junior sent it to Aldrich with the understanding “that you think it will not 
A powerful U.S. Senator from Rhode Island, 
Nelson W. Aldrich was also John D. Rockefeller 
Jr.’s father-in-law. Junior hoped that Aldrich 
would help steer the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
charter through Congress. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
Charles W. Eliot served as president 
of Harvard University for nearly 40 
years, retiring in 1909. He was the 
first trustee to be added to  
the original board. (Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs.)
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in the future the system must be first.” Scientific man-
agement, in Taylor’s view, was not about “invention,” 
but innovation, developing new ways of organizing 
work or practice. To Taylor, and many of the business 
leaders of his generation, every human activity needed a 
“system,” including “our philanthropic institutions.” 
As Taylor suggested, the idea of systems and orga-
nization was applicable to more than engineering and 
manufacturing. In fact, with the dramatic growth in the 
scale of industrial production, the rise of great cities with increasingly com-
plex systems for transportation and sanitation, and the need for sophisticated 
approaches to management, the United States experienced what historian 
Louis Galambos has described as an organizational revolution that affected 
almost every walk of life, including philanthropy. Another historian, Robert 
Wiebe, called it a national “search for order.” In some sense, it also reflected the 
triumph of modern bureaucracy in the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
Gates and Rockefeller Jr. believed they were creating a new kind of philan-
thropic institution “that made earlier philanthropic ventures seem somewhat 
amateurish,” historian Robert Bremner writes. “Most earlier charitable trusts 
had been established for some narrowly defined purpose.” By contrast, the 
new Rockefeller Foundation took as its mission “the well-being of mankind,” 
and it proposed to carry out this mission through the disciplined process of 
research and study. Indeed, Frederick Gates emphasized this point to reporters 
after the Rockefeller Foundation bill was first submitted to Congress in 1910: 
“Every other eleemosynary institution has been organized for some specific 
object,” he said, “and thus limited its sphere of usefulness.” In the face of disas-
ter or some new social problem, these institutions didn’t have the authority in 
their charters to allow them to respond. With a broad charter, the Rockefeller 
Foundation would have much greater flexibility.
To the dismay of those who worked in the Rockefeller offices at 26 
Broadway, the proposal to create the Rockefeller Foundation did not meet 
with broad approval. Harvard President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, who would 
later serve on the board of the Foundation, expressed skepticism. “It is just as 
possible to throw money away in this manner as in any other,” he said, “and 
many undeserving charities may impose on Mr. Rockefeller’s agents.” He 
declared that he was not in favor of “applying the principles of incorporation 
to such an undertaking, for in my mind that is to commercialize the matter 
too much.” He also feared that the overwhelming scale of Rockefeller’s philan-
thropy might discourage others from giving, although he did suggest that the 
Rockefeller Foundation would ultimately “be a great benefit to all humanity.”
The Roots of Change
The foundation that the Rockefellers proposed to establish reflected a confluence of ideas that were dramatically changing western, and especially American, society at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. The rise of large industrial companies, especially Standard Oil, depended 
on the development of efficient systems of management that coordinated 
production and distribution across the globe. This new managerial capitalism 
was buoyed by a growing faith that breakthroughs in science and engineering 
would unleash a new era in history guided by reason and logic. 
Frederick Winslow Taylor became the leading voice behind this move-
ment towards the rationalization of human activity. Influenced by his train-
ing as an engineer to look for efficiencies in mechanical systems, the author 
of The Principles of Scientific Management abhorred the idea of waste. Indeed, in 
Taylor’s view, systems trumped leadership. “In the past the man has been first; 
Industrial assembly lines, like the one 
developed by the Ford Motor Company, 
reflected a widespread effort to organize 
work and society according to the 
principles of scientific management. 
Efficiency expert Frederick Winslow Taylor 
suggested that even philanthropy needed 
a “system” to be effective. (Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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The effort to rationalize and organize American society by engineers 
and social reformers was closely aligned with a movement known as 
Progressivism, which included a faith in the wisdom of experts and profes-
sionals. In many ways, the leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation embraced 
the ethos of the Progressive era, but they were also sensitive to the fact that 
Progressive journalists, dubbed “muckrakers,” were among the greatest critics 
of the founder and his commercial empire. Coming of age as the Progressive 
movement was in full force, John D. Rockefeller Jr. became an enthusiastic 
proponent and participant. Invited to serve as the foreman of a special grand 
jury investigating forced prostitution or “white slavery,” Junior threw himself 
into the work and emerged as a committed social reformer. 
In the context of all of these broad changes in society, leaders in the phil-
anthropic community hailed the development of “a more scientific spirit and 
method in philanthropy.” This movement was anchored in two parallel devel-
opments: the first a series of innovations in law that gave shape to the modern 
foundation; and the second, closely related, developments in administration 
and methods that addressed the operations of the new institutions.
Legally, the modern private foundation evolved from a series of key court 
decisions in the nineteenth century. In 1819, in a case involving Dartmouth 
College, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the contract clause in the 
Constitution protected chartered institutions from unreasonable interfer-
ence by the government. The Court also held that although Dartmouth 
College was established for the purposes of general charity, it was not a 
public corporation susceptible to the control of the state. The ruling helped 
to ensure the autonomy of charitable institutions. A second Supreme Court 
decision, regarding the estate of Stephen Girard, a Philadelphia merchant 
and banker who bequeathed his $7 million estate to the city of Philadelphia 
to establish a school for poor, white orphan boys, confirmed the right of 
donors to give to charitable corporations and of those corporations to carry 
out the donor’s wishes. These court decisions provided the foundation for the 
establishment of new institutions after the Civil War in the United States. 
An important precursor for the Rockefellers was the Peabody Education 
Fund, established by the wealthy Baltimore merchant George Peabody, who 
provided a $1 million gift to improve education in the South. 
In some sense, there was nothing new in these institutions. The leaders 
of the new era, according to historian Robert Bremner, “took the ‘do’s and 
don’ts’—especially the latter—handed down from generations of charity 
reformers, organized them into a comprehensive system of rules, and applied 
them more rigorously than ever before in American history.” In the late 
nineteenth century the science in this new philanthropy focused primarily 
Systemic Change in Health Care
Wickliffe Rose believed in systemic change. 
As the leader of a series of Rockefeller 
philanthropic initiatives in the 1910s and 
1920s, he promoted the development 
of public health systems and sought to 
strengthen medical education to provide the 
human capital needed to make these public 
health systems successful. Rose’s influence is 
evident today in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
health care initiatives.
In the new millennium, the Rockefeller 
Foundation has focused on attacking the 
barriers that prevent millions of people from 
gaining access to basic and, in many cases, 
life-saving health care. The 2002 Joint 
Learning Initiative on Human Resources for 
Health helped draw attention to the shortage 
of health workers in developing countries. 
Subsequent efforts focused on promoting 
innovation in private sector health, support-
ing eHealth initiatives and capacity building  
in health care.  
In 2009, the Foundation launched its 
Transforming Health Systems initiative to 
help governments and communities focus 
on strengthening health care systems to 
achieve universal coverage. Grants supported 
improved planning, financing, and delivery to 
integrate new information systems and spark 
private-sector efforts to improve health care. 
Echoing Wickliffe Rose, in 2009 President 
Judith Rodin suggested that the $100 million 
initiative would “support a new generation 
of innovations on a new frontier” to promote 
systemic change in health care.
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on systematizing the institutions of charity. In many northeastern cities new 
organizations like the New York Charity Organization Society were founded to 
document and authenticate the conditions of the poor and to prevent the unde-
serving from taking advantage of the generosity of charity organizations. These 
new entities also focused on services—employment, childcare, education—that 
would help the poor escape from poverty. As they gathered a growing amount of 
information and data on the conditions of poverty, many philanthropic leaders 
increasingly realized that social systems affecting education, health, and employ-
ment contributed substantially to poverty. They began to search for programs 
that would address the root causes of society’s ills.
This effort to address the root causes of problems and to create large endow-
ments for general-purpose foundations with broad charters marked the primary 
innovation that inaugurated the age of modern philanthropy. The scale of the 
effort made some in Congress nervous. 
The Fight Begins
T he political environment for the Rockefeller Foundation charter in 1910 also turned out to be inauspicious. When a copy was given to President Taft, he consulted with the Attorney General, who objected 
to the idea that Congress would approve the charter while the government was 
seeking to break up Standard Oil for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 
Congressmen hostile to Standard Oil raised similar questions, especially when 
Standard Oil attorneys filed briefs with the U.S. Supreme Court only a week  
after the Rockefeller Foundation bill was intro-
duced in the Senate.
Many officials who were suspicious of the 
Rockefeller proposal focused on the aspects of the 
concept that were most innovative: the proposed 
broad charter “to promote the well-being of 
mankind throughout the world;” the idea that the 
foundation might continue in perpetuity with 
unimaginable resources; and, above all, the lack of 
public oversight. “Many newspapers saw the vague-
ness,” says biographer Ron Chernow, “as a gauzy 
curtain behind which the evil wizard of Standard 
Oil could work his mischief.” They accused 
Rockefeller of creating the foundation to buy back 
the public’s good will. 
There were other criticisms that left little middle ground. Proponents 
of business felt that if Rockefeller’s fortune were pulled out of the market, 
according to the New York Times, capital would be constrained for industrial 
investment, “thereby appreciably diminishing the prosperity and business 
progress of the country.” To dispel these concerns, Frederick Gates provided 
a report to the Secretary of the Interior detailing the investments of the 
General Education Board, to show that they were broadly distributed among 
a host of corporate stocks and bonds. But this evidence failed to enlist the 
government’s support. 
For three years the proposal languished in Congress. Finally, in January 
1913, Jerome Greene believed the Rockefellers were on the cusp of victory. 
By this time Congress had extracted numerous concessions from Rockefeller. 
He had agreed to limit the total assets of the corporation to $100 million and 
committed to spending the income rather than letting it accumulate with the 
corpus of the fund. The size of the board had been increased, and election of 
trustees would be subject to disapproval by a host of public representatives. 
After fifty years, the corporation would be allowed to distribute its principal 
as well as income. After a hundred years, Congress could force the Foundation 
to spend itself out of existence. Meanwhile, Congress would have the 
complete power to amend or repeal the Foundation’s charter. In the mind of 
Rockefeller’s advisor Jerome Greene, Rockefeller’s acceptance of these amend-
ments made it clear that the charter was sought “solely because the gift is to 
the people of the United States, and is to be controlled by them rather than 
in the interest, however beneficent, of any one section.” Greene also thought 
that, with these concessions, Congress would finally give its blessing to  
the endeavor.
On January 20, 1913, the House of Representatives approved the 
Rockefeller Foundation charter by a vote of 152 to 65 and sent it to the Senate. 
Anticipating success at last, Rockefeller gave $3.2 million in bonds to four 
trustees to be given to the Rockefeller Foundation immediately upon passage 
of the bill. On February 19, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported 
the measure to the full Senate. But there it died, as a small group of opponents 
prevented the Senate from passing the measure before Congress adjourned. 
Undeterred, Rockefeller and his advisors turned to the New York 
Legislature. Scrapping the concessions that Rockefeller had given Congress, 
Starr Murphy provided a much simpler charter. On April 24, 1913, the New 
York Legislature unanimously approved the bill. On May 14, with Governor 
William Sulzer’s signature, the Rockefeller Foundation was born and empow-
ered with a remarkably broad mission.
1924
Rockefeller Foundation launches 
its nursing education program as 
part of a larger effort to promote 
medical education and public health.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Unable to win Congressional 
approval for a federal charter, 
John D. Rockefeller turned to 
the New York Legislature to 
incorporate the Rockefeller 
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Organizations are formed for a purpose. Mission statements articulate that purpose. In the context of private foundations, they embody the donor’s 
intent. Shaped by the donor’s personality, philosophy, 
values, religious background, and experience, they serve 
as a guidepost for the board, the staff, and the public. The 
mission statement provides the standard by which the 
foundation and its programs will be measured and judged. 
A successful mission statement also inspires trustees, 
staff, and other stakeholders.
Before the founding of the Rockefeller and Carnegie 
foundations, narrow missions were embodied within 
the trusts and wills of donors who were often said to be 
exercising a “dead hand” from the grave. If the mission 
of the trust became out of date (teaching boys to make 
buggy whips, for example), it was very difficult to put 
these funds to work for a new purpose. Donors framed 
these narrow missions then, as they do today, to ensure 
that they will honor the donor’s intent over the life of  
the foundation.
Others believe that broad mission statements are 
better. They remove the “dead hand” of the donor and 
provide latitude for future generations to adapt to the 
changing needs of society. By adopting broad mission 
statements, the Rockefeller Foundation (“to promote 
What is 
the mission?
the well-being of mankind”), Carnegie Corporation 
(“promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge 
and understanding”), and Russell Sage Foundation (“the 
improvement of social and living conditions in the United 
States”) inaugurated a fundamental innovation in the 
practice of philanthropy in the early twentieth century. 
This freedom to change to address the needs of a 
new generation comes with its own challenges. For busy, 
results-oriented trustees, these broad missions can be 
frustrating in the apparent lack of direction they provide. 
Some observers suggest they lead to a lack of organiza-
tional focus. Each generation is forced to reinterpret the 
mission in light of the needs of its era. And each genera-
tion is challenged to set benchmarks or measures that 
will define progress in the context of such broad missions. 
None of this is easy work, but it is exactly what founders 
like Rockefeller intended. 
What is the mission?
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rationalizing forces of the era. To these men, as Ron Chernow has written, 
“Science seemed to beckon as a new secular religion.” Gates articulated this 
idea in 1911, on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Rockefeller 
Institute, when he suggested that the work of the researchers at the Institute 
would affect every man, woman, and child on the planet. “So your work in the 
scope of its values is as universal as the love of God.”
The confluence of all of these ideas led to the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
broad mission: “To promote the well-being of mankind throughout the 
world.” As many historians of philanthropy have noted, it represented a 
major break from the historic pattern of charitable giving. The breadth of this 
mission, combined with a very large endowment, marked the Rockefeller 
A Mor al Fr amework
In 1712, a young Irish Protestant took to the pulpit at Trinity College in Dublin to offer a sermon. Twenty-seven years old and already on his way to becoming one of Britain’s three great empirical philosophers (along with John Locke and David Hume), George Berkeley was trying 
to understand the essence of virtue, morality, and law. In his interpretation, 
they were all rooted in the will of the Divine. God, being of infinite goodness, 
could only seek “the general well-being of all men.” Thus, “the great end to 
which God requires the concurrence of human actions must …[be] to promote 
the well-being of the sum of mankind, taking in all nations and ages, from the 
beginning to the end of the world.” 
John D. Rockefeller was not a bookish man, so it is unlikely that he read 
Berkeley’s sermon. Frederick Gates may have read it while he was studying at 
the Rochester Theological Union. Regardless, neither man could have avoided 
Berkeley’s influence. As one of the great empiricists of the Enlightenment, 
Berkeley helped to frame the ways of thinking that would lead to the 
Scientific Revolution. He suggested that there was order in nature and that 
this order reflected God’s purpose. Our human instinct is to try to understand 
this order and by doing so draw closer to the mind of God. Ideas like these 
helped shape the mission of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Rooted in the Baptist traditions of Rockefeller and his family, the mission 
idealized the notion of service to humanity. It also reflected the fundamentally 
Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage was 
a pioneer of modern philanthropy. 
After her husband's death, she 
established the Russell Sage 
Foundation in 1907 "for the 
improvement of social and living 
conditions in the United States." 
(Library of Congress,  
Prints & Photographs.)
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has also been described as culturally imperialistic. “The 
foundation used the ideologies of American science and 
medicine as a template for its engagement with countries 
as different as the United Kingdom and Ceylon,” writes 
historian Mary Brown Bullock. Labeling this as cultural 
imperialism does not really do justice to either the work 
or the motivations of Rockefeller Foundation trustees and 
employees even in the earliest years, Bullock says. Instead, 
she suggests we have to understand that as the Rockefeller 
Foundation sought to act upon its mission, it was in turn 
profoundly shaped by the peoples and cultures it encountered. It also evolved 
in response to the ideas, knowledge and worldviews developed by grantees.
At times, the breadth of the Foundation’s mission statement has been 
criticized. It can seem to leave the staff and leadership in the middle of an 
ocean with no land horizon to aim for. It can undermine the popular notion 
in strategic philanthropy today that focus is the key to success. 
Occasionally, leaders at the Rockefeller Foundation have revisited the 
mission statement. In the late 1920s, Wickliffe Rose suggested that, in the 
end, all of the Rockefeller philanthropies were working toward the progress 
of civilization through the advancement of human knowledge. Anson Phelps 
Foundation, along with organizations established by Andrew Carnegie and 
Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage, as fundamentally new players in the field of 
philanthropy in the early twentieth century.
The broad purpose of the Foundation was designed to give future leaders 
flexibility and a chance to be opportunistic, and to address problems or 
solutions as they emerged. Though not specific in the language, it was clearly 
the intent of the founder and his advisors to turn away from the centuries-old 
idea of charity as a momentary relief for the symptoms of social problems. 
Instead, the Rockefeller Foundation would address the roots of social 
problems. “Instead of giving alms to beggars,” Rockefeller said, “if anything 
can be done to remove the causes which lead to the existence of beggars,  
then something deeper and broader and more worthwhile will have  
been accomplished.”
The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission 
was also novel because it was distinctly 
international. Intellectually, the Foundation’s 
leaders aspired to create a scientific community 
that transcended political borders and extended 
around the world. They subscribed to the 
idea that unrestricted scientific exchange 
was critical to the progress of science and 
human civilization, and they worked to create 
networks for transmitting these ideas. Indeed, 
according to historian Mary Brown Bullock, 
the Foundation became “the most important 
American organization to promote and finance 
transnational scientific communities.”
Like many scientific internationalists, 
Rockefeller and Gates believed that the practice 
and promotion of science in society would also 
shape patterns of social behavior and support 
values like reason, restraint, moderation, 
idealism, tolerance, compassion, devotion, and 
discipline. Indeed, Gates hoped that medical 
research would eventually unlock the secrets of 
human behavior as part of an effort to mitigate 
and even control humans’ impulse  
to destruction.
Because the Rockefeller Foundation was 
international in a colonial era, the mission 
1928
A 200-inch telescope to be built 
on Palomar Mountain in Southern 
California receives an initial $6  
million appropriation from the 
International Education Board,  
whose work in the natural sciences 
was taken over by the Rockefeller 
Foundation the following year. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Besieged by requests for money, 
John D. Rockefeller Sr. went out 
with pockets bulging with dimes and 
nickels which he gave to adults and 
children. Along with the money, he 
offered children advice to work hard 
and to save what they earned.  
But this charity was no substitute  
for philanthropy.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Stokes agreed, but wanted to add “diffusion” of knowledge as well. Education 
and teaching paved the path to the future.
With the end of World War II, the institutional landscape for international 
work changed dramatically. New 
governmental and quasi-governmental 
entities appeared—including the United 
Nations, the World Bank, and the World 
Health Organization—whose resources 
far exceeded those of the Foundation. In 
this new environment, the board of the 
Foundation struggled to define its working 
relationship with these new entities and to redefine the Foundation’s 
program. In doing so, the trustees returned to the mission statement. 
As the end of the war suggested an end to the prewar colonial regime, 
the board began to see the language of the mission statement in a new light. 
The board asked if the mandate to promote the well-being of mankind 
“throughout the world” meant the Foundation should be making grants or 
operating in every country. Raymond Fosdick, who had become president 
of the Foundation in 1936, was quick to respond that the Foundation had 
in the past seen this phrase to mean that the Foundation chased problems 
without regard for “flags and frontiers.” He believed that, given the growing 
ideological conflict of the postwar era, this kind of internationalism was 
needed more than ever. “Our aim must be the healing of mankind—the search 
for unity—regardless of race or color or political or social creed,” he wrote to 
Chester Barnard. “Yellow fever vaccine carries no flag and is not the property 
of any nation. Penicillin cannot be slanted in favor of Marxism or capitalism. 
There is not a Russian sulfadiazine as distinguished from an American 
sulfadiazine. We must work in the laying of cornerstones like these—humble 
as our contribution may be—trying to find the common factors, the common 
interests, that will serve men everywhere.” Fosdick went on to emphasize 
the vision of the founders: “The Foundation can always afford to take the 
broad view, the long view, and if we fail to do this, we fail those who in 1913 
described the purpose of the Foundation in liberal and prophetic words.” 
John D. Rockefeller 3rd, who became chairman of the board of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 1952, agreed with Fosdick. In April 1965, when 
representatives of the newly created Volkswagen Foundation came to New 
York to learn more about the practice of philanthropy, they asked him about 
the founding of the Rockefeller Foundation. If he could go back in time, would 
the grandson change the mission? No, Rockefeller responded. His grandfather 
had articulated a remarkably broad purpose, empowering each generation of 
“to enrich and sustain the lives 
and livelihoods of the poor and 
excluded throughout the world.” 
Rockefeller Foundation, 1999
trustees to reshape the program to meet the needs of the day. As a result, the 
Foundation was remarkably flexible.
Nevertheless, trustees, presidents and Foundation staff in subsequent 
generations often yearned for more definition. In the summer of 1973, staff 
searched for a unifying theme that would encompass the Foundation’s past 
and sharpen its focus on the future. The group embraced John D. Rockefeller’s 
mandate to search for and address the root causes of the problems that 
troubled humanity, but they noted that over sixty years the Foundation’s 
work had been and should continue to be focused primarily on the poor and 
disadvantaged around the world.
The global implications of the mission statement became increasingly 
important as the Rockefeller Foundation approached the end of the twentieth 
century, and grantees and development partners realized the implications 
of an increasingly interdependent world. In 1999, when British agricultural 
scientist and environmental champion Gordon Conway stepped into his role 
as the new president of the Rockefeller Foundation, the organization once 
again revisited the mission statement. Again staff and trustees recommitted 
to John D. Rockefeller’s basic purpose, as well as the insight of the 1970s that 
the Foundation should be a champion for the poor and excluded peoples of 
the world. Echoing Wickliffe Rose, they also reaffirmed the conviction that 
it was in the development and 
dissemination of knowledge that 
the Foundation could “enrich and 
sustain the lives and livelihoods of 
the poor and excluded throughout 
the world.” 
Conway suggested that the 
Foundation’s strategic planning 
initiatives in 1999 should focus on “the redefined Rockefeller Foundation 
and the work that we will be doing starting with the new millennium.” In 
some sense this was only half true. In the new millennium, the mission 
was reframed to remove the semantic gender bias of an earlier age, but the 
message remained as relevant as it was encompassing—to promote the well-
being of humanity. 
The challenge for a new generation of board members was to interpret this 
mission, just as John D. Rockefeller had intended, within the light of their own 
era, and to do so in a way that would inspire the collaboration of grantees and 
partners as well as the confidence of the public. 
“Yellow fever vaccine 
carries no flag and is not 
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P rivate foundation boards operate with extraor-dinary autonomy, especially in the United States. Without shareholders or members, foundations 
have governing boards that are self-perpetuating, with 
board members selecting their own successors. Except to 
comply with government regulations, foundation boards 
are rarely accountable for their decisions, except in the 
public eye. Thus the composition of the board is  
extremely important.
A foundation’s initial board often reflects historical, 
personal and institutional factors rooted in the founder’s 
personal and business relationships. It is the donor’s 
money, after all. As they choose new members, boards 
look for individuals who will share a passion for the 
foundation’s mission and an interest in the fields in which 
it operates. They look for people who will bring vision and 
perspective to the board’s decision-making. Sometimes 
they seek specific expertise—in the law, accounting, 
investment management or disciplines related to the 
foundation’s program. Fundamentally, they want people 
willing to commit time and energy to the board’s work.
The danger in a self-perpetuating board is that mem-
bers will tend to pick successors who are like themselves. 
When board members have too much in common, the 
Who should sit 
on the board?
foundation runs the risk of being limited in its vision. Or, 
worse, conflicts of interest can develop that undermine 
the integrity of the organization. Over the past several 
decades, many boards have diversified their membership 
to avoid these problems.
Early in the life of a foundation, the board works to 
develop a shared vision for the mission and program of 
the organization. It is not easy. Many factors can under-
mine the coherence of the board: competing ideas of the 
mission, inattention or apathy, or a lack of capacity to 
understand the challenges faced by the organization. The 
board chair plays a critical role in keeping the members 
focused and attentive to the needs of the institution. 
The board does not run the foundation on a day-to-
day basis. Although the board sets the strategic direction 
and formulates policy, it must empower and trust its 
president. This is easier said than done. Powerful person-
alities and visionary trustees may exert a strong influence 
on the staff or intrude on the day-to-day management. 
In these cases, the president may struggle to maintain 
clear lines of managerial authority. At other times, boards 
may be too deferential or passive, neglecting their duty 
to provide oversight or failing to provide the support the 
president needs to move forward.
The evolution of the Rockefeller Foundation’s board 
reflects many of these patterns, as well as lessons learned 
along the way. For John D. Rockefeller Jr., the quest to 
build the right board began with a confrontation on the 
witness stand. 
Who should sit on the board?
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nearly 40 percent of the stock in 
this company. They were strong 
supporters of the management’s 
anti-union policies. Rockefeller’s 
testimony then had been 
unimpressive, even embarrassing. 
Frequently he was unable to 
answer the committee’s questions, 
evidencing the worst of what some 
called “absentee capitalism.” 
Two weeks later, the 
company’s private guards, 
working with the Colorado 
National Guard, engaged in a 
pitched battle with the striking 
workers, wielding machine 
guns and torching the workers’ 
encampment. The dead included 
two women and eleven children 
who were asphyxiated in an 
underground shelter as fire 
consumed the striking workers’ 
camp. The “Ludlow Massacre” 
turned the nation against  
the Rockefellers. 
In the months that followed, Junior was vilified in the press. “Never 
before had the younger Rockefeller been so keenly and painfully aware 
of his isolation from the American public,” wrote Raymond Fosdick. 
Through the Rockefeller Foundation, Junior recruited Mackenzie King, a 
well-known Canadian authority on labor. With King’s help, the strike was 
settled in December 1914. Junior gradually embraced a more progressive 
attitude toward labor relations that was often ahead of his father‘s or that 
of Frederick Gates and the older generation of capitalists that surrounded 
him. To pursue that vision, the Rockefeller Foundation asked King to 
undertake a broad study of industrial relations.
When the Foundation announced this study, Chairman Walsh became 
suspicious. He feared that the Rockefellers were planning a major anti-
labor campaign to be conducted under the aegis of the Foundation.  
He scheduled hearings in New York City, with Junior expected to be  
a star witness.
John D. Rockefeller Jr. testified 
before the federal Commission on 
Industrial Relations in New York in 
January 1915. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
A Crisis of P ublic Trust
T he chairman gaveled the room to silence. Wearing a three-piece suit with a starched, rounded collar and a stickpin for his tie, John D. Rockefeller Jr. sat quietly in the witness box in New York’s City Hall. His hands on the witness table were 
unadorned, without even a wedding ring, despite fifteen years of marriage. 
His hair was parted on the side and neatly combed over. His broad,  
open face with its strong chin was composed and ready for his third day  
of interrogation. 
Before him, a panel of eight men and one woman took their seats. 
Empowered by Congress to investigate the roots of violent conflict 
between labor and business, the Commission on Industrial Relations had 
been created after a wave of deadly clashes between labor and business 
sparked alarm throughout the United States. Chairman Frank Walsh, 
a crusading fifty-one-year-old lawyer from Kansas City, had turned the 
investigation into a full-fledged inquiry into what he described as threats 
posed by industrialists to American democracy. Morning and afternoon 
for two days Walsh had grilled Rockefeller Junior, hoping to hold him 
responsible for an incident that had shocked the nation.
Mr. Junior, as his staff called him, had expected this treatment. Months 
earlier he had testified before a Congressional committee about a strike at 
the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. At the time, the Rockefellers owned 
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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The atmosphere had been tense when Junior began his testimony. 
With threats against the Rockefellers in mind, the mayor had assigned 
his personal bodyguard to escort Junior to City Hall. 
Intent on avoiding a repetition of his embarrassing testimony 
before Congress, Rockefeller and his staff had spent more than a  
month preparing for the hearings. They had compiled a 103-page 
booklet with answers to fifty-five questions submitted ahead of time  
by the Commission.  
The first day, Walsh grilled Junior for five hours. Self-possessed and 
courteous, Junior won over many in the crowd, including the famous 
labor organizer Mother Jones. He even got the audience to laugh, 
prompting Walsh to chastise the public. On the afternoon of the 
second day, Walsh shifted his focus to the Rockefellers’ philanthropy. 
In a series of questions, he highlighted ways in which the 
boundaries between the Foundation and the Rockefellers’ business 
interests in Colorado had been blurred. Mackenzie King, who 
had brokered the resolution of the strike, had been hired by 
the Foundation. A public relations agent, Ivy Lee, hired by the 
Rockefellers to handle the Colorado situation, sat in on Rockefeller 
Foundation meetings even though he was not a trustee or  
staff member. 
Junior stumbled over this line of questioning. He explained that 
the staff in the Rockefeller offices was “a sort of family affair. We 
talk over all sorts of things of common interest.” 
On the issue of Ivy Lee, for example, Junior 
reported, “He can exert just such an influence over 
the Foundation as any competent disinterested 
individual with whom we might confer.” 
Walsh understood that not just any “competent 
disinterested individual” could sit down with 
the Rockefellers. He also pointed out that two 
members of Rockefeller’s paid personal staff had 
served as directors of Colorado Fuel and Iron and 
as trustees of the Foundation during the period of the strike. A 
third member of the staff was also a Foundation trustee. Junior, 
himself, served on both boards. 
Walsh wanted to know what qualified someone to serve on the board 
of the Rockefeller Foundation. He quoted Starr Murphy’s testimony before 
Congress: “men of wide vision, men of wide experience, and of sound 
wisdom, and men of enthusiasm in the work which is before them, and 
Tension between striking workers 
and management at the Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company erupted into 
violence on April 20, 1914. After the 
workers camp was torched, two 
women and eleven children were 
asphyxiated in an underground 
shelter. (Library of Congress,  
Prints & Photographs.)
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In the weeks that followed his testimony, Junior began to rethink his 
perspective on the governance of the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
concerns raised by Walsh and others that were amplified in the press.  
Of the eleven members of the Rockefeller Foundation’s board of 
trustees, six received salaries or some compensation from either John 
D. Rockefeller Sr. or one of his endowed foundations, including Simon 
Flexner, Wickliffe Rose, Starr Murphy, Charles Heydt, Jerome Greene, and 
Frederick Gates. Among the other five trustees, two—Dr. Judson and Dr. 
Charles W. Eliot—were presidents of universities (Chicago and Harvard) 
that had received substantial contributions from Rockefeller. 
Junior realized that it was not enough for honorable men with good 
intentions to work to do the right thing. According to writers John Enson 
Haar and Peter Johnson, “The lesson for Junior was that never again 
would he ask the Foundation to become involved in an activity that had 
anything to do with a personal or family problem.” Governance of the 
Foundation must be distanced from the Rockefeller family offices. The 
board of the Rockefeller Foundation would need to be shaped in a way 
that would inspire the public’s trust. But what did that mean? Over the 
course of the next century, Junior and his successors on the board would 
seek to answer this question in ways that reflected the issues, concerns, 
and priorities of their respective eras.
The First Board
C ongress might have changed the course of philanthropic history in 1913. While the charter for the Rockefeller Foundation was being debated, some members pushed for amendments that 
would have given public officials a strong voice in the selection of new 
trustees and set a precedent for foundations in the future. Under one of 
these amendments, any nomination to the Rockefeller Foundation board 
could have been vetoed by a majority of the following: the president of the 
United States, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the president of the 
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the presidents of 
Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Chicago. 
Surprisingly, Rockefeller agreed to this condition. But when Congress 
failed to pass the bill, he went to the New York Legislature, which did not 
ask for a similar amendment. As a result, the board of trustees of the new 
Rockefeller Foundation included eight members of the Rockefeller inner 
circle, but governance remained a big question. 
who are willing to give freely of their time.” 
Junior affirmed that sentiment. Walsh asked 
whether trustees should be compensated 
and, if so, how much. Should the Foundation 
pay their expenses? What about the 
expenses of family members? Should 
Congress or the legislature have a voice in 
the selection of trustees? These questions 
came thick and fast, and Junior seemed to 
backpedal as if he had never thought about 
them before.
Now Junior sat waiting for the third 
day of interrogation to begin. As the room 
quieted, Walsh pressed Junior to define the 
proper limits of a foundation’s activities. 
Could it engage in for-profit business? No. 
Could it hire publicity agents? Yes. Could it 
become an advocate in labor policy issues? 
“I don’t see why any foundation should not have 
the same right to legitimate means of publicity 
as any such organization as you have spoken of,” 
Junior responded. 
Then Walsh sought to deliver the coup de 
grâce. Noting Rockefeller’s role and duties as a director of Colorado 
Fuel and Iron, a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a personal 
advisor to his father on investments, he asked how Junior could possibly 
separate these various conflicting interests. Junior was disturbed. He 
responded by saying: 
Mr. Chairman, the question is apparently based upon the assumption 
that if a man has one interest he can not be conscientious in the 
performance of his duty in relation to any other interest. That is 
not the basis on which the foundation has proceeded. If that basis 
were accepted, no man could do but one thing. I am assuming that 
there are men in this country, and hundreds of thousands of them, 
who can be trusted to try to do what they think is right in various 
circumstances, and if there can not be found men who can be so 
trusted, then there should be no funds, and there should be no 
responsibility of any kind given to men.
Chairman Frank Walsh questioned the ties 
between the Rockefellers’ business interests 
and their philanthropy. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
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grind,” Gates wrote, “and he intimated that we might have to sift for years 
before we could get the right kind of Board.” 
Gates too believed that getting the right board would make all 
the difference for the future of the Foundation. Trustees, he wrote 
to Rockefeller in 1905, served the public as much as any agency of 
government. Their decisions should “attract the attention of the entire 
civilized world, their administration become the subject of the most 
intelligent criticism of the world.” Jerome Greene, the secretary of the 
Foundation, wrote that the selection of future trustees “must be the very 
first concern of the original trustees and of all their successors until the 
best method of selection shall be determined.” Greene noted that history 
seemed to show that over time charitable trusts tended to be controlled 
by a few men of high station who were often too busy to devote their 
attention to the institution, and therefore the institution tended to lose its 
innovative qualities. Greene hoped that the adoption of a set of principles, 
along with a flexible attitude toward the future, would help to preserve 
the freedom that would energize future boards.
But the question of the public’s role in governance remained. Greene 
proposed the creation of a public council to advise the board and the 
Foundation. He had in mind Frederick Gates’s admonition that without 
the influence of the people in a democratic society, a private foundation 
would tend toward paternalism and rigidity. Greene thought this public 
council should be geographically diverse, representing all of the major 
sections of the country as well as foreign countries where the Foundation 
was working. He proposed that this council would meet annually to 
review the Foundation’s work and make recommendations. Junior did not 
dismiss Greene’s proposal, but, in the years before Ludlow and the Walsh 
Commission hearings, his instinct was guarded. “I should rather keep the 
foundation as free and as flexible as possible during the early years of its 
existence while its founder and his representative are on hand to guide 
and mould it.”
Even before the Walsh Commission hearings, however, the Rockefeller 
insiders on the board sought to expand membership by inviting well-
known public men who were also familiar to the Rockefellers to serve. 
The first was Charles W. Eliot, the eighty-year-old president emeritus of 
Harvard University. Still a commanding presence, Eliot was a member of 
the board of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and had 
been a trustee of the GEB since 1908. He was also a founding member of 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Commission and  
a leading advisor on the China program.
Unlike Andrew Carnegie, the founder of the Rockefeller Foundation 
never took an active role in its governance. Although he was a member of 
the board for years, he never attended a meeting. The board elected him 
“Honorary President of the Foundation” for life, but as biographer Ron 
Chernow notes, “[Rockefeller] was receding to a more distant supervisory 
role with his philanthropies and yielding more power to his son, although 
he never surrendered his veto power.” After the Walsh Commission 
hearings in 1915, Rockefeller Sr. was convinced that he should delegate all 
of the management of the Foundation to others.
Senior’s reticence hardly reflected a lack of interest in the board or 
the Foundation. Indeed, he was keenly aware that boards play a key 
role in the fate of an institution. In 1889, as he was 
considering whether to support the development of the 
University of Chicago, he had peppered Frederick Gates 
with questions about members of the proposed board. 
He stressed that the board should be “disinterested” 
or, rather, have no vested interest in the fate of the 
institution. “He warned me against cabals with axes to 
For three years, Congress considered a 
bill to grant the proposed Rockefeller 
Foundation a federal charter. Despite 
major concessions on governance 
and finances by the Rockefellers, the 
bill was not approved. (Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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Eliot urged the Foundation to expand the board further “to secure 
the confidence of the public.” In March 1914, the board elected A. Barton 
Hepburn, the president of Chase National Bank. But after testifying before 
the Walsh Commission the following January, Eliot urged further action. 
“It [the board] ought to be doubled at once,” he wrote to Jerome Greene on 
March 3, 1915. “All the new members should be successful professional 
or business men known to the public as men of public spirit and good 
will.” Eliot felt that expanding the board was critical if the Foundation 
wanted to address the criticisms leveled by socialists and labor leaders. 
Eliot was also cognizant of the Rockefellers’ desire to keep a close rein on 
the management of all of the foundations. Although Rockefeller insiders 
were often appointed to multiple Rockefeller boards, Eliot recommended 
that “outsiders” be appointed to only one board as a way to broaden the 
number of men “interested in the wise discharge of the Rockefeller trusts 
in general.”
Junior agreed. In May 1915, the board elected former president of the 
United States William Howard Taft. He wanted to be free to speak his 
mind in the political realm, however. Taft was concerned critics would say 
that, as a member of the Rockefeller Foundation board, his opinions were 
affected “by my association with the Foundation.” So he resigned from the 
board in August 1915.
Taft’s concerns raised an issue that would reappear throughout the 
history of the Foundation—whether to name prominent politicians 
to the board, particularly while they were still active in public affairs. 
In 1948, for example, Lewis Douglas was a member of the board. A 
former congressman from Arizona, Douglas had served as head of the 
Budget during Franklin Roosevelt’s first term, but resigned to protest 
Roosevelt’s deficit spending. Still active in politics in the 1940s, he was 
named ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1947. In a letter to John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd, Junior noted that it was generally his preference that men 
who accepted national appointments resign from the board “lest they, or 
the board, be embarrassed by the relationship.” In Douglas’s case, Junior 
hoped that if Douglas resigned it would be with the understanding that, 
when he returned to private life, he might return to the board. And under 
this informal rule, Douglas did return to the board in the 1950s, as did a 
number of other trustees who served in public office over the years. 
Disappointed with Taft’s decision, Junior continued to recruit new 
trustees. In January 1916, the board welcomed Harry Emerson Fosdick, 
a popular Baptist minister from Montclair, New Jersey, and brother to 
Rockefeller advisor Raymond B. Fosdick. The board also recruited Martin 
Former U.S. President William Howard 
Taft was an attractive potential 
board member in 1915. Taft worried 
that if he was on the Rockefeller 
Foundation board, the public would 
believe his views were influenced by 
the Rockefellers. Ultimately, he turned 
down the board's request. (Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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role of the founder, was elected president and chairman of the board. But 
he was far more deferential to the expertise of his fellow board members 
and to the proper role of the staff. Jerome Greene as secretary (effectively 
chief executive) ran the Foundation’s day-to-day business. At Carnegie, 
according to Robert Kohler, “there was no one comparable to Jerome 
Greene; the executive committee [of the board] made policy and ruled  
on applications.” 
To further distance the Foundation’s day-to-day management from 
the family after the Walsh Commission hearings, the Foundation’s 
offices were moved from 26 Broadway to 61 Broadway, where the 
General Education Board was headquartered. Junior relinquished the 
A. Ryerson, a Harvard-educated lawyer from Chicago 
whose father had been a lumber magnate, and who 
was a patron of a number of cultural institutions, 
including the University of Chicago. The board then 
elected Frederick Strauss, the first Jewish member. A 
graduate of the College of the City of New York, Strauss 
and his brother Albert were partners in the investment 
banking firm of J. & W. Seligman & Co. In 1917, after 
the aging Eliot left the board, several new trustees were added: Wallace 
Buttrick, the head of the General Education Board; Charles Evans Hughes, 
the Republican candidate who ran against Woodrow Wilson for president 
in the 1916 election; and Julius Rosenwald, the man who built Sears, 
Roebuck into a commercial giant and founded the Rosenwald Fund. In 
this way, Junior refashioned the Rockefeller Foundation’s board so that it 
would win the public’s respect and trust.
The Role of the Board, the Donor, and the Chief E xecutive 
A s the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation developed the practices of modern philanthropy in the early twentieth century, the role of a board and its relationship to the 
everyday work of a foundation was far from 
clear. In part this reflected differences in the 
character of the founder. “Carnegie regarded 
the trustees as working executives,” observes 
historian Robert Kohler. He paid them a 
salary, and he dominated board discussions 
the way an executive might oversee his staff. 
As a result, in the early years, the Carnegie 
Corporation “was more like an old-fashioned 
family charity than a modern foundation.” 
Although some board members felt the 
institution would do better with professional 
management, these voices were not able to 
shape the institution until after Carnegie’s 
death in August 1919. 
At the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
relationship of the founder and his family to 
the board was quite different. Senior refused 
to take an active role. Junior, who acted in the 
1933
China’s National Agricultural Research 
Bureau established. The Rockefeller 
Foundation provides grants to sup-
port scientific research and farm 
demonstration programs in Nanking 
related to insect control.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
George Vincent became president of 
the Rockefeller Foundation in 1917. 
Well-regarded as a public speaker, 
Vincent was recruited from his position 
as president of the University of 
Minnesota to help build public support 
for the Rockefeller Foundation’s work.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Raymond Fosdick, one of Junior’s 
closest advisors, solicited opinions in 
the following year on the structure of 
the Foundation and the administrative 
operations. Some board members 
expressed frustration with their role. 
David L. Edsall, dean of the Harvard 
University Medical School, who served 
as a member of the International Health 
Board, felt that the staff over-prepared 
for meetings and usually framed their 
recommendations very specifically. 
Moreover, in an effort to keep the board 
materials from becoming unwieldy, 
arguments were “very succinctly stated.” 
As a result, “The members of the Board 
come unprepared to reach judgments 
about most of the things and they 
therefore avoid giving judgments or 
opinions.” Edsall suggested that certain members 
could be designated as experts in certain subject 
areas and deferred to for comment when these 
issues came up. He acknowledged that if the 
board took more responsibility it would mean 
more work, and he recognized that some board 
members might resist being asked to do this 
additional work. But in his view, with board 
membership came responsibility. 
Edsall’s comments were echoed by the 
colorful William Allen White, editor and owner 
of the Emporia Gazette in Kansas. “I have felt uneasy and a bit unhappy 
now and then about my connection with the Rockefeller Board,” White 
confessed to Raymond Fosdick, “chiefly because I feel so ignorant about 
many matters.” He sometimes felt that the board seemed “to be a group 
of ‘yes yes’ men.” White conceded that he did not know how to fix the 
situation. “I try to read the documents that come to me, but in the end 
I have a rather sketchy knowledge of things.” He wondered if board 
meetings could be held more frequently and for longer periods of time 
so that, instead of an “advisory relation,” the board would have more of a 
“legislative relation” to the work of the Foundation.
role of president, but remained as chairman. Jerome Greene saw this as a 
natural evolution. He believed that individuals long associated with the 
Rockefellers’ personal philanthropy would gradually give way to new 
trustees who would understand “the changing conditions and needs of 
future generations.” 
Unfortunately for Greene, these moves resulted in the appointment 
of a president who replaced him as the administrative head of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Seeking someone with a national reputation 
as a public speaker who could defend the Foundation to a suspicious 
electorate and politicians, Junior and the other trustees chose George 
Vincent, the president of the University of Minnesota, to lead the 
Foundation. Greene resigned as secretary and from the board.
The multiple charitable institutions created by John D. Rockefeller 
(General Education Board, Rockefeller Institute, etc.) created board 
problems that Vincent soon recognized. In an effort to coordinate the 
work of their various charities, Senior and Junior had often asked board 
members to serve on multiple boards. Charles Eliot had felt this was 
a mistake because it limited the number of people with good ideas 
participating in the governance of these institutions. In an era still 
concerned with the idea of secret trusts, Vincent echoed Eliot’s concerns 
and also suggested that the Foundation should be careful to avoid 
arousing public criticism of a “combine” in the philanthropic sector. 
Vincent would find other challenges in working with the board. 
 
The Capacit y of the Board
In common with the directors of most philanthropic organizations, presidents of the Rockefeller Foundation struggled early on to gain the attention of busy board members, to get them to focus on critical 
decisions, and to balance the need to inform with the duty to avoid 
overwhelming them. George Vincent noted in 1925 that “It is difficult 
to interest the trustees in somewhat complicated technical proposals 
presented in voluminous agenda which must be acted upon within a few 
hours.” Often, he felt the board’s decisions were perfunctory. “There is 
little time for discussion, almost no opportunity for individual trustees 
to make suggestions, etc.” Vincent worried the board was too dependent 
on the staff for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Foundation’s 
programs. He suggested that the board might consider occasional 
independent audits, but conceded that each of these methods had 
strengths and weaknesses.
Raymond B. Fosdick played an enormous part 
in shaping the Rockefeller Foundation. After 
becoming a close advisor to John D. Rockefeller 
Jr. in the 1910s, he joined the Foundation’s 
board of trustees in 1921 and orchestrated the 
reorganization of 1928. He became president  
in 1936 and served until his retirement in  
1948. In retirement, Fosdick wrote and 
published a history of the Foundation and  
a biography of John D. Rockefeller Jr.  
(Rockefeller Archves Center.)
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executive committee. Greene felt board members could not have it both 
ways. If they were not willing to delegate these powers to the executive 
committee, then they should be willing to meet at least every month 
(except in the summer) “in order to keep in closer touch with the work 
and to dispose of business in a less hurried manner as it comes up during 
the year.” 
Rockefeller Foundation President George Vincent felt that the question 
focused inevitably on the kind of people who served on the board. On 
one hand, board members who were well known to the public and could 
“command confidence” were generally “too busy to give more than very 
general and largely uncritical consideration to business.” As a result, “the 
officers are likely to have very much their own way.” On the other hand, 
if the organization chose “younger men or persons with leisure,” they 
might “offer little assurance to the public.” Vincent also noted that experts 
were very useful at times, “but too many of them might easily make for 
professional bias and inflexibility.”
For many years, the Rockefeller Foundation board did rely heavily 
on the executive committee, which was dominated by Rockefeller office 
insiders. This reliance raised a continuing issue about the relationship of 
the donor and his family to the policies of the Foundation.
Autonomy and Family
Nearly two decades after the founding of the Rockefeller Foundation, the board still struggled with its relationship to the founder and his family. In reality, governance and financial 
management (see Chapter XI on Perpetuity) were closely tied to John 
D. Rockefeller Jr. and the family offices. Junior continued to serve 
as chairman of the board. In December 1931, his eldest son, John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd, joined the board as well. Meanwhile, two of the most 
influential members of the inner circle—attorneys Raymond B. Fosdick 
and Thomas Debevoise—exerted enormous influence because of their 
close association to Junior.
Roger and Jerome Greene (who had rejoined the Rockefeller 
Foundation board in 1928) felt that the influence of Junior and his 
staff was stifling the Foundation and the work of other Rockefeller 
philanthropies, including the China Medical Board. Roger complained 
when John D. Rockefeller 3rd was appointed to the CMB and became its 
secretary as well as a member of its finance committee. Roger felt that the 
younger Rockefeller (who was twenty-five at the time) sought to have 
Jerome Greene’s brother Roger, who was head of 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s China Medical Board, 
probably did not have Edsall or White in mind when 
he complained to Fosdick that board members seemed 
“impatient to get on with the business and get away.” Yet 
he too conceded that it was difficult “to imagine how any 
board of trustees can have great interest in such a mass 
of detail as is submitted to the Foundation meetings.” Greene proposed 
strengthening the executive committee of the board to empower it to 
make most of the financial decisions, “leaving the trustees free to discuss 
general policies in a leisurely way and to take action on a few matters 
of great importance, especially those involving new principles.” This 
was a proposal that would recur many times in the history of the board. 
Unfortunately, it risked marginalizing trustees who were not on the 
The offices of John D. Rockefeller 
Jr. on the 14th floor at 26 Broadway 
were frequently used for meetings 
of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
executive committee.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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a voice on the board that was not 
commensurate with his experience. 
Tensions between the two of them, 
and the support that the younger 
Rockefeller received from Fosdick 
and other members of the Rockefeller 
office, led Greene to criticize the 
governance of the CMB and all of the 
Rockefeller philanthropies, which he 
believed were not truly independent of 
the family. In a letter to Jerome, Roger 
suggested that it was inappropriate “to 
have on the Board men whose incomes 
are largely dependent on the Rockefeller 
family such as [Raymond] Fosdick and 
[Arthur] Woods.” Escalating tensions led 
Junior to decide, in collaboration with 
Fosdick, that it was time for Greene to go.
In the aftermath of his brother’s 
dismissal, Jerome Greene expressed his 
concerns to Junior. He noted that despite 
the supposed authority of the board, 
“vital matters tended to gravitate to a 
small group accessible to the office of the 
Foundation, chiefly Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. 
Fosdick, Mr. Debevoise, and perhaps the 
President of the Foundation.” According 
to Fosdick’s biographer Daryl Revoldt, this 
group could exercise what Greene called 
“in effect a Rockefeller edict.” This practice 
undermined the autonomy of the institution. 
Never shy, Jerome Greene presented 
these arguments to Junior in a meeting 
on November 16, 1934. He also offered the 
same argument to Debevoise. But Greene 
was unable to persuade Junior, Fosdick, or 
Debevoise that things should change. 
Through the Depression years, Greene 
continued to press his concerns. In October 
1935, following the resignation of Max 
Trustees of the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) 
at the time of the dedication in October 1921, including 
William H. Welch, Richard M. Pearce, George Vincent, 
John D. Rockefeller Jr., and Roger Greene. As head of 
the PUMC in the late 1920s, Roger Greene increasingly 
clashed with the Foundation’s leadership in New York. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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made “without a real decision of the Trustees.” In leveling this criticism, 
Greene noted that the executive committee, often chosen according to 
which trustees were readily available in New York, tended to be made up 
of “persons identified with Mr. Rockefeller’s office or salaried officers of 
one or more of the Boards.” These participants were joined by officers of 
the corporations, many of whom were members of the Rockefeller office 
staff, including the treasurer, comptroller, counsel, assistant counsel, 
directors of divisions, and some of their assistants. “More than once,” 
Greene said, he “had the experience of sitting in meetings of one of the 
Executive Committees as the only ‘outside’ Trustee.” Greene warned that 
if the family and the trustees continued in this way, they did so at their 
own peril. 
Greene offered a series of recommendations: relocate the offices away 
from the family; disallow anyone who received a salary from any of the 
Rockefeller boards or the Rockefeller office from serving as a member 
of the executive committee of the Foundation; disallow anyone who 
served as counsel to the Rockefellers from also serving as counsel to 
the Foundation; avoid having Rockefeller intermediaries interact with 
Foundation staff on behalf of the chairman (Junior); and make the finance 
committee “entirely independent of Mr. Rockefeller’s office.” He also 
suggested that the committee should have the services of a competent and 
independent treasurer.
Junior appeared to take Greene’s criticisms to heart. As chairman 
he empowered a committee of three—John W. Davis, a lawyer and the 
Democratic candidate for president in 1924; E.M. Hopkins, president of 
Dartmouth College; and medical scientist George H. Whipple—to review 
the situation. Several weeks later, Junior reported to his father that the 
Davis Committee helped diffuse Greene’s frustrations and generally 
affirmed the benefits of the Foundation’s close relationship with the 
Rockefeller family offices. 
But the committee was not as light-handed as Junior seemed to suggest 
to his father. Although they were reluctant to intervene in the day-to-
day involvement of Fosdick, Debevoise, and other Rockefeller insiders, 
the committee expressed strong support for Greene’s idea that the board 
needed to step up to its responsibilities. The committee seemed to believe 
this should begin with a stronger board and a more vigorous selection of 
trustees. The current system, they said, was “inadequate to elicit the full 
consideration of the Board.” The committee recommended that the full 
board act as a nominating committee, that names be provided to all board 
members at least fifteen days in advance of the board meeting, and that 
Mason as president, Greene wrote a “strictly confidential” memorandum 
articulating his continuing concerns regarding the role of the trustees. 
Greene noted that “Mr. Rockefeller has divested himself and his family 
from the ownership and control of large funds and entrusted them to 
the ownership and control of corporations created by the State and 
responsible in a real sense, therefore, to the public. Only on this ground do 
the funds of the Rockefeller Boards enjoy exemption from taxation—an 
exemption that needs no defense in principle because the funds are under 
a quasi-public control, are applied exclusively to public uses and are free 
from any element of private profit.” Greene noted that it was “natural 
and proper” that, in the beginning, the boards of these new corporations 
were made up of people chosen and trusted by the founder. “He was but 
perfecting the organization of a work that had won well-nigh universal 
admiration and approval.” But twenty-two years later, Greene wondered 
whether the trustees were “sufficiently alive to their responsibility to the 
public” to exercise independent control of the Foundation. 
Greene believed the answer was “no.” “A trusteeship in the Rockefeller 
Foundation,” he wrote, “ought to be recognized as one of the gravest 
responsibilities to be found in civic life.” Trustees should be willing to 
accept the sacrifices demanded of the position, even if that meant more 
frequent meetings of the board. Unfortunately, trustees too often left 
real decision-making to “a few members of the Board and to an office 
organization still closely identified with the Founder’s family.” 
Greene was quick to say that he was not suggesting that Junior or his 
son, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, were trying to hold on to control. Indeed, it 
had been their vision from the beginning to devolve this responsibility. 
However, “in the absence of a more lively demonstration by trustees 
of a vital and responsible concern for the welfare of the Foundation, 
the influence and control naturally gravitate to those who feel most 
strongly.” As a result, the trustees and the institution had not only failed 
to move towards greater independence, but were actually moving in 
the opposite direction. “The fact is that it [the staff of the Foundation] is 
really under the control, direct or indirect, of Mr. Rockefeller—direct, and 
quite properly so, through his chairmanship of the Board, for which his 
competence is beyond question; indirect through his son and through the 
influence of Trustees in his employ whose contact with the staff is closer 
than is that of other Trustees, or even Mr. Rockefeller, Jr. himself.” 
Greene was also concerned about the fact that the Foundation had 
moved from 61 Broadway back to the floor below Junior at 26 Broadway. 
He was equally disconcerted by the planned move to Rockefeller Center 
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philanthropic institutions they created. In 1937, Debevoise had suggested 
that “This talk has increased very much in the past year or so and it may 
sooner or later result in an investigation.” If such an investigation was 
launched, “the Rockefeller Funds will be among the first questioned.” 
Debevoise was confident that neither John D. Rockefeller nor his son had 
used any of the philanthropies as a way to exert corporate control. However, 
as he pointed out to John D. Rockefeller 3rd, “your father’s connections with 
the Funds, the offices he has held, the services that have been gratuitously 
furnished by his office for the benefit of the Funds and every other little 
thing that a public investigator appealing to popular prejudice can find will 
be emphasized and exaggerated without any regard to the fundamental 
facts.” Changing the retirement rules to allow Junior to remain on the board 
would be a negative in the public eye. Applying the same rule to the son 
of the founder that had been used to retire Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 
Frederick Strauss, Yale President James Angell, and Dr. Simon Flexner 
would send a powerful message about the autonomy of the Foundation.
The Rockefellers saw the wisdom in Debevoise’s perspective. The 
lawyer, however, suggested a compromise. The board invited Junior to 
continue to attend board meetings as chairman emeritus and to join in the 
discussion, recognizing that he would not be able to vote. This courtesy 
was then extended to subsequent chairmen emeriti. Junior continued to 
sit with the board through most of the rest of the decade. 
Some sign of Junior’s ambivalence over letting go is also evident in a 
letter he wrote to Raymond Fosdick in 1943. Since the beginning of the 
Foundation, he noted, two members of the Rockefeller family had always 
served on the board: Senior and Junior in the earliest days (though Senior 
never attended a meeting), and then Junior and his son John D. Rockefeller 
3rd. With Junior’s departure, he wondered if the board might consider 
nominating Nelson Rockefeller. “He would, of course, regard John as the 
ranking family representative and would work with him if elected,” Junior 
offered. Fosdick embraced the suggestion and Nelson welcomed the idea, 
but it did not happen.
The presence of one or more Rockefellers on the board clearly made a 
difference. Fosdick offered more than flattery or personal affection in 1948 
when he wrote to Junior that “for me something went out of the life of 
the Foundation when you left as Chairman of the Board. It has never been 
quite the same; somehow or other the job has not been quite so satisfying 
or rewarding.” Years later, Waldemar Nielsen would suggest that John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd’s chairmanship of the Foundation in the 1950s and 1960s 
had played a key role in sustaining the Foundation’s vitality. 
board members provide a written ballot indicating their preferences. The 
committee proposed that in nominating new members the board seek 
geographical diversity, looking for representatives from all the major 
sections of the country. Board members should also reflect a diversity of 
expertise that mirrored the various lines of activity represented by the 
divisions of the Foundation. The committee further recommended that 
the board increase from two to three the number of meetings per year, 
to allow more time for discussion, and that this third meeting should be 
devoted entirely to policy and program. The committee asked that the 
board receive a list of grant applications rejected by the staff, as well as 
those recommended for approval.
The board’s assertion of authority took time and was resolved over 
several years. A major step forward came in 1936, when Fosdick became 
president of the Rockefeller Foundation, clarifying his role and making 
him responsible for communications between the board and the staff. The 
power of the outside members of the board was also enhanced as Junior 
approached his sixty-fifth birthday in 1940, 
which meant retirement under the board’s 
existing rules. 
Junior’s retirement from the board 
marked an important transition. No one else 
had served as chairman. Walter Stewart, a 
prominent economist who had become the 
director of the Institute of Advanced Study 
at Princeton University, succeeded him with 
Junior’s blessing. “No trustee has taken greater 
interest in the Foundation than Mr. Stewart,” 
Junior wrote. “No trustee has given more 
generously of his time, thought and effort to 
its work.”
For a moment, however, the Rockefellers 
had hesitated. John D. Rockefeller 3rd had 
asked Debevoise whether the board should 
think about making an exception to the 
mandatory retirement age for the son of 
the founder. Debevoise did not think this 
was a good idea. Some members of the 
public remained concerned that donors like 
the Rockefellers continued to manipulate 
corporate control through the agency of the 
1937
To enable fundamental research  
in physics, new grants from the 
Division of Natural Sciences support 
the construction of accelerators  
or “atom-smashers.”  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Dame. Hesburgh would become the board’s chair in 1977, 
serving until 1982. 
Professionally, the board over many decades reflected 
the Foundation’s emphasis on science and research, 
particularly in the context of higher education. In 
1934, for example, board member George H. Whipple, 
a medical researcher, won the Nobel Prize for his work 
on anemia. By 1946, the board included two doctors, 
two newspapermen, three college presidents, one representative of 
agriculture, one of the humanities, with the rest of the nineteen members 
coming from business and the law. 
A R epresentative Board
T he interrogations of the Walsh Commission in 1915 had led Junior, Charles Eliot, Jerome Greene and others to recognize the importance of the board in earning the public’s trust and 
confidence. Over the years, the trustees increasingly saw that keeping that 
trust depended on having a board that was representative of the nation, at 
first, and then of the global community. 
In the early days, building a representative board meant geographic 
and religious diversity as well as recruiting a balanced set of skills and 
expertise. Through the first two decades, most trustees came from either 
the Northeast or the Chicago area. When Ray Lyman Wilbur, the president 
of Stanford University, was elected in 1922, the board gained a West Coast 
member, but a multi-day transcontinental train trip made it difficult for 
Wilbur to attend the board’s quarterly meetings. When James Angell 
retired from the board in 1936, he reminded Junior of the importance of 
geographic diversity, suggesting the board should look for “outstanding 
individuals who represent the greatest diversity of outlook on the basic 
problems of humanity.” But the issue remained a challenge. In 1940, the 
board had one member from the Midwest, two from the Far West and 
one from the South, while fourteen others came from Middle Atlantic 
states and two were from New England. Fosdick wrote to William Allen 
White of Kansas, who was retiring from the board, that he hoped White 
would be able to suggest a replacement. “Here in the East,” he said, “I 
get the impression that we are rather out of touch with the country as 
a whole, and we need some elements on our Board of Trustees who will 
help to interpret to us the United States that lies west of the Allegheny 
Mountains.” This issue of geographic diversity within the United States 
would continue for decades, until the board began to see the need for 
broad international representation.
Given the strong Baptist and Puritan origins of the Rockefellers and 
many of their associates, it is interesting to note that two of the earliest 
board members, Frederick Strauss and Julius Rosenwald, were Jewish. 
And when it came time to nominate two new trustees in 1938, John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd noted that New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger 
“would make a real contribution to the Board” because of the quality of 
his intellect and his Jewish faith. It took longer for Catholics to join the 
board, although by the late 1940s, according to Junior, several Catholics 
had been “splendid” members. The board welcomed Father Theodore 
Hesburgh to the board in 1961, the president of the University of Notre 
Ray Lyman Wilbur was president 
of Stanford University when he 
was elected to the board in 1922. 
Wilbur’s presence provided some 
geographic diversity to a group that 
came primarily from New York and 
the Northeast. (Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
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The board also tended to balance itself 
between academics and men of affairs. In 
1940, when four seats came open because of 
retirements, the split was about even. Warren 
Weaver, the head of the Natural Science 
program, urged Raymond Fosdick to ensure 
that scientists were on the board, though he was 
quick to write that they should not be seen as 
“special representatives of and special pleaders 
for the NS [Natural Sciences] division.” 
Given its strong international approach, it is 
surprising that the Foundation did not recruit a 
non-U.S. citizen in the early years. Remembering 
the challenges of the Charter fight and the Walsh 
hearings, however, the Foundation’s leaders 
were extremely sensitive to the idea that the 
Foundation was legally an American institution. 
In 1941, Fosdick seems to have been interested 
in having a board member who understood 
South America. And the following year, when 
names were suggested for board candidates, a 
prominent Canadian came to the fore, but board 
member John Foster Dulles said he doubted 
that the board would be interested in someone 
who was not a citizen of the United States. 
These doubts were apparently removed by 1960. 
That year, Foundation president Dean Rusk put 
forward the name of Sir Oliver S. Franks, the 
former British ambassador to the United States 
and the chairman of Lloyds Bank Limited of 
London. “It is my thought that his name might 
be considered solely as an individual,” Rusk 
wrote, “and that we would not thereby say to 
ourselves that we would try to have any foreign 
country represented as such or that his election 
would force us to take other foreign nationals. It is my impression that his 
qualities are such that it would be fully understood that we had elected 
him as an individual.” Franks’s election to the Rockefeller Foundation 
board was followed in 1967 by the selection of Alberto Lleras Camargo, 
the former president of Colombia. Lleras Camargo was a distinguished 
Diplomat and political scientist Ralph Bunche joined 
the Rockefeller Foundation board in 1955. Pictured 
at this 1963 board meeting, Bunche (seated at end 
of table) was the first person of color to serve on 
the board and helped sharpen the organization’s 
interest in Africa as well as equal opportunity in  
the United States. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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In 1982, Clifton R. Wharton Jr. was elected chairman of the 
Foundation. The son of the first African American to pass the Foreign 
Service examination, Wharton had received a Ph.D. in economics from 
the University of Chicago. As a staffer with the Agriculture Development 
Council, he worked with the Rockefeller Foundation in Southeast Asia 
early in his career. At the time he joined the Rockefeller board in 1970, he 
was the newly appointed president of Michigan State University. During 
his tenure, he became Chancellor of the State University of New York.
For years trustees had discussed the possibility of appointing a woman 
to the board. From time to time the names of presidents of some of the 
nation’s leading women’s colleges—Bryn Mawr, Vassar—surfaced, but 
no woman was appointed. Following World War II, John D. Rockefeller 
3rd asked Raymond Fosdick whether the issue should be considered, 
noting that “it would not appear that the matter has ever been officially 
discussed.” It is unclear whether any discussion of this proposal took 
place, but no woman joined the board in the next quarter century. 
Rockefeller, however, did not forget the issue. As chairman in 1959, for 
example, when he was developing lists of possible nominees to the board, 
he suggested Aline B. Saarinen, the 
associate editor and art critic for the 
New York Times. The same year, Mary 
L. Bunting, the president of Radcliffe 
College, and Mrs. John G. Lee, the 
former president of the League of 
Women Voters, also appeared on a 
list of potential nominees. Bunting’s 
name was suggested following 
a discussion in which several trustees recommended that a woman 
should be considered for the board. In the late 1960s, the board nearly 
elected Howard University law professor Patricia Roberts Harris, but 
chose broadcaster Bill Moyers instead. By 1969, however, both John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd and Foundation President J. George Harrar recognized 
that the time had come. “Clearly there are outstanding women who could 
add substantially to the deliberations of the Board,” Harrar wrote to John 
D. Rockefeller 3rd. Rockefeller agreed. On the eve of his retirement from 
the board in 1970, he raised the issue again. This time, Harrar passed the 
recommendation on to the board’s nominating committee.
journalist and the first former head of state to serve as a trustee. He was 
also the first Hispanic.
Given the importance of labor issues at the time the Foundation was 
created, it is not surprising that from time to time the board wondered 
whether it should elect someone who could speak to labor’s issues. 
Board members were quick to say that they did not want someone who 
would have to “speak for Labor” on the board; they wanted someone who 
understood “Labor’s point of view.” This desire would lead to the election 
of Lane Kirkland, the Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO as a trustee. The 
board also felt that it needed a representative from the media. William 
Allen White, a famous author and editor from Kansas, was the first. In the 
1940s and early 1950s, Douglas Freeman (Richmond, VA) and Arthur Hays 
Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, filled that role. In later years, 
board members from the press included Frank Stanton, Bill Moyers and 
Frances Fitzgerald.
In the 1950s, the growing influence of the civil rights movement in the 
United States compelled trustees to think again about what constituted a 
representative board. Several times the name of Ralph Bunche appeared 
on the list. Bunche had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 for 
brokering the 1949 Armistice Agreements between the Arabs and the 
Israelis. In December 1954, the board unanimously voted to nominate 
Bunche. When he accepted and became a trustee, he was the first person 
of color to serve on the board. Perhaps just as importantly, he was the first 
trustee to have grown up in poverty.
Bunche’s election was not without controversy. In 1954, he had 
also received the Theodore Roosevelt Medal for Distinguished Service. 
Archibald Roosevelt, the fifth child of President Theodore Roosevelt, 
protested the award. Well-known as a militant conservative and anti-
communist, Roosevelt wrote and published a 44-page treatise attacking 
Bunche for his communist sympathies. Roosevelt sent the treatise to 
all of the members of the Foundation’s board. Sulzberger forwarded his 
copy to John D. Rockefeller 3rd with a note: “In view of our action in 
electing Dr. Bunche a trustee—an action, incidentally, of which I’m very 
proud—I thought it nonetheless advisable to pass the attached on to you 
which I received from Archie Roosevelt.” It took more than a decade for 
the Foundation to nominate another African American trustee. In 1967, 
Whitney M. Young Jr., the executive director of the National Urban  
League since 1961, joined the board and became the second African 
American member.
“Clearly there are 
outstanding women who 
could add substantially to the 
deliberations of the board.”  
J. George Harrar, 1969
Chapter Four: Board 121120 Beyond Charity
in assets), only 12 percent of the trustees were women. At the Rockefeller 
Foundation, there were three women among twenty-three trustees. 
Alice Ilchman’s election as chair of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
1995 marked several milestones in the Foundation’s history. She was not 
only the first woman to serve as chair, but the first chair who had trained 
professionally in the field of development, having received her Ph.D. from 
the London School of Economics in 1960 with a dissertation focused on 
agricultural planning in India. Her resume reflected both scholarship 
and administrative experience in academia, as well as service in the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA) and the Department of State before becoming 
president of Sarah Lawrence College in 1981.
Diversity took on new meaning in the 1980s as the Foundation sought 
to internationalize the board. Despite the fact that five previous members 
of the Board had been non-Americans, the board struggled with the 
concept. In the early 1990s, however, a significant transition began. Alvaro 
Umaña, an environmental scientist and former minister for Energy and 
Environment in Costa Rica, brought a Central American perspective. Ela 
R. Bhatt, the general secretary of the Self Employed Women’s Association, 
brought an intimate knowledge of the women, microfinance and 
entrepreneurship in India. By 1993, Foundation president Peter Goldmark 
declared that “We have at last breached the international barrier and …
we have good diversity in ethnic, gender, geographic dimensions, and a 
terrific sense of collegiality and involvement.” The trend continued over 
the next decade. In 1999, Mamphela Ramphele, the vice chancellor of 
the University of Cape Town, became the first African to join the board. 
Vo Tong Xuan, the rector of An Giang University in Vietnam, was elected 
in 2002. By 2003, members from the developing world accounted for 28 
percent of the board’s makeup.
From A dvisors to Professional Trustees
As it evolved over a century, the culture of the Rockefeller Foundation board of trustees was not only shaped by the relationship with the Rockefeller family, the staff, and the 
public at large, it was also heavily influenced by the evolution of its own 
standards of practice. An informal process of identifying and nominating 
prospective trustees, and then the terms of trustees and the chair, became 
increasingly formal. These innovations sometimes led and sometimes 
followed the development of the field of philanthropy, but they played a 
critical role in shaping the governance of the Foundation. 
Dr. Mathilde Krim was a geneticist specializing 
in cytogenetics and tumor-inducing viruses at the 
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research. Born in 
Italy, she earned her Ph.D. at the University of Geneva, 
was on the staff of the Weizmann Institute of Science, 
then joined the Division of Virus Research at Cornell 
Medical College in 1959. She had moved to Sloan-
Kettering in 1962. In addition to her leading research 
in the fields of cytogenetics and tumor-inducing 
viruses, Krim was active in the Urban League and the African American 
Institute. Krim joined the board in 1971 with enthusiasm. She was 
followed by several other women, and, in 1981, Eleanor Holmes Norton, a 
senior fellow at the Urban Institute and former chair of the Federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, joined the board as the first 
woman of color.
The Foundation’s move to diversify by race and ethnicity was well 
ahead of the majority of foundations in the United States, but about on 
par with its peers among the largest foundations. A 1980 study by the 
Council on Foundations, for example, found that of 294 foundations 
surveyed, 96 percent of trustees were white and 79 percent were male. 
Most of the women who served as trustees served on the boards of 
smaller foundations. Among the largest foundations (over $100 million 
Mathilde Krim was the first woman 
elected to the Rockefeller Foundation 
Board of Trustees. With a Ph.D. from 
the University of Geneva, Krim was 
a geneticist at the Sloan-Kettering 
Institute for Cancer Research when  
she joined the board in 1971.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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During the early years, the board developed a number of rules that 
would be handed down to their successors. The Foundation paid for travel 
expenses related to meetings, but the trustees were not paid for their 
service. When conflicts of interest arose—a potential grant to a university 
whose president served on the Foundation’s board, for example—the 
custom developed that the trustee would step out of the meeting during 
the discussion.
As self-perpetuating entities, boards face a major challenge in deciding 
how long a member should serve. In 1929, trustee Ray Lyman Wilbur 
suggested and the board adopted a mandatory retirement age of sixty-
five. Until the 1970s, age was the only limit on trustee tenure. Many 
trustees served for more than a decade. Junior and his son were each on 
the board for more than three decades. In 1969, however, George Harrar 
recommended some changes. Board members would be elected for three-
year terms, with a virtually automatic renewal for a second three-year 
term. Board members could continue for a third three-year term, but the 
nominating committee was charged with making this re-nomination 
contingent on attendance and board service. “The contribution of 
Trustees who cannot undertake any activities beyond attendance at 
full board meetings may largely be fulfilled during the first two terms.” 
The board adopted these rules in 1970, then revised them in 1982 to 
limit membership to two five-year terms. At that time, only one other 
foundation among the largest thirty-five had both a mandatory retirement 
age and a limit on the number of terms that a trustee could serve.
Throughout the history of the Foundation, the board has also tried 
different approaches to its overall size and the frequency of its meetings. 
After he became president of the Foundation, John Knowles expanded 
the role of the board in the mid-1970s. The number of board meetings 
was increased from two to four [cut back to three in 1978]. To deepen 
the board’s understanding of the Foundation’s work, trustee-staff review 
committees were created to stimulate dialogue between the officers and 
the trustees. Knowles also revised the ways in which information was 
presented to the board, and revived the practice of encouraging board 
members to visit project and field stations abroad.
By the early 1980s, however, there was a sense that things weren’t 
working. With twenty-four members in 1982, the board was too big, 
according to some. [It may have been the largest board among private 
foundations with assets over $10 million]. With more than twenty 
members, discussions were too formal. After extended debate, the board 
set a target of not fewer than fifteen members, but fewer than twenty-five.
One board member in particular played a key 
role in pushing for reforms that would formalize 
expectations and procedures. Scion of the founder of 
the Dayton-Hudson department store in Minneapolis, 
Kenneth Dayton was CEO of the firm when he joined 
the Rockefeller Foundation board in 1977. A powerful 
advocate for ethical board reform within the corporate 
and nonprofit worlds, Dayton pushed for a number of changes at the 
Rockefeller Foundation, including a definite limit on the chairman’s 
tenure. “No public institution with a public purpose should be too closely 
tied to one individual, no matter how good he/she may be,” Dayton 
suggested in a paper on the governance of philanthropic institutions. 
He also advocated strengthening conflict-of-interest rules, including 
the board’s established custom for members to recuse themselves 
from discussions of grants for institutions they had an interest in. He 
recommended that board members rotate between committees so that 
they had the opportunity to serve on more than one committee during 
their tenure on the board. 
Eleanor Holmes Norton and Dayton both pushed for a trustee search 
process that relied less on board members’ personal knowledge of 
potential candidates. Dayton and fellow board member Victor Palmieri 
suggested engaging a professional search firm. At the time, most private 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, as the former 
chair of the U.S. Equal Opportunity 
Commission, increased awareness of 
issues related to women and poverty 
after she became a member of the 
Rockefeller Foundation board in 1981.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.) 
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foundations engaged in a relatively ad hoc approach 
to trustee recruitment. Board members exchanged 
lists of personal recommendations. Staff researched 
these individuals and shared their research with 
the board. The president or board members vetted 
candidates that were high on the board’s list to 
determine whether they would “fit” and whether 
they were willing to serve. This was true at the Ford 
Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation, and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. 
Some institutions rejected the idea of using an outside 
search firm. Several people suggested the idea was 
gauche, if not “kooky.” At least one board member said 
that if a board of the caliber of the Rockefeller Foundation 
was not able to identify prospective trustees, something 
was wrong. But Dayton’s point was that the board needed 
to open its search process to candidates who might not fall 
within the networks of the existing board. That was the 
only way it could avoid shutting out other perspectives.
All of these reforms in the 1980s and 1990s helped to 
professionalize board practices. Many of these initiatives 
were at the forefront of changes taking place throughout 
the philanthropic sector. Though they had not been 
introduced by John D. Rockefeller Jr. and his associates in 
the 1910s, they built upon years of effort by the Foundation’s 
leaders to fashion a board that would be broadly representative 
first of the United States, and eventually of the world in which 
the Foundation practiced. Over the course of these years, cultural 
prejudices that discriminated by race and gender had to be 
overcome. The long, slow process of balancing the influence of the 
donor and his family with that of outside board members had to be 
negotiated. And professional expectations for board service had to 
be developed and accepted by all the trustees. By the end of its first 
century, the Rockefeller Foundation board undoubtedly continued 
to struggle with many of the issues confronted by earlier trustees, 
but it was also the beneficiary of past crises and inspired reforms.
Candid With the Public
To many people philanthropy is a private act. 
Tax deductions for charitable contributions, 
however, suggest that the public has a right 
to know how philanthropic dollars are used. 
As late as the 1960s, very few private foun-
dations published annual reports. Fewer still 
shared their financial information.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s first annual 
report, published in 1915, marked an impor-
tant step in the evolution of modern philan-
thropy. The extensive document provided 
details on the Foundation’s grantmaking 
as well as photographs from its programs 
around the world. It listed the names of all 
the trustees as well as the staff so that the 
public would know who was involved with 
the organization. The financial statement 
listed every security owned by the Founda-
tion along with its book value.
To be sure, controversies surrounding 
the breakup of Standard Oil and the violent 
conflict between labor and management at 
the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and 
Iron Company played a role in the decision 
to publish all of this data. John D. Rockefell-
er Jr.’s experiences before Congress and the 
Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915 
further convinced him that candor  
was important.
Over decades the Foundation’s annual 
reports have evolved to keep pace with the 
culture and operations of the organization. 
Today, readers are more likely  to access 
them online rather than read them in print. 
But they still serve as an important tool for 
engaging the public in the shared work of 
promoting the well-being of humankind.
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B road missions empower boards to establish boundaries through programming, but also provide latitude to future generations to adapt to the 
changing needs of society. At any given time, however, 
foundations must focus their resources to be effective. 
Inevitably they have to ask, which problems are solvable 
and at what scale? Given the resources we have available, 
can we make a difference? 
With its creation in 1913, the Rockefeller Foundation 
was at the forefront of “scientific” philanthropy. 
Focused on addressing the root causes of society’s ills, 
scientific philanthropy embraced the systems approach 
to organization and the use of the scientific method 
to study a problem before developing possible solu-
tions. Researchers launched field surveys to compile 
information on the scope of a problem—the incidence of 
hookworm in a community, numbers of patients in mental 
wards, or the prevalence of laboratories in medical 
schools. Programs were anchored in this research. Many 
foundations still take a systems approach when establish-
ing their programs.
Relative to the size of the private and public sectors 
of the economy, foundations and philanthropy are small. 
To make change, most look for ways to leverage their 
How should the  
program be organized?
investments by either catalyzing contributions from 
others (financial leverage) or igniting larger processes 
of social change (social leverage). This can be a delicate 
art. Finding points of leverage demands a sophisticated 
knowledge of the social systems that surround a given 
problem. Success or failure is often determined by the 
timing and quantity of resources employed. Too much 
investment can become a disincentive to others. Too little 
may mean a project or idea never gets off the ground.
Leverage is also possible when a concept or project 
is scalable, meaning it can easily grow without huge 
additional capital investments. In some cases, other 
organizations are able to replicate a new way of doing 
things—tracking disease, introducing new seeds, or offer-
ing vaccinations. In other situations, a project or program 
that proves successful in one community can be adopted 
by government to benefit a nation.
At its core, the idea of leverage depends on a theory of 
change. For the Rockefeller Foundation and many other 
philanthropic initiatives, the theory of change has been 
rooted in the transformative power of knowledge and ed-
ucation. Investing in the development of new knowledge, 
whether it is in basic science or human behavior, opens 
the door to innovation. New insights can lead to new ways 
of living or doing that solve problems. But knowledge 
alone is rarely transformative. Ideas need to spread. 
Figuring out how to develop and disseminate information 
and ideas isn’t easy. Philanthropic organizations struggle 
with this critical issue every day. Fundamentally, it shapes 
their decisions about what they will and what they won’t 
do with the limited resources they have available, just as it 
did in New York in 1913. 
How should the program be organized?
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At the American University in Beirut, students 
studied chemistry in a new classroom building 
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation in the 
late 1920s. In its early years, the Foundation’s 
program focused heavily on improving medical 
education, scientific research and public health. 
(Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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Flood Waters R ise in Ohio
On Easter Sunday, March 23, 1913, it began to rain across Ohio. Through the night and the next day it poured, water saturating fields, flowing into creeks, rushing downstream to swell the four rivers that converge at the city of Dayton. At midnight on 
Tuesday, March 25, the police activated warning sirens and alarms. By 5:30 
in the morning, the water was streaming over the tops of levees and flooding 
downtown streets. Then the levees on the south side failed and a rush of water 
poured through the city. As residents fled for high ground, carting whatever 
valuables they could carry, buildings collapsed and houses were carried off. 
Meanwhile, gas mains broke. Explosions and fires filled the morning sky with 
an eerie light. By the time the floodwaters had receded, more than 360 people 
were dead and 65,000 displaced. Property damage was assessed at more than 
$100 million (more than $2 billion in 2012 dollars). Dayton bore the brunt of 
the flood, but all along the Ohio River and its tributaries, other communities 
suffered devastation. Appeals for help and relief went out across the nation. 
Charitable New Yorkers raised more than $400,000 within a matter of days 
to help feed and shelter families and begin the process of reconstruction. 
But the rebuilding would take years and millions of dollars in capital. The 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) turned to the newly established 
Rockefeller Foundation for help. 
In the early days of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, trustees 
often met in the Whitehall Club 
on the thirtieth floor overlooking 
New York harbor. (Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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American history. It was difficult to imagine the hardship in the Midwest, and 
tougher still to decide if this was the kind of work the Rockefeller Foundation 
should do. 
The petitions from Ohio forced the trustees to wrestle with fundamental 
issues. How would they decide among many requests for funding? How 
would they prioritize? What would be their attitude in the face of crisis and 
grave human suffering? How would they balance the needs of the present 
against the good they might do over the long run? 
As the discussion continued, Gates made the point that the Foundation 
could not afford to consider these kinds of requests for relief. Instead, “the 
Rockefeller Foundation should in general confine itself to projects of an 
important character, too large to be undertaken, or otherwise unlikely to be 
undertaken, by other agencies.” With this determination, the board declined 
to provide money to the YMCAs of Ohio.
To give the board some kind of structure for giving, over the next several 
months Jerome Greene, the secretary and chief administrative officer, pre-
pared a memorandum on principles and policies as a kind of distillation of 
the lessons learned by Rockefeller and his advisors over the course of many 
years of philanthropic practices:
• individual charity and relief was excluded;
• institutions and enterprises that were purely local were excluded, except 
those that might serve as models for other places and communities;
• grants should not be made without significant local matching 
contributions;
• grants should never be seen to be permanent and ongoing and should 
never exceed more than half of the organization’s current budget;
• gifts should not be made in perpetuity (avoid restrictive endowments);
• grants should address root problems rather than ameliorate immediate 
suffering because the effects of these grants are more long lasting.
Greene’s principles, as Fosdick later observed, formed a program only in 
the negative. They outlined what the Foundation would not do, but not what 
it would do. Over the next several years, the trustees worked to establish the 
basic framework for a program that would last in broad strokes for decades. 
But the staff and trustees were rarely comfortable with its contours. Over the 
next century, they would constantly revise it at the margins and occasionally 
make dramatic and sweeping changes as each generation learned from the 
past to innovate for the future.
Students and staff at the Peking Union 
Medical College. Medical science, 
medical education, and public health 
emerged as the primary fields of focus 
for the Rockefeller Foundation and its 
sister organizations in the 1910s and 
1920s. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Barely six weeks had elapsed since the governor of New 
York had signed the Act creating the Foundation. In their 
first two meetings, the trustees had focused primarily on 
establishing the administrative structure of the organiza-
tion. On July 1, 1913, the trustees gathered at the Whitehall 
Club on the thirtieth floor of the Whitehall Building, 
overlooking New York Harbor, and considered grant 
requests for the first time—including an appeal from the YMCA in Ohio to 
help rebuild and rehabilitate damaged YMCA buildings in Dayton and other 
communities in the Ohio River Valley. 
Rockefeller attorney and board member Starr Murphy didn’t need to 
explain why the devastated communities in Ohio needed help, but he took 
the time to remark that, given the disaster, the YMCA could not tap local 
resources to pay for this work. As waiters in white coats served plates of food 
and a cool breeze blew in through the windows on a mild summer day, the 
request from Ohio undoubtedly made the men around the table uncomfort-
able. The devastation was enormous, one of the worst natural disasters in 
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Rockefeller Foundation relief efforts 
during World War I were designed to 
catalyze contributions from others. 
John D. Rockefeller Jr. personally 
helped promote community giving.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Focusing on Medicine and P ublic Health
Rockefeller and his advisors were committed to a scientific approach to philanthropy. Their strategy was shaped by the pattern of Rockefeller’s past giving, the exigencies of the moment, and their collective goals 
for the future. In 1913, that pattern suggested a certain framework—church 
missions, health and sanitation, and education. In this framework, the 
Rockefeller Foundation would establish quasi-independent operating entities 
that would focus on delivering services within specific communities. 
Gates was clear about his program preferences. “Disease is the supreme ill 
of human life,” he told the board, “and it is the main source of almost all other 
human ills—poverty, crime, ignorance, vice, inefficiency, hereditary taint, and 
many other evils.” During the charter fight, Jerome Greene had made it clear 
to Congress that the Rockefeller Foundation would expand the hookworm 
campaign internationally, “not for altruistic motives merely but because no 
one country can be safe until all have been cleared of this pest.” Thus, one of 
the board’s first acts was to ask Wickliffe Rose, the director of the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission, to plan for the internationalization of the hookworm 
campaign. The board established the International Health Board to carry 
forward this work.
With the support of several other board members, Gates also pushed 
through a major initiative in China to create the Peking Union Medical 
College (PUMC). With its investments, the Foundation hoped the PUMC, 
modeled after Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, would introduce 
science-based medicine to China. Over the next three decades, the Foundation 
would invest nearly $45 million in PUMC and other China projects. In con-
stant dollars, this was the largest investment the Foundation made in any one 
project in its history. 
While Gates focused on medicine and health, the trustees also considered 
establishing an Institute for Economic Research and explored major initia-
tives focusing on industrial relations and mental hygiene. In the aftermath 
of the Ludlow massacre in Colorado and the highly publicized hearings by 
the Commission on Industrial Relations, however, the board shied away from 
controversial subjects and followed Gates and Rose into the fields of medical 
education, public health, and medical science. In these arenas, the Foundation 
operated directly. In other programmatic areas, the Foundation favored grant-
making to outside agencies that were not under the Foundation’s control. 
World War I brought human misery beyond imagination. John D. 
Rockefeller had challenged the Foundation’s leaders to address the root causes 
of human misery rather than provide relief for current problems. Confronted 
with the devastation of the war, and despite their resolution 
in the face of the Ohio floods, the trustees agreed to provide 
more than $22 million ($285 million in 2011 dollars) in aid 
to avoid mass starvation in Belgium and fight disease in 
France and other war-ravaged European nations. For five 
years, the war and its aftermath consumed much of the focus 
of the Foundation’s activities. 
Through the 1920s, the Foundation worked alongside sister Rockefeller 
philanthropies including the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, the 
General Education Board (GEB), the International Education Board (IEB), the 
China Medical Board (CMB) and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial 
(LSRM). Each of these organizations was separately incorporated with its 
own funds and trustees, but some trustees sat on multiple boards, and John D. 
Rockefeller Jr. served on all of them. The Rockefeller Institute studied disease 
in its New York laboratories. The GEB continued its support for the nation’s 
leading universities and for education in the South, primarily for African 
Americans. The IEB worked to advance research and develop higher education 
abroad, particularly in Europe. The CMB oversaw the development of the 
Peking Union Medical College. Meanwhile, the LSRM, under the direction of 
Beardsley Ruml, worked in the fields of social science, the humanities and race 
relations. Within the Foundation, the International Health Board operated as 
a semi-autonomous entity. Sometimes it was hard for outsiders to distinguish 
the differences among these organizations. Internally, competing programs 
and ambiguous lines of authority created confusion. 
In Brazil and other countries, nurses 
were critical to the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s efforts to increase 
the capacity of health systems in 
various nations around the world. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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In 1928, trustee Raymond Fosdick, with the advice and sup-
port of Rockefeller Senior and Junior and the cooperation of 
president George Vincent, facilitated a reorganization of some of 
the Rockefeller philanthropies. The LSRM became a part of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and its assets and obligations were added to 
the Foundation’s books. The China Medical Board was organized as 
an independent, self-perpetuating organization with its own board 
of trustees and ownership of the project’s assets, including land 
and buildings in Peking, as well as endowment funds and annual 
appropriations to be given by the Rockefeller Foundation. In the new 
structure, the public health program would be under an International 
Health Division supervised by a group of seven scientific directors. 
Meanwhile, the natural science and humanities programs of the GEB 
and the IEB were moved to the Rockefeller Foundation. With this reor-
ganization, the Foundation also made a fundamental shift in program.
A dvancement of K nowledge
With the consolidation, the program of the Foundation was reoriented around a key goal: advancing human knowl-edge. The International Health Division (IHD) continued its 
fight against hookworm, yellow fever, malaria, and other diseases in its labo-
ratories in New York and in the field from Thailand to Nigeria. Meanwhile, 
under the new structure, the Foundation focused primarily on grantmaking 
in four broad arenas: medical sciences, natural sciences, social sciences, and 
the humanities. With these grantmaking activities, the Foundation worked 
closely with research institutions in the United States and Europe. Its grantees 
made spectacular contributions to the development of basic knowledge in  
physics and molecular biology. They also created treatments for disease, 
including penicillin. Some grantees received Nobel Prizes for their work. 
Through the 1930s, the Foundation placed new emphasis on laboratory 
work while the world struggled with a global economic depression and 
the Foundation’s officers nervously watched the rise of totalitarianism in 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Soviet Union, and Japan. The IHD worked on 
malaria, influenza, typhus, syphilis, yaws, streptococcal infections, and other 
diseases. Among its many breakthroughs, the development of a vaccine  
for yellow fever, led by Max Theiler, would be recognized with the Nobel Prize  
in 1951.
The Foundation’s other programs also focused heavily on research. Under 
director Warren Weaver, the Natural Sciences Division played a leading role 
in the emerging field of molecular biology. Rockefeller Foundation funding 
helped scientists build and use critical new tools including the ultra-
centrifuge, the cyclotron, and powerful new telescopes to see into space. 
Meanwhile, in the social sciences, the Foundation invested in increasingly 
quantitative efforts to study business cycles and address the root causes of 
the economic depression. 
The rise of totalitarianism and the onset of World War II, however, were 
profoundly disruptive to the Foundation’s work. Many scholars and scien-
tists working in Europe were forced to flee totalitarian regimes. Through 
its refugee scholars program, the Foundation helped a significant number 
of these researchers find new intellectual homes in the safety of Britain 
and the United States. National governments, focused on research and 
development that would help them win the war, recruited many of these 
scientists into war-related research. Under these changed circumstances, 
the Foundation re-evaluated its program. Raymond Fosdick even asked 
the officers whether the Foundation ought to suspend its major activities. 
Beyond the immediate question, Fosdick recognized that once the war was 
over, the world would be profoundly different. Though he and others at the 
Foundation could not foresee the details, they were already beginning to 
recognize the contours of the new landscape. 
Agriculture, Education and Development
T he program of the Rockefeller Foundation shifted dramatically after World War II to respond to major changes in the political and institutional environment in which the Foundation operated. 
On the one hand, the demise of the colonial system brought opportunities 
to engage directly with newly independent governments and peoples in 
what became known as the developing or Third world. The rise of the 
Cold War, however, sharply limited these opportunities to countries not 
aligned with the Soviet Union and China and cast geopolitical overtones 
on nearly all international initiatives. The establishment of the United 
Nations and the World Health Organization obviated the traditional role 
of the International Health Division. Increases in government spending in 
the United States for basic research in science—under the auspices of the 
National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and other 
government entities—forced the Rockefeller Foundation to rethink its role 
in basic research. A dramatic expansion of the philanthropic sector that in-
cluded the emergence of the Ford Foundation as the world’s richest private 
With the creation of the 
World Health Organization 
and the establishment of 
the United Nations after 
World War II, the Rockefeller 
Foundation shifted its 
primary focus to food, 
nutrition, and development. 
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foundation forced the Rockefeller Foundation to 
shift from its prewar traditions of solo initiatives to 
focus more on collaboration and cooperation with 
other foundations and international agencies. Most 
of these changes played out over many years. The 
Foundation’s ability to adjust, however painfully at 
times, would provide lessons to future generations 
of philanthropic leaders.
In 1946, the trustees sought to cope with this 
changing world. They appointed a special com-
mittee (Chester Barnard, William Myers, John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd, and Walter Stewart) to review 
the program and plans of the foundation. As the 
committee pointed out, this was the first complete 
review of the program undertaken in eleven years.
 As the trustees struggled to reinterpret the 
mission in light of postwar concerns and the 
Foundation’s resources, they defined three primary 
objectives: 1) to understand human behavior; 2) to 
promote a better American national life, and 3) to 
facilitate international understanding and coopera-
tion. The committee acknowledged that the objec-
tives were broad. Providing continuity with the 
past, they reaffirmed that the core principle of these three programs should 
be “the extension and application of knowledge.” They noted that people in 
many parts of the world were not yet benefiting from existing knowledge, so 
they stressed application. “World conditions stress the need not only for the 
continuation of important basic research but also for concentrated and in-
tense effort upon the application of existing knowledge to man’s well-being.” 
To achieve these goals, the committee recommended programs that would 
focus on health, agriculture (including nutrition), and education “since these 
are basic and fundamental to the well-being of man and not controversial, and 
since the Foundation and its sister organization, the General Education Board, 
have had considerable experience in these fields.”
While the officers and trustees focused on understanding the postwar 
world, the future of the Foundation was largely being shaped in the field. A 
new initiative had already been launched during World War II that reflected 
the Foundation’s historic opportunism and pragmatism and would play a 
profound part in the Foundation’s postwar history.
With Europe and Asia in chaos during the war, the Foundation looked 
again to Latin America. For many years the International Health Division had 
worked with Latin American governments on public health campaigns. In 
the 1930s, however, Foundation staff, encouraged by the U.S. Ambassador to 
Mexico Josephus Daniels, had been urging the Foundation’s leaders to consid-
er a program in Mexico to increase food production. After U.S. Vice President 
and former Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace joined this chorus early 
in 1941, president Raymond Fosdick agreed to see what could be done. These 
conversations would open a whole new era in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
efforts to promote the well-being of humankind and lead to a significant shift 
in focus from health to agriculture.
What came to be known as the Green Revolution started in Mexico in 
1943 with a simple focus: to dramatically increase agricultural production by 
developing higher-yielding varieties of basic food grains like wheat and corn, 
improving irrigation, and enhancing fertilizing techniques. Along the way, 
working closely with the national government, the Foundation supported 
the training of a generation of Mexican agronomists and scientists to lead and 
sustain a permanent increase in food production. The pro-
gram was enormously successful. By preventing widespread 
famine, the increase in food production alone is estimated 
to have saved over one billion lives. In 1970, Rockefeller 
Foundation scientist Norman Borlaug was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for his work on this initiative.
Josephus Daniels (pictured above), the U.S. 
ambassador to Mexico, and John Ferrell of 
the Rockefeller Foundation talked several 
times in the 1930s about an effort to promote 
agricultural development in Mexico. These 
conversations came to fruition in 1943 when 
the Rockefeller Foundation launched an  
effort to help increase agricultural yields.  
(Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
As chairman of the Foundation,  
John D. Rockefeller 3rd (left) 
strongly supported efforts by 
presidents Dean Rusk (middle) 
and George Harrar (right) to fight 
hunger in the developing world.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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The simplicity of the model in Mexico made it easily exportable to other 
countries. Similar programs were launched in Colombia, Chile, and then 
India. In each country, the program was changed to fit the circumstances of 
local government and the environment. The ascent of the agriculture program 
was accompanied in 1951 by the historic end of the International Health 
Division, which had been criticized by a board review committee for having 
lost touch with the socioeconomic factors affecting public health. The  
IHD’s remaining programs were merged with the Foundation’s Division  
of Medical Sciences. 
After Dean Rusk became president in 1952, the Foundation’s work in eco-
nomic and social development took on new meaning. Having seen the world 
for many years from the perspective of U.S. State Department, Rusk believed 
that the success and stability of the newly independent nations of Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East was critical to the well-being of their citizens and to 
world peace. 
Rusk’s support for the agriculture program was evident in 1959, when 
he promoted J. George Harrar, who had joined the Rockefeller Foundation 
as a field scientist in Mexico, to become vice president of the Foundation 
with broad administrative responsibility. Harrar also enjoyed the support of 
the board and the chairman, John D. Rockefeller 3rd. In 1961, after President 
John Kennedy tapped Dean Rusk to be Secretary of State, the board promoted 
Harrar to be president of the Foundation. 
Agriculture dominated the Foundation’s 
programs in the 1960s. From country-specific 
programs, however, the Foundation increas-
ingly shifted to the creation and stabilization of 
specialized international research institutes in 
agriculture. Funded collaboratively with the Ford 
Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and 
various international agencies, these institutes 
eventually became independent. Foundation 
support focused on funding research. 
Harrar oversaw a fundamental realign-
ment of the Foundation’s program in 1963, a 
realignment that confirmed the new direction 
of the postwar era. In September of that year, 
the board articulated five major goals for the 
Foundation, three of them focused on the 
developing world: 1) overcome hunger and 
malnutrition, 2) stimulate the development of 
strong universities; 3) stabilize the growth of popu-
lations. The other two goals were aimed primarily 
at the United States: focus on issues affecting equal 
opportunity and enhance the development of the 
nation’s cultural resources.
Through the 1960s and early 70s, the 
Rockefeller Foundation worked to strengthen 
health, agriculture, and social science programs 
at universities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
Foundation staff worked as faculty members in 
these universities. They were supplemented by 
visiting professors from schools in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Meanwhile, 
promising indigenous scholars were given op-
portunities to complete pre- and post-doctoral work 
abroad with the expectation that they would return 
to their home countries and join the faculties of 
national universities. 
A dramatic drop in the stock market coupled 
with rapid inflation in the 1970s forced the Rockefeller 
Foundation to reevaluate its programs. Under a new 
president in 1972, the board began a fundamental review, 
soliciting input from other foundation leaders as well as 
the Foundation’s staff. As part of this review, President John 
Knowles raised existential questions. With diminished 
resources, should the foundation continue the expensive 
operating programs—like the university development and the agriculture 
programs—that had been so successful? Could it afford such staff-intensive 
initiatives? Or should the foundation pivot and focus more on grantmak-
ing? Should it become a think tank or a non-profit consulting firm? Or 
should it find a way to balance or fuse these various options?
Knowles published the results of these deliberations in The Course 
Ahead in 1974. In general, the report supported the work of the existing 
programs, but added two more: a renewed emphasis on the arts and 
humanities and the creation of a program to focus on international rela-
tions. But as financial pressures increased in the latter part of the decade, 
Knowles pulled back. In 1977, he announced that the Foundation would 
begin winding down the Education for Development Program. 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Foundation took stock. The 
staff-intensive field operations that had characterized the eras of the 
Faced with rampant inflation and a 
weak stock market, President John 
Knowles, a physician and former 
hospital administrator, launched 
a fundamental review of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s programs  
in the 1970s. (Daniel Bernstein.  
Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Millions of doses of yellow fever 
vaccine produced by the International 
Health Division in New York were 
provided to Allied soldiers and 
civilians during World War II.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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International Health Division, the Green Revolution, and 
the University Development Program no longer seemed 
viable given the Foundation’s assets and income. Moreover, 
as Rockefeller Foundation officer Joyce Moock pointed out, 
developing countries were no longer tolerant of highly vis-
ible expatriate staff in key positions within their national 
institutions. Neither were they willing to allow foreigners to bypass normal 
administrative channels or cut through bureaucratic red tape to launch 
new initiatives. In addition, with an increasing emphasis on collaboration 
with other foundations and non-government organizations, the strategic 
options for the Foundation seemed to revolve around a more centralized 
grantmaking program. 
Building on its long-term strengths, the Rockefeller Foundation an-
nounced a major new program in 1986 to promote science-based develop-
ment. Richard Lyman, who had become president in 1980, pointed out that 
national independence and development were increasingly reliant on the 
presence of a cadre of scientists in every nation. Investing in this human 
capital was critical to the future of developing nations. Arguably, the program 
continued many of the traditions of health, agriculture and education initia-
tives created earlier in the Foundation’s history. But Lyman and his senior vice 
president Kenneth Prewitt, as well as other leaders, imagined a radical break 
from the past. 
Having learned from prior experience, the Foundation sought to ensure 
that techniques and strategies were introduced in ways they could be adapted 
to fit local conditions and communities. They imagined a profoundly inter-
disciplinary initiative that would look at problems from multiple points 
of view. In many ways, they were taking a significant risk. As one of the 
Foundation’s consultants pointed out, despite enormous attention to the 
problem there was very little agreement in the field of development theory 
and even less understanding of the role of science. If successful,  
the Rockefeller initiative “may induce first-rate minds to address this 
formidable challenge.” 
Under the aegis of the Science-Based Development Program, the 
Foundation continued to emphasize many traditional themes, but with 
a fresh approach. The investment in human capital continued as the 
Foundation sponsored Leadership for Environment and Development 
(LEAD) to broaden the conversation among mid-career professionals 
working in these fields in the developing world. Between 1985 and 2000, 
half of the Foundation’s staff in Agricultural Sciences was dedicated to rice 
biotechnology for Asia. The Foundation invested nearly $110 million in 
this effort. The argument for this investment was straightforward: over 
70 percent of the world’s poor lived in Asia, and rice provided anywhere 
from a third to half of the food calories consumed in the region. In health, 
the Foundation also looked for ways to take relatively simple steps that 
would make large-scale differences. In 1980, the Foundation launched the 
International Clinical Epidemiology Network (INCLEN) to strengthen 
health policymaking in developing countries and focus care in areas that 
could make the biggest impact for the most people. With the leadership of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, the organization soon attracted support from a 
wide variety of international organizations. INCLEN also hoped to serve as 
an early warning system when new pandemics like HIV/AIDS struck.
HIV/AIDS was a critical target of the Foundation’s philanthropy in the 
late 1980s as Rockefeller played a leading role in urging American founda-
tions to focus on the disease in the developing world. At a time when 
U.S. foundations were spending $150 million for treatment and research, 
only $8.6 million was reaching the developing world, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation provided half of this total.
 By 1990, when the Foundation awarded nearly $95 million in grants 
and fellowships, its science-based development programs in agriculture, 
health, and population received about 43 percent of the total. Newer 
science-related initiatives tied to the global environment accounted for 
another $6.5 million or 7 percent. Long-standing domestic programs fo-
cused on arts and humanities and equal opportunity accounted for another 
32 percent. Newer initiatives focusing on school reform and international 
When Richard Lyman became 
president in the 1980s, he cut 
staff dramatically and shifted the 
focus of the Foundation from 
field operations to grantmaking.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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security made up 7 percent of the awards. The remaining 11 percent went for 
a variety of special projects and initiatives.
Collaboration had become a driving component of program strategy. In 
1990, for example, the Foundation joined with the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts to create the Energy 
Foundation. The goal: to help the United States on the road to a policy of 
high energy efficiency and energy renewables. This effort was matched 
in the developing world with support for alternative energy initiatives to 
help triple the production of electricity and other energy services for the 
poor. Meanwhile, in Africa, the Foundation convened the Working Group 
on Female Participation in Education, a collaboration organized under the 
auspices of the World Bank, which led to the establishment of the Forum 
for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). By encouraging the education 
of girls in Africa—where only ten percent of females attended secondary 
schools—the project hoped to reap long-term benefits in terms of economic 
self-sufficiency, improved health management, and family planning at the 
household level. In the United States, the Foundation also joined the Ford 
Foundation-led National Community Development Initiative to help promote 
grassroots efforts to renew inner city neighborhood infrastructure.
New initiatives often grabbed the attention of the Foundation’s leaders, 
but initiatives like the Foundation’s Population Sciences Program, first 
developed in the immediate postwar years, evidenced the value of a sustained 
commitment. In 1991, the New York Times noted “a remarkable success story 
in international development.” Since the mid-1960s, population growth rates 
in the third world had been cut in half. The Times called this “a Contraceptive 
Revolution that is every bit as impressive as agriculture’s Green Revolution.” 
Despite the success of the population program, the Rockefeller Foundation 
had begun to move away from its internationalist perspective. In the 1980s, 
under Richard Lyman, although nearly 70 percent of annual spending went 
overseas, offices abroad were closed and international staffing was reduced. 
Under Peter Goldmark, who became president in 1988, the Foundation’s 
traditional emphasis on science also declined. Goldmark was more focused on 
the environment, equal opportunity, community development, school reform, 
and other domestic issues in the United States. When it came time to look for 
his successor, the Foundation wanted an internationalist, according to trustee 
Alice Ilchman, “someone with strong on-the-ground experience in developing 
countries and proven expertise in the science and technology of hunger and 
disease”—someone who would, in effect, return the Foundation to its tradi-
tional emphasis on scientific internationalism.
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As the 12th president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Gordon Conway 
reaffirmed that focus on scientific internationalism. An agricultural ecolo-
gist born in the United Kingdom, Conway had trained at the universities 
of Bangor, Cambridge, and West Indies, and had received a Ph.D. from the 
University of California (Davis) in systems ecology. He became a pioneer in 
the field of sustainable agriculture in the 1960s. Over the next two decades, 
he worked on projects sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the World Bank, 
and USAID in Asia and the Middle East. Remarkably, he was a leading critic 
of some of the methods of the Green Revolution. 
Conway moved to make the Rockefeller Foundation “more explicitly 
global.” Even before he officially stepped into his role, he encouraged the 
staff to think of ways in which the Foundation could “make a real and sig-
nificant difference to the well-being of the poor” that would result in people 
being “better fed, in better health, better educated and skilled.” “We should 
be aiming at sustainable livelihoods,” he wrote. As president, he revitalized 
two of the Foundation’s signature areas—agriculture and health—under 
the themes of Food Security and Health Equity. He also initiated an inter-
disciplinary or “cross-theme” initiative called Global Inclusion to focus on 
biotechnology, intellectual property, and world trade. He strengthened the 
Foundation’s international field offices.
In 2005, Judith Rodin replaced Gordon Conway as president of 
the Rockefeller Foundation. The former president of the University of 
Pennsylvania, and the first woman to lead an Ivy League university, Rodin 
recognized that the Foundation needed to adjust to changing dynamics. 
With an awareness of the complexity, dyna-
mism, volatility and uncertainty of globalization 
in mind, Rodin led the Foundation through a 
strategic review of its programs. A new plan 
emerged that continued the Foundation’s efforts 
to promote the well-being of humankind by 
focusing especially on the poor and vulnerable, 
but under Rodin the Rockefeller Foundation 
assessed the opportunities and challenges raised 
by globalization. Rather than return to the 
concept of “program areas,” the Foundation po-
sitioned itself to address five major issues related 
to “smart globalization.” It organized much of its 
work around time-limited initiatives in which 
the Foundation would address a specific prob-
lem – such as transforming health systems – and 
then target programmatic investments to enable systemic 
change. By 2012, the Foundation continued to face an 
evolving global context, one which it described as “more 
people, more connected and distributed in new ways.” To 
better meet the demands of this changing environment, 
Rodin sharpened the focus of the Foundation’s work on 
four primary goals that aimed to secure livelihoods, 
transform cities, advance health and revalue ecosystems. 
Within each of these issue areas, the Foundation devel-
oped goals that fit within John D. Rockefeller’s broad mis-
sion—to promote the well-being of humanity. These goals 
aimed to build resilience to enable people, communities 
and nations to bounce back after shocks and respond to 
stresses. They also worked to promote equitable growth 
so that the benefits of economic improvement were more 
widely shared. Among other priorities, Rodin also stressed 
the important role of private capital in addressing the 
problems of the future. (see Chapter IX – Social Investing.)
As the Foundation entered its second century, the 
remarkable story about its program was its basic consistency 
across generations of leaders and staff. The emphasis on 
education and training as a way to create the capacity for 
people in a given community to fight disease, malnutrition, 
and poverty was manifested in the earliest days of the 
International Health Commission in 1913, and it was apparent in the 
Foundation’s efforts to empower communities to tackle the challenges 
and opportunities of globalization in 2013. The belief that science and 
technology could mitigate the ravages of disease, increase food supplies, and 
ease the overwhelming pressures of overpopulation has carried through the 
Foundation’s work for decades.
As the relationships between technology and culture became increasingly 
apparent over the course of the century, the Foundation adjusted its strategies 
to give local leaders and communities the ability to adapt technology to their 
own needs. These efforts have not always been successful. Frequently, larger 
historical forces including political instability, global capitalism, and envi-
ronmental change have overwhelmed the modest contributions that philan-
thropy is able to make to the well-being of humankind. Persistence in the face 
of long odds and an increasing tendency to organize all programs around the 
idea of collaboration, however, have resulted in remarkable improvements in 
the human condition.
1943
Mexican agriculture program  
becomes the forerunner to  
the Green Revolution.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Chosen to become the first woman 
to lead the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Judith Rodin became president in 
2005. Rodin led a strategic effort 
to focus the Foundation’s programs 
on promoting systemic change in 
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W ith the rise of the knowledge economy,  we face a profound paradox. At no time  in history has it been easier for people to 
access the accumulated wisdom of humankind. And yet, 
in a world where ideas create enormous wealth, the legal 
control of information through patents and copyright has 
never been more fiercely contested. In this brave new 
world, products that derive their value from this intel-
lectual property—including pharmaceuticals, medical  
technologies, bioengineered crops, computers, and 
more—are often too expensive for poor and vulnerable 
communities to afford. 
A new brand of philanthropy has emerged that makes 
patents available to the public for the greater good. Some 
call it “patent philanthropy.” Inventors and corporations 
contribute their intellectual property rights to charitable 
organizations and foundations to lower the costs of 
making these technologies or ideas available to poorer 
peoples around the world. Under this kind of regime, 
pharmaceutical companies have established drug-pricing 
systems that offer highly reduced rates for low- and 
middle-income regions. Companies have also contributed 
Who should control 
knowledge that can 
benefit humankind?
intellectual property to patent pools designed to promote 
research to fight neglected diseases. 
Patent pools can also help to spark economic develop-
ment. According to some estimates, less than five percent 
of the patents that have been filed by innovators around 
the world are actually being developed for commercial 
use. When companies donate their unused patents to 
patent pools, they provide opportunities for consortia in 
developing regions to find new products and processes 
that will create jobs for local residents.
All of these approaches to disseminating knowledge 
derive from fundamental issues that confronted the 
Rockefeller Foundation and other early philanthropies 
in the twentieth century. If philanthropic dollars enabled 
the creation of new vaccines or hybrid seeds, who should 
control this new knowledge? Should the inventors, even if 
their work was subsidized by philanthropy, reap a financial 
return? Would society be better off and would the search 
for innovation be promoted by rewarding these inven-
tors? The Rockefeller Foundation dealt with these issues 
as it sought to rid the world of the scourge of yellow fever 
and other diseases.
Who should control knowledge that can benefit humankind?
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biological warfare, including the release of clouds 
of mosquitoes carrying the yellow fever virus, had 
decided that if the U.S. was drawn into the war, 
military personnel destined for the tropics should 
all be vaccinated. 
The unseen man on the other end of the 
telephone conversation, Dr. Milton Veldee, wanted 
private drug companies to begin making the Rockefeller Foundation’s yellow 
fever vaccine. A bacteriologist and Harvard-trained physician, Veldee had been 
a faculty member at Johns Hopkins before he joined the U.S. Public Health 
Service as chief of the Laboratory of Biologics Control in 1931. Under the 
authority of Congress, his division regulated the production of vaccines in the 
United States.
Fosdick, with the active support of scientists working in the International 
Health Division’s laboratories in New York, was resisting Veldee’s proposal. 
Basic principles and human lives were at stake. The Rockefeller scientists 
Principles,  Profits,  and Phil anthropy
Raymond Fosdick was not happy. As he sat in the office of the Acting Surgeon General of the United States, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation listened to one side of a telephone conver-sation about vaccines. In Washington, D.C., for a meeting with  
the vice president of the United States to talk about Mexico, Fosdick  
had not anticipated getting caught in the crossfire of a bureaucratic feud 
between scientists.
In January 1941, the United States was preparing for war while much 
of the rest of the world was already engulfed in the fighting. Germany had 
suffered its first defeat when it lost the air Battle of Britain. Now Congress was 
debating President Roosevelt’s proposed “Lend-Lease” program to provide aid 
to the Allied nations. In Asia, fighting continued as the Chinese struggled to 
resist the Japanese invasion. Meanwhile, in North Africa, Britain had launched 
two major offensives—one in Egypt and the other in East Africa—to liberate 
Ethiopia and end Italy’s plans for conquest. British troops, however, faced an 
unseen enemy as an epidemic of yellow fever raged in the Sudan. 
Brilliant and dangerous work by Rockefeller Foundation scientists had 
led to the development of a vaccine for yellow fever in 1937. The Foundation 
had produced tens of thousands of doses for people in Brazil and other 
tropical countries. But now the British government wanted 50,000 doses a 
week. And the U.S. War Department, fearing that the Japanese were planning 
Raymond Fosdick met with the acting surgeon 
general of the United States at the office 
of the U.S. Public Health Service in January 
1941. The government wanted to privatize the 
manufacturing of yellow fever vaccine, which 
had been developed by Rockefeller Foundation 
scientists. (National Library of Medicine.)
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weren’t sure that commercial companies could be trusted to manufacture 
a vaccine that was still very difficult to preserve. Even more importantly, 
Fosdick was appalled by the notion that commercial companies should be 
allowed to profit from the Foundation’s enormous investments of money and 
lives in path-breaking medical research. In the culture, there was still a deep 
uneasiness with the idea that private interests should profit from the illnesses 
of others.
The Fight Against Yellow Fever
A scourge on human populations for centuries, yellow fever is en-demic in tropical and subtropical areas of Africa and Latin America. The disease damages internal organs and frequently leads to severe 
bleeding and death. As the disease attacks the liver, victims frequently see 
their skin turn yellow or jaundiced—a condition that gave rise to the name 
“yellow fever” or “yellow jack.” 
For centuries, as epidemics ravaged cities, doctors and scientists were 
unable to identify the source of the disease or its method of transmission. 
A Cuban doctor and scientist, Carlos Finlay, first suggested in 1881 that 
mosquitoes transmitted yellow fever. A team of American doctors, led by 
United States Army Surgeon Walter Reed, proved this theory correct in 1900. 
They also demonstrated that the disease was transmitted by a particular kind 
of mosquito, the Aedes aegypti. With this information, physician and later 
Rockefeller Foundation scientist William Gorgas organized to eradicate the 
Aedes aegypti in Cuba and Panama by attacking their breeding sites. The 
campaign was so successful that it stopped the devastating loss of life among 
canal workers and allowed for the construction of the Panama Canal. 
The Rockefeller Foundation launched its fight against yellow fever in 
1915, when Wickliffe Rose, the head of the International Health Board, made 
the brave, or perhaps foolish, decision to go beyond the fight against hook-
worm—which had a known cure—to tackle two diseases that had no known 
cure: malaria and yellow fever. Rose was responding to the concerns of of-
ficials in the United States, as well as in Hong Kong and Singapore, who feared 
that the opening of the Panama Canal would lead to epidemics of yellow fever 
in regions that had not previously been affected. Rose and 
other leading public health officials, including Gorgas, who 
had been promoted to Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, 
believed they could take the eradication campaign to other 
affected cities and countries. Delayed by World War I and 
negotiations with local authorities, these efforts proved 
Cuban doctor Carlos Finlay first 
suggested that yellow fever was 
transmitted by mosquitoes. A team 
of researchers led by Walter Reed 
identified Stegomyia (later known 
as Aedes aegypti) as the carrier. 
(National Library of Medicine.)
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successful in Guayaquil, a key port in 
Ecuador that served ships headed for 
the Panama Canal. 
Meanwhile, researchers at the 
Rockefeller Institute, including 
Hideyo Noguchi, were working on 
isolating the pathogen for yellow fever in order to 
find a way of arresting its attack on the body. In 1918, 
Noguchi, who had earned considerable respect for his 
work on syphilis, snake venom, and the spirochaete 
bacteria, claimed to have found a bacterium that 
caused yellow fever. Noguchi said that he had 
developed a vaccine that inoculated guinea pigs. 
Preliminary tests on human subjects yielded impres-
sive results. After the Rockefeller Institute began 
producing large quantities of vaccine, inoculation 
campaigns in Mexico and Peru in 1921 seemed equal-
ly promising. Leaders at the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Rockefeller Institute and the International Health 
Board were ecstatic.
Exuberance was followed by dismay, however, 
when researchers with the International Health 
Board’s West Africa Yellow Fever Commission 
discovered in 1926 that most of Noguchi’s results 
could not be replicated in Africa. They concluded 
that the disease in Africa was fundamentally different 
from yellow fever in South America. Further experi-
ments with rhesus monkeys appeared to suggest 
that Noguchi was wrong in his identification of 
the pathogen for yellow fever. Noguchi, shamed by 
the discovery, sailed for West Africa to address the 
situation himself, but was infected with the disease in 
the lab and died. Noguchi was not the only scientist 
taken in the battle against yellow fever. Five other 
Foundation staff members gave their lives in the fight. 
Their work, however, led to critical breakthroughs. 
Continuing research seemed to suggest that 
there were at least two ways in which yellow fever 
was transmitted. On one hand, the aegypti mosquito 
traveled mostly from people to mosquito to people 
Hideyo Noguchi (left) was 
internationally recognized for his 
work on syphilis, snake venom, 
and spirochaete bacteria when he 
turned his attention to yellow fever. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Chapter Six: Knowledge 167166 Beyond Charity
Controlling the Vaccine
W hen the Rockefeller Institute was founded in 1901, its charter included language that made “all discoveries and inventions” by employees the property of the Institute to “place at the service 
of humanity in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the founder.” This 
philosophy permeated the field of medical research in the first half of the 
twentieth century, especially when researchers received funding from either 
the government or non-profit organizations. The first patent for the production 
of insulin, for example, was sold by the inventors to the University of Toronto 
for one dollar. 
Rockefeller philanthropists recognized, however, that there was a useful 
purpose to patenting, particularly when it came to ensuring public safety. 
The ability to control the production of a vaccine or a drug 
ensured that it would be made properly. Early in the history of the 
Rockefeller Institute, scientists developed a new arsenic compound 
known as Tryparsamide that proved effective in treating African 
sleeping sickness, a disease that killed hundreds of thousands of 
people in Africa. The Rockefeller Institute patented the formula “to 
control the manufacture and sale for the protection of the purity of 
the product.”
In the early 1930s, as Rockefeller 
Foundation scientists were hard at 
work on the yellow fever vaccine, 
there was a great deal of interest in 
the research community in the idea of 
funding basic research with proceeds 
received from patents. The Rockefeller 
Foundation was skeptical. As President 
Max Mason wrote to Dean C. S. Slichter 
[at the University of Wisconsin], the 
Foundation was concerned that if this 
idea caught on it would inhibit the 
publication of research and lead to 
greater secrecy in the scientific com-
munity, which would slow the pace of 
discovery and innovation “to the great 
detriment of the scientific spirit.” This 
would be compounded by the growth 
of patent litigation that would require 
in urban areas, often infecting all 
of the members of a household. 
Alternatively, so-called jungle yellow 
fever was carried by monkeys and 
opossums and transmitted by jungle 
mosquitoes. A crucial development 
came on June 29, 1927, when one 
of the Foundation’s scientists at the 
Yellow Fever Laboratory in Lagos, 
Nigeria, isolated the yellow fever 
virus from an African man named 
Asibi. Scientists were able to attenu-
ate this strain and mix it with human 
serum recovered from yellow fever 
victims to create a crude vaccine that 
could protect workers in the lab. 
Dr. Max Theiler, a young South 
African researcher who had studied 
at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, had focused on 
yellow fever as a virus long before 
others accepted this theory. Invited to join the staff of the 
International Health Division under Dr. Wilbur A. Sawyer, 
he continued his research and was able to develop a new 
vaccine, based on the Asibi virus strain, that did not use 
human serum. Labeled 17D, the vaccine was first tested on 
human subjects in November 1936. After successful trials, 
the vaccine soon went into mass production. In 1938, more 
than a million people were vaccinated. By this time, the fight 
against yellow fever had absorbed over half of the IHB/IHD’s 
disease budget and cost nearly $14 million. In 1951, Theiler would win the 
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his effort to isolate the virus and 
develop the vaccine. 
The importance of the Foundation’s breakthrough could hardly be 
overstated. With the advent of World War II, Allied forces coming from areas 
where the disease was not endemic were hugely susceptible and could be 
killed in massive numbers. The soon-to-be Allied governments were desperate 
to obtain millions of doses of the vaccine. But who would control the rights to 
yellow fever vaccine? And who would take charge of its production?
Max Theiler, a scientist 
working in the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s International 
Health Division, developed 
the first yellow fever vaccine. 
In 1951 Theiler was awarded 
the Nobel Prize for his work.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Louise Pearce, a physician and 
researcher, went to the Belgian 
Congo in 1920 to field test a new 
drug, Tryparsamide, developed 
by the Rockefeller Institute for 
the treatment of African sleeping 
sickness. The Rockefeller Institute 
patented the drug to guarantee 
safe production and distribution. 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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expert testimony and take researchers away 
from the lab. Mason believed that support for 
pure research by government and private donors 
would also suffer “if the idea becomes spread 
that such research is capable of commercializa-
tion for its own support and that this process  
is advisable.”
In 1932, program officer Robert Lambert 
echoed these ideas when he wrote to Dr. Claus 
Schilling at the Koch Institute to say: “Since the 
Foundation’s aid to research is based on the prin-
ciple that any advance in knowledge should be 
made known freely to all the world, the officers 
are not at liberty to take any step which might 
appear to be out of accord with that principle. 
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, we do not un-
dertake to act as intermediaries in negotiations 
between scientists and governments regarding 
the application of scientific discoveries, however 
much we may wish to see the best use made of any such 
advance in knowledge.” Nevertheless, as late as 1933, the 
Foundation had no policy on patents. 
As the Foundation continued to wrestle with the 
issue, other perspectives came to the fore. Vannevar Bush, 
writing as Dean of Engineering at MIT, pointed out to 
Max Mason that “patenting for control, especially on 
medical matters, is oftentimes essential.” Moreover, clear patent control was 
essential to attracting funding for development. Bush conceded that he was 
“struggling to crystallize my ideas” on whether or not educational institutions 
should patent discoveries as a strategy for funding further research. “From one 
point of view there is a danger that revenue from patents might alienate the 
beneficiaries of educational institutions. On the other hand there is certainly 
a possibility that some types of men would incline strongly to support institu-
tions which showed an ability to take care of their own affairs.”
In 1937, the University of Cincinnati considered adopting a policy to 
patent discoveries coming from its labs. The Rockefeller Foundation, which 
provided grant money to the university’s department of neurology, requested 
that the university notify the Foundation if the university intended “to oper-
ate these patents for the purposes of securing income from them.” Alan Gregg 
believed that the Foundation’s trustees should at least be informed if the 
Max Mason, a distinguished 
mathematical physicist and former 
president of the University of Chicago, 
became president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 1929. Mason feared 
that patenting would slow the pace 
of scientific discovery and innovation.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
“Golden Rice” and the Role of 
Intellectual Property
Preschool children in poor communities in 
developing countries often die because they 
don’t get enough Vitamin A. One study in 
Indonesia in the 1980s showed that mortal-
ity rates among children could be reduced 
by 30 percent if they received sufficient 
doses of this critical vitamin. 
Rice is the leading staple in the diets of 
many poor children around the world, but 
rice does not contain Vitamin A or its pre-
cursor, beta-carotene.  After the Rockefeller 
Foundation launched its rice biotechnology 
program in 1985, the development of a new 
breed of rice with beta-carotene became a 
major focus.
Research by two European scientists—
Dr. Ingo Potrykus and Dr. Peter Beyer—led to 
a fundamental breakthrough. By genetically 
engineering rice that incorporated daffodil 
genes, these researchers were able to 
create “golden rice,” a breed rich in the beta-
carotene needed for Vitamin A. 
Intellectual property controls threatened 
to constrain the widespread production, 
safety testing, and dissemination of golden 
rice. To resolve these issues, the research-
ers, with the Foundation’s consent and 
encouragement, entered into a partnership 
with Zeneca, a large pharmaceutical and 
agribusiness. The agreement allowed 
public-sector breeding programs to make 
golden rice seeds available to resource-poor 
farmers in developing countries at no ad-
ditional cost. Zeneca (today Syngenta) also 
provided resources to the Humanitarian 
Project, founded by the inventors to 
continue their research. 
This innovative partnership should enable 
millions of the world’s poorest children to 
enjoy better health and a higher quality of life. 
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product on a commercial basis is somewhat premature.” If Sharp and Dohme 
wanted to go ahead, the Foundation wanted to make sure they didn’t link their 
product to the Foundation. In response, the government reiterated that Sharp 
and Dohme would only be licensed to produce and sell the vaccine if the U.S. 
Public Health Service approved its vaccine and “no responsibility,  
even by implication, will attach to the Rockefeller Foundation.”
While these conversations were taking place, the debate over patenting 
continued at the Rockefeller Foundation. By 1940, Raymond Fosdick hoped 
to resolve the issue by creating a joint committee of trustees and officers to 
study the problem. Members were appointed and the committee met, but no 
minutes or report were ever issued. The debate stalled as the world became 
increasingly embroiled in war. 
The government and the research community seemed to switch direction 
in 1940. The U.S. Public Health Service considered establishing a production 
facility in Bethesda, Maryland. In June, the Division of Medical Sciences of the 
National Research Council asked the IHD to provide and maintain a supply of 
100,000 doses of yellow fever vaccine for the armed forces of the United States. 
An empty floor in the North Building of the Rockefeller Institute was al-
located for this work and for the production of influenza vaccine. Dr. Kenneth 
Goodner was appointed director of the new manufacturing division. The 
effort was supposed to be temporary, until the government could establish 
vaccine production facilities of its own. 
For the American military, the request for a standby supply of yellow fever 
vaccine was precautionary. In Africa, however, where British troops were 
already fighting, the need for the vaccine became urgent late in 1940, when an 
outbreak of the disease swept through the Sudan. By January 1941, the British 
government was asking for 50,000 doses a week. But the lack of refrigerated 
shipping options made this almost impossible. 
As demand for the vaccine surged, the U.S. Surgeon General wanted to 
license commercial manufacturing. The government asked the Rockefeller 
Foundation to train two scientists from these commercial firms in its labs. 
The Foundation demurred, saying space was already tight. They suggested it 
wasn’t really necessary. The procedure had been published, and a competent 
biological company would be able to do it. Milton Veldee, the chief of the 
Division of Biologics at the U.S. Public Health Service, agreed. Nevertheless, 
the Foundation was clearly not pleased at the prospect of commercial firms 
entering the field. So Foundation president Raymond Fosdick went to see the 
Acting Surgeon General, Warren Fales Draper and waited as Draper talked to 
his staff on the phone.
Foundation had provided the initial capital for the discovery. Warren Weaver, 
director of the Natural Sciences Division, wrote in a letter to a grantee at the 
University of Virginia: “When people ask us questions about possible patents 
arising in connection with work which we have supported, in whole, or in 
part, our reply is, in effect, to tell them to use their own best judgment. If their 
judgment should turn out to be notoriously bad or clearly selfish, this would 
probably be reflected in our future relations.”
One solution to this dilemma was available through the Research 
Corporation for Science Advancement, established in 1912 by Professor 
Gardner Cottrell at the University of California, Berkeley. Cottrell had 
invented a device to reduce air pollution by removing particles from a flowing 
gas. With profits from this device, the Research Corporation funded research 
by other scientists. By 1937, with an agreement with MIT, the Research 
Corporation began to manage patents for educational institutions.
All of these conversations were ongoing as the Rockefeller Foundation 
struggled to standardize the preparation of the yellow fever vaccine in 1938. 
That fall, the U.S. pharmaceutical company Sharp and Dohme was the first 
commercial company to indicate an interest 
in manufacturing the vaccine. The Rockefeller 
Foundation expressed concern over whether the 
vaccine would be created with high standards. 
The U.S. Public Health Service offered its 
reassurance: “Yellow fever vaccine comes 
within the scope of the Biologics Act and can be 
marketed only with the approval of the Treasury 
Department thru the Public Health Service.” 
The government promised that the company’s 
vaccine “will not be marketed unless it complies 
with the requirements of the Treasury 
Department [which oversaw the PHS].”
The Rockefeller Foundation, however, 
remained concerned. Scientists in the labs 
felt that the production process had not been 
perfected. To be effective, the vaccine needed to 
contain a live virus. To keep the virus alive while 
the vaccine was being shipped, it had to be kept 
cool and maintained in dry form. The situation 
made the vaccine unlike any other vaccine then 
available. These factors led the Foundation’s sci-
entists to believe “that the manufacture of this 
1954
New grants for dance and music 
reflect the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
expanded interest in supporting  
the arts and culture. (Dance Notation 
Bureau. Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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One hundred doses of yellow fever vaccine 
prepared by the International Health Division 
of the Rockefeller Foundation in its New 
York laboratories. In 1939, the IHD’s scientists 
feared that the production process was not 
stable enough to turn over to commercial 
manufacturers. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
A graduate of Harvard Medical School, the fifty-seven-
year-old Draper had spent much of his career in the U.S. 
Public Health Service. He understood the bureaucracy. 
When Draper got off the phone with Veldee, Fosdick 
made it clear that the Foundation was already working 
with production facilities in the United Kingdom, 
South Africa and Brazil to meet the world’s needs for 
the vaccine. It could and would produce enough yellow 
fever vaccine to meet the needs of the United States. The 
Foundation was happy to do so as “our contribution to 
the cause of national defense.” Draper accepted Fosdick’s 
offer, which ended the talk of bringing commercial firms 
into the process.
True to Fosdick’s expression of patriotism, the 
Rockefeller Foundation agreed to supply the vaccine 
for one dollar a year. In 1941, before the U.S. entered 
the war, more than 2 million doses were made and 
shipped, primarily to Africa but also to India. Another 
1 million doses were delivered to the U.S. Army and 
Navy. Foundation staff worked all year long—Sundays 
and holidays included. Some shipments were lost when 
transport ships were torpedoed or delivery planes crashed. The cost of each 
dose was approximately three cents.
The Rockefeller Foundation continued its efforts as the U.S. government 
equipped its Public Health Service laboratory in Hamilton, Montana, to 
manufacture the vaccine. Meanwhile, in Britain and Brazil, two other labora-
tories, Wellcome Research Institute and the Yellow Fever Laboratory in Rio de 
Janeiro, were producing vaccine. And in South Africa, efforts were being made 
by the South African Institute for Medical Research to begin manufacturing. A 
similar effort was underway in India. The government of the Netherlands East 
Indies was also interested in manufacturing. 
The Foundation’s vaccine production ran into a major problem when U.S. 
Army service members who had been inoculated became sick and jaundiced. 
The jaundice problem led the Rockefeller Foundation to modify its strategy 
for the production of the vaccine, eliminating the use of human serum. It 
also led to an institutional change. In the wake of this incident, the Surgeon 
General of the Army suggested that the Rockefeller Foundation’s laboratories 
should obtain a license from the U.S. Public Health Service to produce the yel-
low fever vaccine. Dr. Johannes H. Bauer, who worked in the yellow fever lab, 
agreed to this idea and wrote to the director of the National Institute of Health 
With war raging in Europe and North 
Africa, Acting Surgeon General Warren 
Draper was under pressure to obtain 
millions of doses of yellow fever vaccine 
to inoculate U.S. recruits and British 
forces. (National Library of Medicine.)
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lack of policies.” Within the International 
Health Division, according to the direc-
tor, George K. Strode, “We believe that 
scientific advances in the field of medicine 
should be freely available to all.” Strode 
acknowledged, however, the issue of 
control. “We recognize that there are some 
in the world who would exploit the sci-
entific work of others through the patent 
device and in consequence we would not 
condemn the device if used to protect the 
welfare of man.” Strode noted, “The IHD 
could have patented its yellow fever vac-
cine; instead it published full particulars 
concerning the vaccine and thereby made 
it impossible for others to patent it.” 
In 1950, the Foundation finally turned 
to its attorney, Chauncey Belknap, to 
articulate a patent policy, but even he 
was unsuccessful. The officers of the 
Foundation agreed in November 1950 that “We have a policy 
of having no policy but to deal with each case as it arises.” 
And Belknap wrote “I am glad we are not going to try to 
solve the insoluble by laying down a uniform patent and 
copyright policy for the Foundation.”
But the dilemma over patents did not die. As the 
Foundation’s work in agriculture in Mexico progressed in 
the 1950s, the development of new seed varieties raised the patent question 
again. When one of the Foundation’s scientific consultants, P.C. Mangelsdorf, 
obtained a patent for corn that didn’t need to be de-tasseled, and filed it with the 
Research Corporation, the move made officials at the Rockefeller Foundation 
uneasy. Warren Weaver said that the Foundation “would be criticized for its 
part in what would be described as an effort to develop corn in Mexico in order 
to produce revenue for one of our consultants.”
Weaver continued to express concern on this issue. In 1956, he wrote a 
memo to George Harrar regarding a potential patent for the development of a 
solar energy project at the University of Wisconsin. Although the investigators 
proposed to have a nonprofit patent management entity hold the patent, 
Weaver noted that “It would be completely anomalous if solar cookers in India, 
for example, cost 50 cents extra because of [the patent].” Weaver’s angst was 
in May 1942. The licensing process led to a full write-up of the new methods 
used for producing the vaccine. It also led to a major overhaul of equipment 
and procedures in the lab. But it still did not lead the Rockefeller Foundation 
to secure a patent on the vaccine. 
In fact, by June 1942, the issue of patenting was still unresolved within 
the Foundation. Writing to Linus Pauling, Warren Weaver confessed that the 
staff at the Foundation was divided over the issue: “The medical people here 
have taken a strong position against patents as such.” In Weaver’s Natural 
Science Division, the laissez faire attitude of the 1930s persisted. Weaver was 
concerned that Pauling’s work related to hemoglobin, if patented, would have 
implications for medicine, so he noted that his division would be  
more careful. 
When the war ended, the Rockefeller Foundation abandoned the business 
of producing yellow fever vaccine, and the U.S. Public Health Service took 
over. The Foundation characterized the effort “as a war measure to supply the 
army and the navy.” No commercial entity stepped into the field. 
In 1949, the Rockefeller Foundation was again forced to wrestle with the 
issue when the National Research Council launched a survey of educational 
and philanthropic organizations on the patent issue. President Chester 
Barnard deemed it unacceptable for the different 
divisions in the Foundation to have different 
policies, although he pointed out that, “as things 
have turned out, there has been very little 
difference in the practice of the two divisions.” 
Barnard believed that the problem was less 
urgent than it had been a decade earlier because 
of the development of the Research Corporation 
and other nonprofit patent management 
organizations. He noted that the Research 
Corporation’s practice included provisions for 
the discoverer to receive “some modest return” 
from his or her discovery, which the Rockefeller 
Foundation did not think improper.
Barnard’s letter, however, did not completely 
reflect the sentiment of the organization or 
the field. One staffer said that a conference 
sponsored by the National Research Council in 
1949 to address the patent policies and practices 
of educational institutions “reflected complete 
confusion and a perfect welter of policies and 
Linus Pauling’s work with hemoglobin 
was supported by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Warren Weaver feared in 
1942 that Pauling (right) would seek 
to patent his work, which would have 
serious implications for medicine.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Ralph Ellison receives a Rockefeller 
Fellowship to support his liter-
ary work. Ellison was among a 
distinguished list of novelists and 
playwrights who received literature 
fellowships in the 1950s and 1960s.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.) 
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Creativity & Culture, Food Security, Health Equity, 
the Africa Regional Program, and the Program-Related 
Investment team in ProVenEx. Over the next two years, the 
team worked closely with grantees and analysts—includ-
ing HIV/AIDS activists, small-scale farmers, plant breeders, 
and indigenous peoples—to identify ways in which the 
Foundation could support changes in intellectual property 
policy that would benefit poor and excluded people.
The team outlined the challenges. International 
trade agreements provided for high levels of intellectual 
property (IP) protection in the developed world and played 
a major role in directing capital into research. But these 
incentives favored markets that promised the highest 
return, and arenas that might offer the greatest benefit to 
the poor were often neglected. Meanwhile, “IP monopolies” 
often resulted in high prices for drugs or seeds that put 
these products outside the reach of developing nations. 
Even when researchers sought to address the needs of the 
poor, they were often stymied by “patent thickets” that made 
it difficult for independent researchers to work in the arena. 
The group pointed out a number of ironies and inequities in 
the situation. Many agro-biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
products had been derived from genetic material and traditional knowledge 
originating in developed countries. Intellectual property laws rarely provided 
any compensation to developing nations for these contributions.
The group also concluded that many of the Foundation’s grantees that were 
struggling with these issues were making a difference. “A deeper and more 
nuanced understanding of the role of IP in development is emerging,” the team 
concluded in 2004. New policies were also emerging that would lift patent pro-
tections to allow greater access for developing countries to medicines essential 
for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and neglected diseases such as TB and malaria.
This work led to new grants in various program areas to support “more 
progressive IP practices.” Moreover, the organization’s learning in this realm, 
combined with a history of emphasis on the open dissemination of knowledge 
stretching back to the development of yellow fever vaccine and more, 
positioned the Rockefeller Foundation to be an effective broker between groups 
promoting policy change in the intellectual property arena and those institu-
tions in academe and the private sector focused on research and innovation. 
In 1999 Rockefeller Foundation 
president Gordon Conway challenged 
Monsanto’s use of so-called 
“terminator technology” to  
produce seed sterility.  
(Rockefeller Foundation.)
important. The world was entering a new era where the control of informa-
tion and knowledge would play a critical role in dividing the haves and  
the have-nots. 
Over the next three decades, however, the Foundation maintained a 
flexible approach to its patent policies. Then in 1984 the Foundation adopted 
a formal policy “to ensure that the results of Foundation-supported research 
are made available widely for the betterment of mankind throughout the 
world.” The policy sought to channel the financial rewards from Foundation-
sponsored discoveries, inventions or developments back into research for the 
public interest. The policy affected all of the Foundation’s grant programs. It 
meant, for example, that researchers working on rice biotechnology projects 
funded in whole or in part by the Foundation would share their discoveries in 
developing countries with “zero royalty use.” 
Ideas in a K nowledge Economy
T he evident tensions over patenting vaccines for yellow fever, encephalitis, and other diseases marked the beginnings of a broader movement from an industrial to an information- or knowledge-based 
global economy in the late twentieth century. This transition accelerated with 
the proliferation of computers and networked global information systems. 
It permeated the health sciences as biotechnology led to the patenting of life 
forms. In 1999, staff at the Rockefeller Foundation recognized that “debates 
around intellectual property rights will be core to the distribution of wealth 
and poverty in the next century.”
Foundation president Gordon Conway drew attention to the issue that 
year when he appeared before the board of directors of Monsanto and urged 
them to “disavow use of the terminator technology to produce seed sterility.” 
Conway then went public with his recommendations the following day. 
In the moment, Conway’s confrontation sparked animosity, but Monsanto 
agreed to study the issue. In October, in a public letter to Conway, Monsanto’s 
CEO announced that the company would not commercialize sterile seed 
technologies designed to force farmers to buy new seed every year. This was a 
preliminary victory for the Foundation and for the advocates of less restrictive 
applications of intellectual property rules in developing nations, but it was 
only the beginning of a much larger fight.
In April 2002, to address these issues, the Foundation’s board of trustees 
approved a new initiative entitled “Charting a Fairer Course for Intellectual 
Property Policy.” The project brought together officers from each of the 
Foundation’s main programs at that time, including Global Inclusion, 
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I n keeping with the decision to make grants rather than operate programs for the long term, foundations confront the question of how to work 
with grantees. These challenges begin with the first 
inquiry. New foundations quickly discover that the volume 
of requests for aid can be overwhelming. Articulating 
specific programs can help to narrow the pool of serious 
applicants, but they may also constrain the foundation 
by discouraging innovators who might have projects the 
foundation hadn’t even imagined.
As they seek to focus their programs to achieve 
tangible objectives and goals, foundations often discover 
that the kinds of grantees or projects they want to 
support don’t exist. Some foundations are tempted to 
establish and run these projects on their own. Others 
look for partners or collaborators who can help create the 
necessary institutions capable of pursuing the work in the 
field that will achieve the goal.
All of these approaches raise issues for board 
members and staffers. If the foundation funds grantees 
who come “over the transom,” will the foundation 
develop the kind of relationship with a grantee that leads 
to long-term transformation? If the foundation creates 
and launches a program on its own, is it really prepared to 
What makes a relationship 
with grantees successful?
be the operator for the long term? If the foundation helps 
to create a new agency, what responsibility does it have to 
provide sustaining support that will allow the institution 
to achieve long-term stability? Inevitably, foundations are 
also forced to consider the question of when engagement 
becomes interference.
All of these issues ultimately focus on questions of 
success or failure. If foundations provide venture capital 
to the social sector, they have to expect high rates of 
failure, but they also need to invest in evaluation efforts 
that will yield lessons even from initiatives that don’t 
work. They have to ask themselves, how long does 
it take to give a grantee a fair shot at getting off the 
ground? How long before sustainable resources come  
to the table? 
At some point, funders almost always want the 
grantee to become independent. Negotiating the end to 
the relationship can be difficult, however, especially when 
the funder has been deeply involved in the development 
of the project or program. Funders have to wrestle with 
their moral responsibilities in the situation. Grantees have 
to confront the harsh reality as to whether the project is 
actually viable. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has faced all of these 
issues time and again over the course of a hundred years. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Foundation’s 
philosophy was crystallized in a famous memo entitled: 
“How Do You Do, Dr. X?”
What makes a relationship with grantees successful?
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constituted a key element within the Foundation’s 
enormous information system that constituted one 
of its primary sources of ongoing innovation.) These 
diaries were widely shared and made available to the 
officer’s colleagues in the division as well as to the central 
administrative team. If a copy of a diary entry needed 
to be directed to a particular staff member, secretaries 
inserted a carbon when they typed up the entry so that it 
could be initialed to the proper individual. 
Weaver described the standard method for routing inquiries, which 
involved a sometimes difficult process of judgment as to whether, for 
example, a proposed project related to human genetics (Medicine and Public 
Warren Weaver, director of the 
Foundation’s Natural Sciences division 
for 27 years, was an accomplished 
mathematician in his own right. Weaver 
immersed himself in the work of the 
Foundation’s grantees and played a 
profound role in the development of  
the field of molecular biology.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
How Do You Do, Dr. X ?
I n 1952, Warren Weaver, the head of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Natural Sciences, wrote a striking memo entitled “How Do You Do, Dr. X?” The ten-page document provided new staff with a guide to interacting with visitors who came to the door hoping to receive 
a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The title alone spoke volumes 
about the kinds of applicants who frequented the Foundation—academic 
scientists and researchers immersed in the deep search for knowledge that 
might advance civilization. In many ways the document amplified a short 
handbook Weaver wrote in 1946, called “N.S. Notes on Officers’ Techniques.” 
Both provided extraordinary insight into the culture of the Foundation and its 
attitude toward applicants and grantees.
Weaver began his memo with a statement on “The Least They Can 
Expect.” Everyone who came to the Rockefeller Foundation deserved to be 
treated with courtesy and “should leave with the feeling that he has had a 
fair reception.” He admonished the staff to listen more than talk. As he wrote 
in Officers’ Techniques, “in the language of radiation theory, be very good 
absorbers and poor emitters.” He advised officers to ask everyone before 
they left if they had been given a chance to say the things they wanted to 
say. Whenever someone actually met with an officer, the meeting should 
be recorded in the voluminous diaries that all officers kept describing the 
people and places they encountered as part of their work. (These diaries 
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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grantees.) But the lack of a specific application form did not mean that the 
Rockefeller Foundation took the process of applying or decision-making 
lightly. Instead of receiving forms, Rockefeller program officers preferred to 
ask a potential applicant to “talk about his ideas while he is at RF. What is 
he doing? What does he want to do? What does he need in order to do what 
he wants to do?” Eventually, Weaver said, these ideas should be put into a 
letter that should be sent to the Foundation. “The letter does not need to be 
long or complicated,” but Weaver said it should include a c.v. and a list of 
publications for key personnel. It should also include a descriptive statement 
of the problem or field of inquiry (at least a page, but no more than five). 
Weaver was very prescriptive about 
the structure of this statement: the first 
several paragraphs should be written 
for a layperson’s understanding so that 
it could be included in packets for the 
Board of Trustees. “We also find this 
most illuminating about the applicant himself.” In the rest of the description, 
the applicant was invited to “let yourself go and get more technical for two 
or three pages of description.” The applicant needed to provide a budget 
detailing what funds would be provided from the host institution. The 
Foundation also wanted to know “what hopes of continuity” there were for 
work that might follow the end of a Foundation grant, and what physical 
facilities were available for the project. If the responses provided to all of 
these questions piqued the interest of the Foundation’s officers and fit with 
a program, then the applicant might be invited to submit a formal request. 
This request had to come from the highest authority within the applicant’s 
institution (for example, the president of the university). Weaver advised 
new program officers to tell applicants that the Rockefeller Foundation rarely 
made a decision on the basis of written information alone. If the project had 
merit, “one of the officers will visit the man in his own laboratory, to meet 
his people, and to see with his own eyes the circumstances, handicaps, and 
progress of his work.”
One of the toughest but most routine jobs facing any officer was to say no 
or decline an application. The easiest answer was always to say that a proposal 
did not fall within the scope of the Foundation’s program, but, as Weaver 
noted: “Almost everyone knows that we do make exceptions,” so the pat 
answer didn’t work. Rockefeller program officers had to say that the proposal 
did not fall within the program and the Foundation did not choose to make 
an exception in this case. But Weaver said that applications should never be 
declined too quickly; there should always be sufficient time “for us to roll the 
Health) or genetics at the molecular level (Natural 
Science). While officers weren’t cross-trained in one 
another’s disciplines, they were asked to listen to and take 
notes on visits by applicants to other divisions if no one 
else was available. Weaver conceded that many projects 
were interdisciplinary and should involve program 
officers from different divisions. The Foundation also 
tended to put the relationship ahead of the discipline, so 
if one program officer had been working with a researcher, he or she would 
continue even if the new project seemed to fall into a different discipline. 
Visitors would often want to know how to apply for a grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and were surprised to know that there was no 
formal application form; nor was there any special calendar. “We do most of 
our work during the academic part of the year,” Weaver noted. (Staff were 
generally not in the office in the summer, when they were traveling to visit 
The Rockefeller Foundation moved 
to the newly constructed Rockefeller 
Center in New York in the summer of 
1933. The new facilities provided ample 
space for the Foundation’s growing  
staff and room to greet potential 
grantees and dignitaries.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
“Almost everyone knows that 
we do make exceptions.”  
Warren Weaver, 1952
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matter around in our minds, and be perfectly sure that the obvious necessity 
for declination is indeed inescapable.” In a rephrasing of the classic advice that 
it is always easier to change “no” to “yes” than the other way around, Weaver 
cautioned against ever expressing encouragement or optimism with regard 
to an application. “If you are conservative and the man gets the grant, he is 
happy, satisfied, and thinks the officers very stout fellows; but if you are the 
least bit optimistic and he does not get his grant, then he is likely to feel you 
have let him down.” 
Weaver’s instructions to new program officers also crystallized the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s philosophy of grantmaking, which echoed many of 
the principles laid down by John D. Rockefeller, Frederick Gates, and Jerome 
Greene in the earliest days of the Foundation’s life. The Foundation did not 
“give money to completely unattached persons. We give money to institutions 
for the use of people.” The Foundation generally did not provide support to 
pay for buildings, publications, or “major salaries” and overhead that would 
be part of an institution’s general administrative cost. The Foundation did not 
fund expeditions. (Weaver conceded this might be institutional cowardice, 
but the Foundation did not want to be held responsible in the event of a tragic 
accident.) The Foundation did not provide funding for people to go to general 
conferences, but it would fund small groups of people to come together to 
focus on a specific problem. 
Weaver explained that the Rockefeller Foundation gave money in several 
different ways. “Appropriations” were made by the trustees. These were 
generally large grants given to major projects. “Officer’s actions” included 
grants-in-aid or fellowships and could be decided by staff. These kinds of 
grants could be decided in a week or, “if in a great rush,” in a day or even an 
hour. But they could not extend for more than three years or be worth more 
than $10,000 (in 1936 dollars). The Foundation also allowed for very small 
“allocations” of up to $500 conferred by an individual program officer. Weaver 
gave an example of a Swedish researcher visiting the United States who 
stopped off at Bell Laboratories and discovered they were making a device that 
Congressman B. Carroll Reece launched 
an investigation into the work of private 
foundations, he attacked the Rockefeller 
Foundation for supporting Kinsey's 
work. Months after Kinsey appeared on 
the cover of TIME in 1953, the Rockeller 
Foundation decided to end its support for 
Kinsey's work. (TIME magazine.)
Alfred Kinsey and his team of researchers 
investigating human sexuality received 
indirect support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation through grants provided to the 
National Research Council's Committee 
for Research on Problems of Sex. 
Kinsey's research was controversial inside 
and outside of the Foundation. When 
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was not yet on the market, that he needed for his research. The Foundation 
might provide a small allocation to allow him to purchase and ship some 
of these devices back to Sweden. “This is admittedly ‘chicken feed,’” Weaver 
wrote, “but it may keep a very good rooster alive and crowing.”
People understood that the Rockefeller Foundation was well-placed at 
the center of many networks of information and influence. In the 1930s, 
they would arrive in the office hoping to benefit from these networks. Deans 
of graduate schools, research directors, college 
presidents, and scientists would drop by every 
time they were in New York, “presumably on the 
hypothesis that presence, rather than absence, 
makes the heart grow fonder.” Sometimes people 
came looking for a job. Other times they came 
looking for employees. Weaver wisely counseled 
program officers to avoid recommending people 
for positions. “At the worst there might be an 
assumption that we have a special interest in the person, and that therefore 
there is some implication of future support from us. At the least, we may very 
likely be hurting the institution the man leaves.”
The informal and relationship-based approach to grantmaking articulated 
in “How Do You Do, Dr. X?” carried on for decades after Warren Weaver 
retired. Even in 1983, when the Foundation received roughly 8,000 proposals 
per year, the section in the annual report titled “Applications” began as it had 
for decades: “No special form is required in making a request for Foundation 
aid.” Applicants were still encouraged to send a letter to the foundation with 
a description of the project, a comprehensive plan and budget, and a listing of 
the applicant’s qualifications and accomplishments. 
Increasingly, however, the process of selecting grantees evolved along 
the deeper path worn by the Foundation’s program officers as they traveled 
the globe gathering information. The networks they created provided a 
rich asset to be mined and developed to meet the Foundation’s increasingly 
targeted goals. By the start of the new millennium, grantees were increasingly 
seen as partners in the process of philanthropy, and the Foundation 
devoted significant resources to the processes of identifying and shaping 
collaborations. Though the Foundation remained eager and open to input 
from a wide variety of constituencies, the typical Dr. X was far less likely to be 
seen as the primary grantee. The Foundation’s new collaborators were more 
likely to be working with or in communities around the world. 
“This is admittedly 
chicken feed, but it may 
keep a very good rooster 
alive and crowing.”  
Warren Weaver, 1952
Grantees Focused  
on Building Resilience 
When Hurricane Katrina slammed the Gulf 
Coast of the United States, it once again raised 
fundamental questions for the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The founder had envisioned work 
that addressed the root causes of problems 
and not the provision of relief during times of 
crisis. In 2005, with contributions pouring into 
the Gulf Coast for immediate relief efforts, 
Foundation staff sought ways to help New 
Orleans recover from the disaster that would 
strengthen the long-term health and resilience 
of the community.
Choosing the right grantees proved critical 
to this process. The Foundation wanted orga-
nizations with well-established track records 
and expertise in the fields of housing and com-
munity development. The organization chose 
the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, 
the Enterprise Foundation, and Habitat for 
Humanity because these entities were already 
pursuing innovative strategies for rebuilding 
housing and businesses that included forging 
partnerships between low-income residents 
and private industry. These efforts focused 
on channeling financial and human capital 
into communities that had been marginalized 
for too long by hostile economic, natural, and 
political forces.
This work with grantees in New Orleans 
helped to shape an emerging theme in the 
Foundation’s work around the globe—the  
need to cultivate and sustain institutions  
and systems that make poor communities 
resilient in the face of natural, economic,  
and political disasters.
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Sustained relationships with grantees were at the heart of the 
Foundation’s success. Fosdick and Weaver pointed out that in the sciences, 
particularly, the Foundation often started small with a particular 
researcher or institution. Fosdick used the example of three primary 
researchers at the Rothschild Institute for Physico-Chemical Biology in 
Paris. Back in the 1920s, the International Education Board had provided 
a series of fellowships to scientists Rene Wurmser, Boris Ephrussi, and 
Emmanuel Fauré-Fremiet, who later became affiliated with the Rothschild 
Institute. The fellowships allowed them to travel and collaborate 
with researchers in other European and American institutions. These 
fellowships culminated in grants-in-aid to support their research. During 
all this time, Foundation program officers were in contact and made visits 
to their labs. Familiarity “rooted in the established Foundation habit of 
frequent visits” helped build a shared vision for the research and a base for 
the Foundation’s support, culminating in a major grant in 1936 to support 
the work of all of these men at the Rothschild Institute.
Fosdick summarized the Foundation’s grantmaking strategy in a letter 
to Karl Compton, the president of MIT, in December 1943. He noted that 
the Foundation, like similar organizations, adopted rules and principles 
as a way of narrowing the totality of requests so that they could be dealt 
with competently. “But the deeper significance is that the principles, 
if wisely chosen, can give steadily accumulating significance to what 
would otherwise be only a scattered sequence of unrelated episodes. The 
Rockefeller Foundation has, in actual fact, made little use of rules; but it 
has not hesitated to formulate principles.”
Evaluation
In the late 1930s, Raymond Fosdick wrote a note to Alan Gregg wondering if the $160 million the Foundation had spent had made a difference. The note revealed Fosdick in a vulnerable moment, but it 
was the kind of moment that visits almost everyone in philanthropy.
For years the Rockefeller Foundation had relied on a very subjective 
system of evaluation. Program officers visited grantees and talked to 
peers in the same discipline. They wrote long memoranda for grant 
files and officer diaries. These efforts generated a great deal of paper, 
but surprisingly, given the Foundation’s attention to systems and the 
rationalizing principles of science, there was little theoretical or formal 
basis for evaluation. In part this reflected the philosophy of the foundation. 
As Lindsley Kimball, the Foundation’s vice president for administration 
Patience and L ong -Run Innovation
A s the Foundation focused on grantmaking in the 1930s, the organization’s strategies for identifying and working with grantees evolved as well. As Warren Weaver and Raymond Fosdick explained 
in 1936, using as an example the program in experimental biology (the field 
was later known as molecular biology), grantees surfaced primarily in three 
different ways. The greatest number of applications came from people who 
learned about the Foundation by reading a newspaper or magazine article or 
one of the Foundation’s annual reports and contacted the Foundation asking 
for support. Most of these applicants, as Fosdick put it, “are quite outside 
our program and can be handled [rejected] quickly.” If the Foundation had 
an interest in the application, officers would visit the institution and its 
laboratories, meet all the workers, and listen to explanations of the work and 
the need before they would recommend a grant for approval. 
Other projects came forward through the conduit of a national or 
international science committee focused on a particular academic discipline. 
The National Research Council Committee 
for Research in Problems of Sex, for example, 
would identify and recommend projects to 
the Foundation. This group solicited projects 
informally without a defined application 
process. The National Research Council 
Committee on Radiation, however, published 
an invitation for grant applications, reviewed 
these applications, and then forwarded 
recommendations to the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Finally, a third group of applications came 
as a result of the Foundation’s continuous 
contact with the field. In formal and informal 
meetings in laboratories, universities, and 
conferences, program officers were constantly 
talking to potential applicants about work 
in the field. (From the time the program in 
experimental biology was launched in April 
1933 to March 1936, Foundation staff paid 531 
visits to 312 laboratories or institutions in 65 
cities in 17 countries in Europe and more than 75 
institutions in the United States, many of them 
multiple times).
1956
Following the recommendation of 
President Dean Rusk, the Board 
of Trustees launches a major new 
initiative to help developing nations 
in Latin America, Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa. (James S. Wright. 
Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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example, in the 1960s, “Large programs were continued for many years 
without thorough assessments.” Meanwhile, project and grantee evaluations 
were often stored in the Foundation’s archives without reflection. In 1990, 
Foundation President Peter Goldmark said that “effectiveness” was “one of the 
most perplexing issues for foundations.” That year the Rockefeller Foundation 
decided to institute a new system of regular evaluation. As Goldmark told the 
public, “We are determined to bring rigor and tenacity to this effort.” Under 
Judith Rodin’s leadership, monitoring and evaluation were built into every 
major initiative of the Foundation.
L ong -Term Support
I n 1914, a fire swept through the main wood and brick building of Wellesley College. After reading about the disaster in the paper, Jerome Greene wrote to John D. 
Rockefeller to ask whether the newly created Rockefeller 
Foundation might come to the rescue of the college. Greene 
noted that “the behavior of the girls in the fire offers good 
evidence that Wellesley is an educational institution in 
the best sense of the term.” Greene then 
suggested that “while our attention is 
rightly given in the main to plans carefully 
thought out with coolness and deliberation 
I think we may well consider the good 
we can occasionally do by an act that will 
convey no less the impression of generous 
sympathy than of mature judgment.” 
Shortly afterward, Bishop William 
Lawrence, a fundraising innovator and a 
Wellesley trustee, arrived at 26 Broadway 
to make a personal appeal for the college 
and its 1,500 female students. Before the 
fire, the General Education Board had 
promised $200,000 towards Wellesley’s 
effort to raise $1 million for its endowment. 
John D. Rockefeller Jr. was sympathetic—so 
sympathetic, in fact, that when he did not 
receive a written proposal within the week, 
he wrote to Lawrence to say “we have been 
Bishop William Lawrence was 
an early innovator in the field of 
fundraising, especially in the arena of 
endowment building. In negotiating 
with Lawrence over the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s grant to Wellesley, 
John D. Rockefeller Jr. helped 
provide structure and incentives for 
Lawrence’s campaign. (Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
explained to visitors from the fledgling Ford Foundation in 1952, it was 
the Foundation’s job to thoroughly vet the applicant and the project before 
funding. But once the decision was made, the Foundation believed it should 
“let the chips fall where they may.” Although the Foundation kept track of 
expenditures as compared to the grantee’s budget, the grantee was responsible 
for execution and the Foundation “should interfere as little 
as possible in the grantee’s operations.” Rockefeller believed 
that contacts in the field were more useful than any detailed 
narrative reports by grantees. When grantees wanted 
additional money, however, evaluation of past performance 
played a critical part in the Foundation’s deliberations. In 
these cases, as Kimball reported, a complete evaluation was 
performed by the staff.
In this arena, the Foundation was not out of step with 
its peers in the philanthropic community. At Ford, for 
Fire destroyed the main building 
at Wellesley College in 1914. The 
Rockefeller Foundation pledged 
$750,000 to help with reconstruction, 
but only if the college could raise 
the additional $1.25 million needed 
for the project. Local giving by those 
who cared about the outcome of a 
project was critical to the Foundation’s 
philosophy of grantmaking.   
(Wellesley College Archives.)
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but Junior suggested they stick with the original goal in case costs rose. If the 
construction project came in on budget, then they would have an additional 
$200,000 for the endowment. He also suggested they raise the money in 
one campaign, rather than go for building money first and endowment 
money second. If they split the campaigns, fundraising would peter out once 
the building goal was met, and “you will be obliged to plod along on the 
endowment as you have done in the past, without the additional incentive 
and leverage which the recent fire will give.” He also pressed Wellesley to set a 
definite end date to the campaign to bring a sense of urgency to the effort.
In expressing gratitude for the gift, Bishop Lawrence noted that aside 
from the money itself, the Foundation’s endorsement would help the capital 
campaign immensely. In this case, Junior’s advice hit home. Wellesley 
launched an aggressive campaign and surpassed their goal by $100,000 on 
December 31, 1914.
For the first two decades of the Rockefeller Foundation’s history, 
Rockefeller money flowed heavily from the Foundation, the General 
Education Board, the International Education Board, and the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial to provide endowments for leading institutions. 
This strategy sparked some controversy among board members, however. 
Frederick Gates, for example, resisted the idea of making large contributions 
to endowments. In 1913, he wrote, “It seems to me that if there were no other 
objection to our giving to endowments—and there are many—this one 
objection, that we would not be able to have influence in the conduct of the 
institution proportionate to the weight of our gift, once it is out of our hands 
and built into an endowment, would be in itself a fatal objection. To have a 
voice in the conduct of institutions, to observe annually whether or not they 
are fulfilling their mission, are doing effective work, are meeting the needs of 
the community which they are set to meet, is both a healthful influence on 
the institutions themselves and a perfectly just and necessary protection to 
the Foundation.” Indeed, Gates believed this kind of oversight represented a 
critical social role for the Foundation, protecting other givers who didn’t have 
the time for this kind of due diligence. 
On the other hand, large gifts to major institutions, in the minds of 
some, represented exactly the kind of wholesale philanthropy that Gates 
believed was necessary, given the scale at which the Rockefeller Foundation 
was operating. In 1928, for example, as the Foundation considered cutting 
back considerably on its institutional support programs, Roger Greene, the 
head of the China Medical Board, protested to President George Vincent. The 
Foundation’s intended shift to an emphasis on the advancement of knowledge 
would demand specialized staff with a high level of scientific knowledge to 
waiting the receipt of this letter before advising you of the decision which we 
have reached. I assume I will hear from you shortly.”
To save the college, Wellesley’s trustees launched a capital campaign to 
raise $2 million for buildings and an endowment fund, and at a meeting on 
April 2, the Executive Committee of the Rockefeller Foundation agreed to 
contribute $750,000 contingent upon the college’s ability to raise the balance. 
The point of the gift: to provide physical and financial 
resources that would allow the college to fulfill its mission 
through good times and bad times ahead.
Junior’s good-news letter to Lawrence reveals the way 
in which the Rockefeller Foundation was already seeking 
to engage with grantees as well as provide them with 
resources. Lawrence had told him that the trustees were 
inclined to lower the total campaign goal to $1.8 million, 
Endowment gifts were frequently 
offered to universities in the early 
days to encourage a long-term 
commitment to new programs. 
Rockefeller Foundation grants helped 
build and endow the School of 
Hygiene and Public Health at Johns 
Hopkins University, which opened in 
1918. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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operating budgets. “Unless there is some evidence of inspired curiosity, why 
not put up the 25 percent and save the 75 percent wasted upon mediocre 
‘research.’ I’m fearful of entering this jungle.”
In fact, the Rockefeller Foundation had been in this jungle for quite some 
time. In 1913, Jerome Greene suggested that it would be 
“unwise for an institution like the Rockefeller Foundation 
to assume permanently or indefinitely a share of the current 
expenses of an endowed institution which it does not 
control.” Greene understood that the question of control 
had at least two dimensions. One related to program, the 
other to administration. John D. Rockefeller had supported the mission and 
program of the University of Chicago, but he was constantly frustrated by the 
expectation that he would cover the institution’s rapidly growing budget in 
the early years when he had no control over spending. 
After World War II, this issue appeared in a new context as many 
universities and research institutions began to insist that they could not 
support externally funded research projects without a contribution to the 
assess the proposals by scientists working on the cutting edge of knowledge. 
Moreover, many of these grants would be small because “a great investigator 
frequently needs no more to carry his work over a critical point.” Processing 
and judging large numbers of small grants would increase the Foundation’s 
need for staff and grow the operating budget. In contrast, Greene pointed 
out, giving large, unrestricted grants for research to universities and special 
institutes would require only a modest staff at the Foundation. He suggested 
that picking a handful of top universities would be a good policy. Greene also 
believed that this policy would help to sustain these educational institutions, 
which he believed was important to the Foundation’s mission and goals. “We 
have felt that American university presidents had to do too much in the way 
of money raising,” he wrote to Vincent, “but have we done anything to lessen 
that burden? We have rather encouraged them to take up new projects which 
otherwise they might not have attempted.”
In general, the Rockefeller Foundation made endowment gifts in the 
same spirit as John D. Rockefeller had made his gifts to the Rockefeller 
Foundation—with great license to the trustees of the grantee institution to 
do with the money as they saw fit, and according to their charitable mission. 
In April 1934, a trustee resolution made these guidelines explicit. Institutions 
that had received endowment gifts from the Foundation were free to merge 
or consolidate with other institutions and to take the endowment with them. 
If, after ten years, a better purpose akin to the original purpose had emerged 
for the income from the funds, they were free to redeploy the income. After 
fifty years, they could use both the income and the principal for other needs 
“closely akin to the original purpose.”
Support for Overhead
I n the case of the Rockefeller Foundation, many of its grantees during the first seventy-five years were universities or institutions of higher learning. An issue that emerged in the 1950s was the increasing tendency 
of universities to include within their budgets a percentage for overhead 
and university administration. The Foundation wrestled with whether or 
not it was willing to pay for this. In 1958, President Dean Rusk worried: 
“What happens to research if overhead commissions become an important 
part of the general support of our key universities. Couldn’t this become a 
large and pretentious racket, with the tail wagging the academic dog?” He 
suggested that university administrators might propose mediocre research 
projects just “to pay heat and light bills.” Rusk thought it might be better for 
the Foundation or other philanthropists to simply contribute to university 
John D. Rockefeller’s gifts to create 
the University of Chicago have been 
described as his first great adventure 
in giving. (Hans Behm, Library of 
Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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In 1890, Rockefeller pledged $600,000 to 
help create the University of Chicago. The 
gift was contingent upon the American 
Baptist Education Society’s efforts to raise an 
additional $400,000. By 1910, after making his 
final gift, Rockefeller had contributed  
$35 million to the university.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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new governmental funding agencies would be increasingly responsible for 
specific projects. The report approvingly quoted trustee Dr. Lee DuBridge’s 
argument that requests for project support should always come through the 
university administration, with indirect costs clearly articulated so that the 
Foundation could judge the real commitment of the institution to the project.
In 1958, Dean Rusk summarized the Foundation’s current philosophy on 
overhead by saying that when the Foundation initiated a project and asked 
an institution to be the 
implementer, the Foundation 
normally accepted “an 
obligation to pay the full 
costs.” Where the grantee 
came to the Foundation 
looking for support, costs 
for specific project facilities, 
support staff, or personnel 
benefits were allowed. But 
the Foundation did not allow 
a surcharge as a contribution 
toward the general costs 
of the institution involved. Rusk wanted institutions seeking 
general operating support to apply for it specifically, but they 
were unlikely to get it. Although the Foundation and the 
General Education Board had given nearly $250 million to  
the endowments of forty-one American universities over the 
history of the institution by 1958, it was increasingly reluctant to help  
build endowments, preferring targeted programs that would yield 
demonstrated results.
As a consequence of its history, the Rockefeller Foundation is still 
well-placed at the center of many networks of information and influence, 
as Warren Weaver pointed out in 1952. These networks, anchored 
in relationships with grantees past and present, represent one of the 
Foundation’s key assets as it seeks to address the challenges confronting 
the poor and vulnerable around the world. Although “Dr. X” rarely arrives 
unannounced anymore, the attitude of listening and being open to ideas  
that come from grantees and partners has played a critical role in paving the 
way for successful collaborations, especially with other funders in the world  
of philanthropy.
university’s overhead. MIT offered a case in point. Given the magnitude of 
externally funded research carried on at MIT, the institution asserted that it 
was not able to pay the incremental administrative costs of these projects out 
of its own endowment. Moreover, the university said that the endowment 
funds were not given to support research, but rather for “educational purposes 
of a different nature.” Thus it developed a policy that all projects and grants 
had to “cover the total cost of a research project on a no-loss, no-gain basis.”
Unfortunately, detailed cost accounting necessary to allocate costs 
appropriately was almost impossible. Thus indirect charges were levied 
based on a percentage of the total cost of the project. MIT calculated that 
indirect expenses normally fell within a range of 15 to 25 percent of the total 
direct costs for the project. MIT based this range on years of experience with 
government-contracted work. 
The Rockefeller Foundation also recognized this issue in the 1950s in 
the context of its fellowship program by giving a general, unearmarked 
grant, over and above the cost of tuition, to each institution that received a 
fellow. A similar issue came up in the context of paying for the salaries of 
principal investigators on grants. Warren Weaver outlined what he saw as the 
prevailing practice in 1952. With developmental grants where the Foundation 
was looking “to build up a certain general field of activity in some institution,” 
it had become standard practice to pay for major salaries in the beginning 
and then to taper off. This was done in the field of psychiatry, for example. 
But Weaver pointed out that these kinds of grants marked the exception 
rather than the rule in the Natural Sciences 
and Medicine and Public Health Divisions. In 
Humanities, the institutional structures and 
prevailing practices were different. As Joseph 
Willits, the director of the Social Sciences 
Division, pointed out, often the payment of a 
salary for a principal offered the only way in 
which an academic could buy release time to 
work on a project.
When the Board of Trustees conducted a 
five-year review of the Foundation’s programs 
in 1958, the issue of whether to pay overhead to 
grantee institutions merited special attention. 
To the trustees, the solution lay in a shift of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s program away from 
project-specific funding to more general support 
for institutions. In part, the trustees felt that the 
University of Chicago President 
Harry Pratt Judson with John 
D. Rockefeller Jr. (Rockefeller 
Archive Center.)
1963
University Development program 
begins. The effort seeks to promote 
economic and social well-being by 
enhancing higher education and 
research in African, Asian, and Latin 
American nations. (Ted Spiegel. 
Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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For more than a century the Nobel Prize has 
been associated with profound discovery. 
Often this recognition comes to the 
discoverer long after the path-breaking work 
has been completed. In contrast, fellowships 
awarded by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and other grantors are often given early in 
someone’s career. They provide resources to 
enable further study or training, equip a lab, 
or perform experiments. Timing is everything. 
Even small grants given at the right moment 
can make an enormous difference. 
As of 2012, at least 221 Nobel Prize 
winners have received support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation or its sister philan-
thropies. They come from all over the world 
and reflect not only the spectrum of human 
understanding, but also humankind’s eternal 
ambition to live in a peaceful world. (Data 
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F oundations often act with a great deal of autonomy. Protected by endowments and self-per-petuating boards, they can, if they choose, spend 
their time soliciting and reviewing grant proposals, writ-
ing checks, and reading evaluations without ever thinking 
about what their peers are doing. Only the donor’s intent 
and a desire to be effective compel foundations to work 
closely with grantees or other funders.
In a world where philanthropic dollars represent only 
a small share of the available capital, foundations seeking 
to maximize the impact of their grants and contributions 
must be able to collaborate with grantees, governments, 
and other potential funders. By pooling resources, they 
can minimize the risk that any one funder takes on a 
social venture. They also benefit from information shar-
ing that allows ideas to be tested from multiple points 
of view. Finally, collaboration reduces the likelihood of 
creating redundant organizations or facilities in a given 
community or social sector.
Collaboration is not easy. It demands alignment of the 
goals of multiple institutions and a process for shared de-
cision-making. Within the context of a single organization 
there are hierarchies for resolving differences. Ultimately, 
a president or board of trustees must decide. Within the 
How do we  
collaborate?
context of a collaboration, however, lines of authority 
are often less clear and decisions must be negotiated. 
The costs of communication and coordination go up, and 
decision-making slows. 
Collaboration is also shaped by the partners a founda-
tion chooses. At one end of the spectrum, some founda-
tions make grants and never expect more than a thank 
you letter and a summary report when the project is 
finished. But other philanthropic organizations see grant-
making as an active partnership between the foundation 
and the grantee, with the foundation supplying intellec-
tual and social capital as well as financial resources. 
Many projects or initiatives require the cooperation 
and assistance of government agencies. In this arena, the 
foundation has to understand the political factors that 
shape the government’s ability to act. The foundation 
also has to avoid getting trapped within the government’s 
political constraints. 
In recent years, with a growing recognition that the 
private sector represents a powerful force for innova-
tion and a deep source of capital, many foundations are 
looking to partner with private-sector corporations or 
companies in an effort to achieve a “double bottom-line” 
impact, producing both a social and financial return. 
Culturally, these collaborations are often difficult 
because the motivations of the organizations are not the 
same. Companies must deliver profits to their owners. 
Foundations seek social returns on the investments made 
by their donors. Nevertheless, as authors Matthew Bishop 
and Michael Green report, there is great potential for 
what is sometimes called “philanthrocapitalism.”
How do we collaborate?
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contact with natural sources of support; 
he included mathematics and astronomy 
in this category. He joked later to his 
colleagues that mathematicians might 
even be able to help Ford Motor develop 
an efficient spring suspension system for 
its cars.
Over the next several months, Fiske 
frequently returned to the Rockefeller 
Foundation to pick the brains of its 
top officers. He wanted to know about 
different programs and generally about 
operations. He and Weaver talked about 
the influence of donors and their families 
on a foundation’s work and program. 
Fiske believed the Ford Foundation would 
need to move its offices out of Detroit.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s officers 
were at least a little skeptical of Fiske’s 
efforts, concerned that he was naïve 
and knew little about the actual work 
of giving money away. Over lunch with 
Alan Gregg, the head of the Foundation’s 
medical division, Fiske talked about “the science 
of man” concept. He was also interested in “the 
present state of morals and ethics,” a topic that was 
important to Chester Barnard and the Foundation 
board. After Weaver met with him again on    
March 7, 1947, he noted that Fiske continued to 
show “a considerable but rather formless enthusiasm for the social sciences 
and for the development of ‘leadership.’ He also intends to recommend a little 
of almost everything else.” To borrow from Frederick Gates, there was a danger 
that the Ford Foundation might fall victim to “scatteration.”
All of the Foundation’s officers, however, recognized the weight of Fiske’s 
task. As Alan Gregg wrote in his diary, “I do not know that I have seen, aside 
from wartime conditions, as large an opportunity confronting an individual 
as that which [Fiske] confronts.” What is less clear is whether the Foundation’s 
officers realized how Henry Ford’s death would signal the beginning of a new 
era for the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Scions of two of America’s most successful 
entrepreneurs: Edsel Ford and John D. 
Rockefeller Jr. To avoid enormous inheritance 
taxes and a forced sale of Ford Motor Company 
shares in the 1930s, Edsel and Henry Ford 
established the Ford Foundation.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
No L onger the Biggest
I n December 1946, Wyman P. Fiske came to New York to meet with Warren Weaver. A tall, heavy man in his late 40s, with a law degree as well as an MBA from Harvard, Fiske was a former accounting professor at MIT who knew something about philanthropy. He had developed 
and directed the Sloan Fellowship Program since 1939. Nevertheless, he had a 
lot of questions.
In Michigan, the founder of the Ford Motor Company was near death. 
Years earlier, after Congress voted to tax estates of over $50 million at a 
rate of 70 percent, Henry Ford had created the Ford Foundation. To avoid 
paying an estimated $321 million in federal estate taxes, Ford and his son 
Edsel had willed most of their shares in the Ford Motor Company to this 
new institution. While the two men were still alive, the foundation gave 
an average of $1 million a year to Michigan charities. But with Ford’s death, 
the foundation would become the richest in the world, with assets valued at 
nearly $500 million ($4.67 billion in 2011 dollars), almost four times the net 
worth of the Rockefeller Foundation. With these assets, the Ford Foundation 
needed a program. They had asked Fiske to develop a plan. 
Fiske had a lot of ideas. He was very interested in a program focused on 
training leadership in business as well as in “national life.” He and Weaver 
talked generally about the idea of “cooperation.” At one point, Weaver 
suggested that Ford might think of funding fields of science that had little 
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
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Role Model and Coll abor ator
Over the years, the Rockefeller Foundation had collaborated with other major philanthropic organizations, especially the Carnegie Corporation. But in the postwar era, the scale and complexity of the 
world’s problems, combined with the relative paucity of philanthropic dollars 
in the context of these challenges, forced the Foundation to find new ways 
to partner with other foundations. Much of what the Rockefeller Foundation 
learned in this era, it learned in working with Ford.
Henry Ford’s death in April 1947 forced the Ford Foundation to get serious 
about the future. Wyman Fiske was quickly pushed aside. In December 
1948, Henry Ford II announced the formation of an eight-member study 
commission under the leadership of H. Rowan Gaither Jr., a San Francisco 
attorney who had served as the assistant director of the Radiation Laboratory 
at MIT during World War II, and would soon 
help found the Rand Corporation. Less than 
two years later, the Commission released its 
recommendations for the policy and program  
of the foundation.
The proposed program was organized 
around five core initiatives: 1) to promote  
world peace and establish a world order of law 
and justice; 2) to secure greater allegiance to 
basic principles of freedom and democracy;  
3) to advance the economic well-being of people 
everywhere; 4) to strengthen educational 
opportunities to promote equal opportunity 
and allow individuals to realize their potential; 
and 5) to increase knowledge of factors that 
influence or determine human conduct 
and extend that knowledge for the benefit 
of individuals and society. In keeping with 
the traditions developed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, the 
Ford Foundation’s objectives were broad and 
comprehensive, providing a great deal of room 
for staff and future trustees to be opportunistic 
and respond to emerging challenges. 
Through the 1950s, the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations found many reasons to work together. 
1970
Norman Borlaug wins the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his work with  
the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Conquest of Hunger program.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Collaborat ion Anchored  
in  H istory
When Bill Gates established the foundation 
that would bear his name in 1994, he asked 
his father to manage the new organization. 
To understand the challenge, William H. Gates 
Sr. began reading about the Rockefellers and 
the Rockefeller Foundation. What he learned 
surprised him, and his discoveries would help 
pave the way for a collaboration anchored in 
the confluences of history.
“Every corner we’ve turned in the field  
of global health,” Gates Sr. writes in his book 
Showing Up for Life, “we’ve found ourselves 
building on efforts the Rockefeller Foundation 
had helped launch and fund in the 1980s.” 
If you want to pursue “audacious goals,” 
Gates writes, “you need like-minded partners 
with whom to collaborate. And we learned 
that such goals are not prizes claimed by the 
short-winded. The Rockefellers stay with 
tough problems for generations.” 
These were the insights that helped pave 
the way for the Alliance for a Green Revolu-
tion in Africa. “We expect that, over time, 
African farmers will be able to produce two or 
three times as much food as they are growing 
now,” Gates says, “and sell what they don’t 
need. All this should help tens of millions 
of people in sub-Saharan Africa lead more 
prosperous lives.”
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After Dean Rusk became president in 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
interest in the developing world coincided with the Ford Foundation’s ob-
jectives to promote world peace and strengthen the institutions of democ-
racy at home and abroad. As the two largest private foundations, Ford and 
Rockefeller also strategized their response to Congressional investigations 
into philanthropy launched in 1952. 
Ford and Rockefeller worked together particularly on agriculture 
programs. Even before Rusk officially assumed his position at the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Foundation officials had concluded that 
collaboration with other foundations would be critical to the success of 
its programs in the future. Rusk met with Ford Foundation’s staffer John 
B. Howard in April 1952. The two men talked about a variety of subjects, 
including Rockefeller’s plans to develop hardier food crops in India and 
Southeast Asia. Howard told Rusk that the Ford Foundation would be very 
interested in this initiative. 
Through the mid-1950s, staff at the Rockefeller Foundation studied 
a variety of options for developing rice research in Asia. Meanwhile, 
the Ford Foundation invested heavily in development projects in India 
between 1951 and 1953 that met with only limited success. Staff work and 
the exhortations of John D. Rockefeller 3rd raised the Ford Foundation’s 
interest in population and food production issues. Then, in August 1958, 
senior officials from both foundations met to discuss grants they were 
considering making to the College of Agriculture at Lyallpur in Pakistan. 
At this lunch, the conversation turned to the idea of developing a single 
international institute to focus on rice research.
From this initial conversation, it took just over a year to work out 
the details with the Philippine government to establish in Los Baños the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), which was formally created 
with a memorandum of understanding signed in December 1959. To get 
the institute off the ground, the Ford Foundation agreed to provide capital 
and the Rockefeller Foundation assumed a substantial burden to pay 
for staff and programming. Dean Rusk believed that the cooperation of 
Ford and Rockefeller internationalized the project and made it seem less 
like a national effort on the part of the Philippines. Although he highly 
doubted the possibilities for securing cooperation 
among the Asian nations, Rusk believed the foundation-
led institute would enjoy more success than any 
analogous effort launched by national governments or 
even international agencies. 
  Cooperation on IRRI opened the door in the 1960s 
At the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI), sponsored by the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, 
researchers looked for new ways to 
control pests affecting rice crops.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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for continuing partnerships between Ford and Rockefeller, 
especially in agriculture. Indeed, by 1963, Foundation 
president J. George Harrar was actively negotiating with 
Ford for joint support of three international institutes 
including IRRI, the Arid Lands Research Institute and the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture. For its 
part, the still-developing Ford Foundation benefited from the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s experience and connections in the world of scientific research. 
Meanwhile, the programs initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation were 
more ambitious than they might have been thanks to the Ford Foundation’s 
participation.
Lingering Uncertaint y
Despite their cooperation on IRRI, however, Ford and Rockefeller Foundation staffs were still uncertain about how to work together. In 1960, for example, Robert Morison, who directed the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Medical and Natural Sciences Division, had raised 
a cautionary flag when one of his staff asked about cooperating with the 
Ford Foundation. From Morison’s point of view, there were practical and 
ethical issues to be resolved.
Morison noted that things shared in confidence by grantees or others 
in the Rockefeller Foundation’s network should not be passed on to other 
foundations. He also said the Foundation should avoid “the impression that 
we are in any way putting pressure on another foundation to do what we 
want them to do.” He further suggested that “it is important to avoid doing 
anything which might be interpreted on the outside as undue collusion 
between two large foundations with unusual power.” Morison conceded 
that there was no equivalent in the philanthropic world to the antitrust 
laws that applied in business, “but from time to time in the past the public 
has worried about the amount of power over cultural activities placed in the 
hands of a few foundation officers and trustees.” 
Morison determined that it was appropriate for Foundation staff to 
share their appraisals of the institutional capacities of organizations that 
had applied to the Ford Foundation for funding, but that it was “probably 
not wise, except under extraordinary circumstances, to travel around with 
the representatives of other foundations or to give the impression that we 
are making a sort of joint appraisal.” Morison didn’t want grantees to think 
that the Rockefeller Foundation might become a conduit or an advocate for 
grants from the Ford Foundation.
Research on barley helped lead to 
the development of the International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture in 
Colombia with sponsorship by the 
Ford and W.K. Kellogg Foundations.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Chapter Eight: Collaboration 221220 Beyond Charity
Resolving protocol issues was one thing, but the 
Rockefeller Foundation also struggled with the idea that 
it was no longer the biggest foundation on the planet. The 
birth of the Ford Foundation foreshadowed an important 
question that would confront the Rockefeller Foundation 
in the second half-century of its existence. When it was no 
longer the largest private foundation, or even the second 
largest, how would it continue to exercise influence? 
Asked to look ahead twenty years in 1960, Charles Fahs, 
the director of the Humanities program, suggested that it 
would have to be through “intellectual leadership and by 
imagination and courage on the part of both officers and 
Trustees.” He said that with the growth of other American 
foundations, the Rockefeller Foundation could withdraw 
from fields that others were likely to serve, and focus on 
problems that others “are unwilling or unable to tackle.”
 Indeed, cooperation with Ford in the 1960s opened the 
door to other collaborations. Out of a Bellagio Conference 
came the establishment in 1971 of a consortium known 
as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR). The Foundation teamed with Ford and 
Kellogg to finance the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). 
With Canada’s International Development Research Centre, the Foundation 
embraced a number international agricultural initiatives. In the U.S., the 
Foundation worked with the Kresge Foundation to support environmental 
programs at Michigan State University and Woods Hole, Massachusetts, 
and to help finance a building at CIAT. Rockefeller also helped connect 
Kresge with New York University to finance a new medical building. These 
collaborative projects led to the development of a more collegial relationship 
between the two foundations, especially on environmental programs. 
Rockefeller staff provided leads to Kresge regarding potential grantees 
working on projects that complemented the joint projects they funded.
Cooper ating with Smaller Foundations
T he emergence of the Ford Foundation in the early 1950s posed one kind of challenge to the Rockefeller Foundation’s role in the philanthropic community. The proliferation of thousands of 
smaller private foundations raised another. Through the 1960s, a series of 
Congressional investigations focused on abuses of the tax code perpetrated 
by some private foundations as well as the lack of public information about 
the work of foundations in general. The Rockefeller Foundation defended 
itself and the principles of philanthropy during these hearings, but some 
people expected more as the foundation community sought to pull together 
and establish standards and best practices that would stave off further attacks. 
The Rockefeller Foundation was deeply ambivalent about some of these 
efforts. In 1972, for example, the Commonwealth Fund sought to recruit 
Rockefeller and Ford to take part in a study of the administrative expense of 
leading foundations. Both Rockefeller and Ford hesitated, fearing that they 
would not necessarily agree with the report’s findings. Rockefeller trustee 
Robert Goheen pressed John Knowles to get involved, suggesting that in this 
new world the Rockefeller Foundation should be a leader in dealing with 
foundation management issues. Frederick Seitz, the head of Rockefeller 
University, wrote to Knowles to suggest that the Rockefeller Foundation had 
to “exhibit rational leadership” to protect its own 
interests and the field. In 1973, the Rockefeller 
family offices helped fund a study, by Harvard 
Professor Martin Feldstein, of the economic 
effects of charitable contributions on tax 
policy and social welfare in the United States. 
Feldstein’s report bolstered the philanthropic 
community when it demonstrated that tax 
deductions produced far more  
dollars for social welfare programs than 
conventional government programs.
Some staff imagined a leadership role for 
the Rockefeller Foundation that went beyond 
these defensive actions in the public policy 
sphere. In 1972, for example, vice president 
Sterling Wortman proposed that the Foundation 
begin to systematically track the interests of smaller 
foundations to “become a broker for ideas as well as for 
funding of worthwhile proposals.” Wortman proposed that 
the Foundation experiment with such an initiative, trying 
it for three years to see if it worked. Wortman also wanted 
to use this program as a vehicle to begin to strengthen weak 
relationships with foundations in Europe. The plan was  
not approved.
The Rockefeller Foundation's 
Bellagio Center has played a key part 
in the effort to convene stakeholders 
and design innovative solutions to 
global challenges. Among many 
historic moments, a 1971 conference 
led to the formation of the 
Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Robert S. Morison succeeded Warren 
Weaver as director of the Division 
of Medical and Natural Sciences. 
As collaboration with the Ford 
Foundation developed, he and other 
staff had to define the boundaries  
for the working relationship  
between the two organizations.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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A Growing Communit y
T he expansion of the philanthropic community accelerated with the boom of the 1980s. By 1987, with $1.6 billion in assets, the Rockefeller Foundation was ranked seventh among the largest foundations 
in the United States. These changes created obvious new realities. As Peter 
Goldmark said to a gathering of philanthropists on the occasion of John D. 
Rockefeller’s 150th birthday in 1989, Rockefeller and his philanthropies 
had had the audacity to set out “to tackle global problems single-handedly: 
eliminating hookworm and yellow fever, or creating the entire field of public 
health. Today no one in this room represents an institution that can single-
handedly wrestle to the ground a global problem. That day is long past. And 
we in philanthropy are all faced with the requirement to build partnerships 
more daring, more disciplined, more generous, than anything we have ever 
done before.”
Goldmark and his fellow CEOs at the Ford Foundation (Franklin Thomas 
and later Susan Berresford), the MacArthur Foundation (Adele Simmons), 
and Pew Charitable Trusts (Rebecca Rimel) formed a group engagingly 
known as “the Four Musketeers” to try to develop a structured dialogue 
regarding ways in which they might collaborate on common goals. The 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation (William Richardson) joined the group in 1995. To 
strengthen the framework for collaboration throughout their organizations, 
the group sponsored a “Multi-Foundation Training” session in 1995 that 
was in reality a conversation about priorities, impact and opportunities for 
collaboration. This group would also provide a useful sounding board for the 
Rockefeller Foundation board of trustees in 1997 as it began the search for a 
new president, after Goldmark announced his 
departure at the end of the year.
The foundations represented in the 
Musketeers group were among the largest in 
the country, but they would soon welcome a 
newcomer to the philanthropic community. It 
is in the nature of philanthropy’s relationship 
to capitalism that new foundations will be born 
that surpass their predecessors in wealth. So in 
2000, with the creation of the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation (with an initial endowment 
of $16 billion that quickly grew to $36.3 billion 
by the summer of 2011), a new institution was 
created with enormous potential. 
In 2006, the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations 
launched a partnership to create the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA). The need was overwhelming. 
Three hundred million Africans went without sufficient 
food each day. Modest investments and improvements in 
farming practices were expected to triple or quadruple 
the levels of production. The Gates Foundation initially 
committed $100 million over five years, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation provided $50 million. AGRA represented 
the Gates Foundation’s first “venture into poverty and 
development after years of focusing largely on global health 
and education.” To outsiders, as well as the partners, the 
collaboration was extremely promising. As the Washington 
Post reported, “the mere fact that the world’s biggest 
philanthropist is joining with the preeminent foundation 
working in agricultural development is ‘going to make a 
difference.’” Indeed, the combination of the Rockefeller 
and Gates Foundations on this initiative, as Melinda Gates 
said, reflected a shared vision “for creating lasting change 
that will help millions of the most vulnerable in Africa lift 
themselves out of extreme poverty.”
A R enewed L ook at the Private Sector
A s collaboration became increasingly important to strategy, in the 1990s the Foundation turned to the biggest source of capital in the world—the private sector. John D. Rockefeller had suggested 
that creative entrepreneurs in the marketplace offered the most powerful 
vehicle for improving the well-being of mankind. Neither philanthropy nor 
government had the resources to meet all of these growing needs. Moreover, 
as Foundation leaders increasingly recognized, the private sector offered 
valuable knowledge and experience to tackle some of the biggest problems 
facing humanity. But partnering with the private sector demanded a new  
way of thinking about collaboration, a way of thinking rooted in the idea  
of social investing. 
As president, Peter Goldmark  
worked with his peers in the 
philanthropic community to  
promote greater collaboration.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
1978
Rockefeller Foundation helps to 
convene the first meeting of the 
Great Neglected Diseases Network.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Members of two local cassava 
associations gather in Malawi. Under 
the aegis of the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution for Africa (AGRA), the 
Foundation and its partners sought 
to triple or quadruple agricultural 
production levels in Africa to meet 
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P rivate foundations have traditionally seen money from two perspectives. It is a resource given to them by the donor, and if it is meant to do good 
over time it must be invested in a way that will protect 
the value of the asset and produce annual income. This 
income, in turn, provides the resources the organization 
needs to carry out its program. 
As good stewards, boards of trustees have been 
expected to manage their investments prudently and 
allocate their budgets to maximize the effectiveness 
of their programs. Traditionally, the social mission 
of the organization was not supposed to color the 
organization’s investment strategy. Likewise, the 
investment of program funds was not expected to 
provide a financial return. As a result, for many years,  
the vast majority of philanthropic organizations did not 
make loans or invest directly in businesses. This kind 
of activity was unseemly, if not illegal, for a nonprofit 
organization. But times have changed.
How should  
the Foundation’s 
mission influence its 
investment strategies?
Starting in the late 1960s, these assumptions began 
to be challenged. Foundations were asked to provide 
loans (investment capital) for minority businesses or 
housing developments in low-income communities. 
Activists, meanwhile, asked why foundations were 
investing in companies whose business practices 
seemed to be at odds with the work and mission of 
the foundation. They also asked why foundations and 
other entities managing public capital shouldn’t provide 
financing to new enterprises or sectors—like renewable 
energy or biotechnology—that seemed to promise 
significant social returns. Changes in the U.S. tax code 
in 1969 specifically allowed foundations to begin making 
these kinds of Program-Related Investments. 
Today, a number of philanthropic organizations 
practice some form of social investing. They may 
incorporate programmatic goals into their endowment 
management strategies, or they may include investment 
activity in their program work.  Some subscribe to what 
has been called “socially responsible investing.” They 
use their status as shareholders to take an activist role 
within the private sector or to screen out investments 
that might have harmful effects on society or the 
environment. They may also push for corporate policies 
that benefit the poor, the environment, or some other 
social good. Some institutions also practice “mission-
related investing.” When making investment decisions, 
they consider the positive impacts a company’s 
business might have that correlate with the mission 
of the foundation. Taking advantage of changes in the 
How should the Foundation’s mission influence its investment strategies?
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tax code, some philanthropic entities make Program-
Related Investments that provide capital to high-risk, 
marginalized communities, while others are engaged in 
“impact investing” that produces a “double-bottom line” 
return with social or environmental benefits as well as a 
return of capital or greater financial receipts.
Despite all of these innovations, this socially 
influenced approach to investing is still very controversial 
in many organizations. Some trustees continue to 
believe that investment policy should only be shaped 
by the effort to protect the value of the organization’s 
assets and maximize the income generated within an 
acceptable range of risk. Many still believe that a high 
wall should separate the market from philanthropy.
In 1919, John D. Rockefeller Jr. disagreed.
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Attending a conference in Washington in September 1919 to confront the 
growing issue of labor unrest in post-World War I America, Rockefeller met 
privately with the top executives at U.S. Steel, Elbert Gary and Henry Frick. 
The company’s management was intent on breaking the strike and adamantly 
opposed the idea of collective bargaining. As a 
shareholder, Rockefeller hoped to convince them  
to recognize the workers.
Rockefeller was polite, although the atmosphere 
was tense. He offered examples of successful 
agreements between labor and management that 
led to increased productivity and decreased strife. 
U.S. Steel’s Elbert Gary with President Calvin 
Coolidge and John D. Rockefeller Jr. After 
Ludlow, John D. Rockefeller Jr. became an 
advocate for collective bargaining. When Gary 
refused to bargain with striking steelworkers 
in 1919, Rockefeller sold his shares in protest. 
(National Photo Company, Library of Congress, 
Prints & Photographs.)
A n Activist Shareholder
On September 22, 1919, more than 350,000 steelworkers in nine American states walked off the job to protest working conditions in the nation’s steel mills. The strikers wanted the workday reduced from twelve to eight hours. They wanted higher wages 
and the reinstatement of workers who had been fired for participating in 
union activity. Most of all, they wanted collective bargaining. To the surprise 
of many people in the United States, John D. Rockefeller Jr. quickly emerged as 
an advocate for the workers and the concept of collective bargaining. 
Uncomfortable as a corporate board member because he shared 
responsibility for decisions that he could not control, Junior had resigned 
from the board of the Standard Oil Company and most of the other corporate 
boards he served on, resolved to focus his energy on philanthropy. The one 
board he stayed with—Colorado Fuel and Iron Company—had been an 
ethical and public relations disaster and confirmed his worst fears about his 
moral position as a board member and as a shareholder. His personal process 
of reconciliation with labor had convinced him that employees had a right to 
collective bargaining. He began to use his position as a stockholder to pressure 
corporations into granting these rights to workers. As he wrote to a church 
official, “I am now, and have long been, a believer in the moral responsibility 
of stockholders.”
b e y o n d  c h a r i t y
Chapter I X
Chapter Nine: Social Investing 235234 Beyond Charity
Wickliffe Rose and Thomas Debevoise, the 
Foundation’s long-time attorney and advisor, 
engaged in a spirited discussion on the issue 
with regard to the General Education Board. In a 
1925 letter, Debevoise asserted that a charitable 
corporation holds securities only as an investor and 
that “it is not equipped to direct the activities of a 
business corporation; that any interference by it will bring responsibilities 
which it cannot assume, and that its only course when it is displeased with 
the management of a corporation in which its funds are invested is to dispose 
of its investments; that while a stockholder it will never use its voting power 
to continue in office directors who do not show proper regard for the interests 
of the stockholders and public alike.”
Thomas Debevoise served as outside general 
counsel to the Rockefeller Foundation for a 
quarter of a century. Debevoise argued that  
a foundation holds stock only as an investor  
and is “not equipped” to interfere with  
the management of a business. (Frank 
Ehrenford. Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Gary replied that he knew of more examples of failure and asserted that the 
principle was dangerous. Unable to make his case, Rockefeller said good-bye 
and expressed his hope that the situation would work out.
“If it does not,” Gary responded, “ it will be because you and others are 
advocating representation and collective bargaining.” 
“With every courtesy and fullest respect,” Rockefeller responded. “I might 
say that if the outcome of the present situation is not as you and I both hope it 
will be, it will be due to the fact that you and other employers are unwilling to 
recognize and adopt the fundamental and just principle of representation and 
collective bargaining.”
Shortly afterward, Rockefeller sold his shares in U.S. Steel. The Rockefeller 
Foundation liquidated its holdings in the industry, selling shares in Otis Steel 
and cashing out a $1 million note from Bethlehem Steel. If there was any 
debate over these moves with the Finance Committee of the Board, it is  
not recorded.
The decision to sell shares in Otis Steel may have reflected the first time 
that the Rockefeller Foundation wrestled with the correlation between 
its mission and program and its endowment. But it would not be the last 
time. Over the course of nearly a century, there would be many times when 
Foundation leaders talked about how they might promote the well-being of 
mankind in their role as investors. By the beginning of the 21st century, the 
Foundation would increasingly recognize that social investing offered a major 
new path for philanthropy. But it was a path that had to be opened step by 
step over many years. 
Limitations of the Prudent M an
While Junior leveraged his position as a shareholder, the Rockefeller Foundation was more ambivalent about its attitude towards a range of investment and program strategies that 
would later be described under a broad category called social investing. 
Historically, trustees were expected to invest the assets of a trust or foundation 
according to the “prudent man” rule with two key goals: to produce income 
to meet current expenses and to preserve the corpus of the trust. Trustees 
and their financial advisors and attorneys generally believed that attention 
to social concerns would undermine this focus. In 1917, the Annual Report 
declared that there were things the Foundation could not “successfully or 
wisely do.” It could not “give money or make loans to individuals, or invest in 
securities which have a philanthropic rather than a business basis, or assist in 
securing patents, or aid altruistic movements which involve private profit.” 
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As small as the foundation world was in the 
1920s, however, there were examples that ran 
counter to Debevoise’s point of view. One was the 
Russell Sage Foundation, which had been given 
specific authority by the foundation’s donor to use 
up to one quarter of its investment funds for “social 
betterment.” The donor had specifically stated that 
the returns on these investments would be less important than  
their social goals. 
In 1927, during an informal conference, Debevoise pressed his points 
again. This time, the officers and several board members generally agreed to 
his principles. But Debevoise conceded that “it is also recognized that crises 
might arise in which the trustees might feel it their duty to take vigorous 
public action with respect to a given situation.” Once again, forced to define 
its position, the Foundation came down firmly on the side of flexibility.
Though this perspective on the moral responsibilities of shareholders was 
not always front and center at the Rockefeller Foundation, Raymond Fosdick 
revisited the issue in 1940 after public controversy erupted regarding the 
New York Transit Company, whose stock was included in the Foundation’s 
portfolio. In a note to Debevoise, Fosdick wrote, “I hate to have the Foundation 
involved in a fight over proxies, but I suppose that a tax-exempt organization 
has a responsibility as the owner of securities just as an individual or a 
business corporation has.” Fosdick did not see a need to intervene in the 
situation, but he asked Debevoise: “How much do we know about the inside 
workings of the companies whose securities we hold? How much ought  
we to know?” 
Debevoise again counseled caution. Looking through old files three years 
later, Fosdick found Debevoise’s letter to Rose from 1925 and forwarded it to 
Walter Stewart, the chairman of the Foundation. “I’m not sure that I agree 
with Tom’s doctrine,” Fosdick wrote, “but it is difficult to determine what the 
alternative policy should be.” Fosdick noted the contradictions in Debevoise’s 
advice. How could the Foundation stay above the fray and at the same time 
intervene when a corporation’s directors did not show proper regard for 
shareholders and the public? These discussions did not result in a formulation 
of policy towards what would today be called social investing, but they show 
that leaders at the Foundation were aware of the potential to do good on the 
investment side of the Foundation’s business, as well as the expenditure side. 
Board member Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York 
Times, raised similar issues in 1952 when he wrote to the Foundation’s new 
president, Dean Rusk, to suggest that the Rockefeller Foundation develop real 
Board member Arthur Hays Sulzberger 
suggested in 1952 that the Rockefeller 
Foundation should develop housing for workers 
in New York City. The Foundation did not 
pursue this concept for a programmatically 
motivated investment. (Artist Benjamin Sheer.  
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs.)
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estate for housing and light industry in Manhattan that would offer workers 
the opportunity to live close to where they worked. Rusk saw the proposal 
in the context of other urban initiatives focused on ameliorating problems 
affecting inner cities in the postwar years. He noted that it had long been the 
Foundation’s policy to invest “on a business—not philanthropic—basis…. If 
RF investments were considered on the grounds of having its capital make a 
social contribution in addition to that which would be made by its income, 
such questions should be carefully explored before acting.” But Rusk was leery 
of predicaments that might arise where the Foundation’s philanthropic image 
would be compromised by its business investments. In real estate especially, 
he pointed out, “with the current social feeling against landlords, a legitimate 
attempt by RF to raise rents could well be met by a clamor on the part of the 
tenants which, as a public relations matter, RF could not ignore.”
These discussions do not seem to have gone anywhere at the time. As 
late as 1968, research by the general counsel’s office concluded that the 
Foundation had never made a programmatically motivated investment.  
That year, George Harrar asked Chauncey Belknap, the general counsel, to 
revisit the issue. Given the crisis in America’s inner cities and the lack of 
investment capital in poor neighborhoods to help finance entrepreneurs, 
Harrar wanted to know if the Foundation could invest from its portfolio in 
these communities. 
Belknap’s report noted that the Rockefeller Foundation made frequent 
grants under its Equal Opportunity program to nonprofit organizations 
working in poor inner city neighborhoods. Moreover, in 1968 it had given 
money to two organizations—one in Harlem 
and the other in the Roxbury neighborhood of 
Boston—to help finance revolving loan funds 
targeted at minority business owners in inner 
city neighborhoods. But direct investment was 
a different question. According to Belknap, 
the Foundation had always followed generally 
accepted practices for charities, and the newly 
founded Charitable Foundations Division of the 
Attorney General’s office of the State of New 
York “would be quick to pick up any deviation 
from what the Division regards as authorized 
procedure in the investment or distribution 
policies of a charitable corporation.” In addition, 
Belknap wrote, “even under the most liberal 
standard that has been put forward, ‘social 
investments’ of the type under consideration would not qualify. They would 
not be made with a view to fiscal return, and the realization of such a return 
would be largely fortuitous.” 
Belknap acknowledged the argument that a loan could be construed as a 
“new species of charitable gift” and therefore seen as within the Foundation’s 
mission and charitable purpose. He believed there was “considerable merit 
in this approach, but it has never been tested in the courts and there are 
weighty arguments on the other side. Assistance to needy individuals 
has been a traditional form of charity, but assistance to needy business 
corporations for the purpose of helping them make a profit for the benefit 
of their shareholders has not so far been legally sanctioned as a permissible 
application of funds held subject to a charitable trust.” Belknap then offered 
the hypothetical of two grocery stores on opposite corners in Roxbury, one 
financed with low-interest rate money from the Foundation. He suggested 
that the owner operating with market-rate loans might object to the 
Foundation’s soft loan to his competitor as an exercise in charity. Analyzing 
the question from the perspective of federal regulators at the IRS, Belknap 
noted that the government had recently given tax-exempt status to the newly 
created Boston Urban Foundation, whose founding documents authorized 
the provision of loans “to needy individuals to start their own businesses, or 
acquire existing ones, in economically disadvantaged areas of Boston in which 
such individuals reside.” The IRS ruling specifically allowed for loans to 
individuals, but withheld judgment on the legality of making loans to “firms, 
corporations, financial institutions and others.” 
To try and break through the IRS logjam, a nonprofit corporation 
sponsored by the Taconic Foundation—with support from The Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York 
and seven other tax-exempt charitable foundations—created a loan fund 
focused on low-income inner city minority communities. After several 
high-level hearings, an IRS decision on the Cooperative Assistance Fund 
application was still pending at the time of Belknap’s memo. Given the 
uncertainty of the situation, Belknap concluded that the Foundation should 
wait. Any venture down the path of social investment, at least beyond any 
minimal level, might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exemption.
Congress resolved this dilemma in 1969. The Tax Reform Act defined the 
concept of a Program-Related Investment (PRI) as any investment intended 
to further the tax exempt purposes of a foundation that would not ordinarily 
appeal to a prudent investor. Unlike a grant, a PRI could be structured with 
a provision for repayment and it could be made to a for profit entity whose 
business advanced an exempt or charitable activity or goal. The new law gave 
1983
Collaborative for Humanities and Arts 
Teaching (CHART) begins to develop 
teachers as key agents in school re-
form in the United States. (John T. 
Miller. Rockefeller Archives Center.)
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private foundations a powerful new tool as they worked to promote the well-
being of humanity. The law also recognized that philanthropic organizations 
could make a difference by investing, as well as grantmaking.
Activist Shareholders
In the 1970s, foundations, universities and other nonprofit institutions also began to look more closely at their role as shareholders. Some refused to invest in tobacco or defense-related industries, because these 
businesses undermined the social goals of the foundation. Around this time, 
Princeton University decided that it would refuse to invest in banks that were 
making loans to the Republic of South Africa, because of the government’s 
apartheid policies. This move towards activist shareholding, especially  
with regard to South Africa, prompted new soul 
searching at the Rockefeller Foundation.
In the late summer of 1986, treasurer Jack 
Meyer noted a number of universities, public 
pension funds and foundations—including the 
$28 million Rockefeller Family Fund—had chosen 
to divest shares of companies doing business in, 
or with, South Africa. But the Ford Foundation, 
in concert with the conclusions of the Study 
Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern 
Africa, chaired by Franklin Thomas (and launched 
by the Rockefeller Foundation), had decided not 
to undertake a wholesale divestment. At the time, 
the Rockefeller Foundation already had adopted 
several guidelines with regard to investing in South 
Africa, including the Sullivan Principles and Bishop 
Desmond Tutu’s Proposals. But there was growing 
pressure on American institutions to go further. 
Meyer outlined a number of options open to the 
board: maintain its policies, toughen its stance on 
corporate proxies to support withdrawal, begin 
a letter-writing campaign relative to proxies, sell 
securities of companies not considered to be doing 
enough to promote equal treatment for non-whites, 
or completely divest all South African holdings. 
Meyer concluded that selling the Foundation’s 
South African shares would not have a significant 
impact. Moreover, the Foundation could do more if it 
remained engaged with companies doing business in 
South Africa. And finally,  “A far more effective use of 
Foundation resources would be to fashion grants that 
directly aid anti-apartheid groups and the non-white 
population in South Africa.” Meyer noted that the 
Foundation had already moved down this path, making 
grants worth more than $900,000 since 1982 to groups 
working to strengthen black-led institutions.
Meyer’s memo raised concerns with other staff 
members. Senior vice president Kenneth Prewitt 
suggested that if it became public, portions of it could 
be taken out of context or made to sound as if the 
Foundation was more concerned about the cost of 
divestment than the welfare of black South Africans. He 
also urged President Richard Lyman to include a broader 
cross-section of the staff in a discussion of the issue so 
that, either way, they would feel some ownership of the 
final decision.
The board chose not to divest, but empowered the 
treasurer to review proxies for issues related to South 
Africa and encouraged the staff to look for new ways 
for the Foundation to invest in “front-line states” that 
bore the brunt of South Africa’s troubles. But the idea 
of investing capital in ways that aligned with the 
Foundation’s mission and produced both a social and a 
financial return did not die.
Moving into Progr am-R el ated Investments
I n the mid-1990s, the Rockefeller Foundation returned to the idea of Program-Related Investments. In collaboration with the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller invested in the National Community Development 
Initiative, a project that catalyzed the creation of more than 500 Community 
Development Corporations in central cities across the United States. 
Loans structured as PRIs were seen as a major tool to finance community 
infrastructure projects launched by these local initiatives. Rockefeller hoped 
to deploy this tool in other program areas.
The move required new skills within the organization and the 
repurposing of existing skills. Investment analysts working in the treasurer’s 
Franklin Thomas had been the president of the 
Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation 
when John Knowles asked him to lead the 
Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward 
Southern Africa. By the time the Commission 
was launchd in 1979, Knowles had succumbed 
to cancer and Thomas had been named CEO of 
the Ford Foundation. The Commision’s report, 
issued in 1981, set the stage for significant 
changes in U.S. attitudes toward apartheid and 
provided guidelines for socially responsible 
investing in businesses in South Africa. 
(Georgiana Silk, Ford Foundation Archives. 
Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Recruited to the Rockefeller Foundation 
by Richard Lyman in 1985, Kenneth 
Prewitt served as senior vice president 
during a critical period of transition. As 
the board considered divesting assets 
linked to South Africa, Prewitt suggested 
that the Foundation should consider the 
perspectives of partners and grantees 
as well as the financial impacts of such a 
move. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Protests against apartheid increased in 
South Africa and around the world in the 
1970s. In Guguletu township near Cape Town, 
protestors confronted police and dogs in 
August 1976. (AP Images.)
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invested in some of the most innovative transactions of its time and offered 
lessons for many subsequent social investors. 
In creating ProVenEx, the Foundation had made a fundamental and 
important decision to fund the project with program money rather than 
endowment assets. This decision emphasized the focus on social impact 
rather than financial return. It also continued the separation between the 
motivations for selecting investment opportunities on the endowment side 
of the house (financial return on investment) and the motivations on the 
program side (social return on investment). 
As the idea of social investing continued to evolve, it attracted a much 
wider range of investors, including non-philanthropists who wanted a risk-
adjusted financial return on their investments but also wanted to invest in 
enterprises that might generate a social return. As the marketplace widened, 
debates emerged over the packaging and marketing of these investment 
opportunities. Questions were raised about definitions. How much of a social 
impact should an investment make to qualify as an “impact investment?” 
In the context of this conversation, Foundation President Judith Rodin 
recognized an opportunity to help stabilize and grow this potentially 
significant market. In 2007 and 2008, the Foundation brought together 
leaders in finance, philanthropy, and development at its Bellagio conference 
center in Italy to explore the potential for impact investing. At these 
meetings, the term itself was coined and the conversation led to a decision by 
the Foundation’s board to approve a new $38 million program to help create 
the infrastructure for this new industry. The Impact Investing Initiative 
focused on four key strategies: building networks for collective action; 
contributing to basic industry infrastructure, like social performance 
ratings; building and scaling intermediaries; and supporting basic research 
and policy. Key outcomes of this initiative included the creation of the 
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) and the establishment of the Global 
Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) to provide investors with a double-
bottom line assessment of the performance of participating businesses. 
In helping to create the GIIN, GIIRS, and other organizations, Rodin 
recognized that its greatest opportunities in this emerging arena were tied 
to its leadership role and to developing the intermediary institutions that 
would give investors confidence, thus growing the marketplace. It was a step 
that John D. Rockefeller—ever the advocate for rationalizing systems and 
markets—would have appreciated.
office, for example, began to collaborate with their peers in the programs to 
analyze Program-Related Investment opportunities.
In 1996, Peter Goldmark offered the staff’s proposal to the board to create 
what became known as the Program Venture Experiment (ProVenEx). In 
the words of the staff, “ProVenEx reflected the zeitgeist of the late 1990s, 
aiming to ‘enable the Foundation to engage, in selected cases, the energies 
and mechanisms of the private sector in pursuit of the RF’s program goals.’” 
The rationale was straightforward. There was far more capital available in the 
private sector than in either the philanthropic or government sectors. If some 
of that private capital could be directed toward for-profit enterprises that 
generated social impact, the leverage from the investment of the Foundation’s 
money would be enormous.
The Rockefeller Foundation was regarded as a pioneer in its activities 
related to ProVenEx, since few other major foundations at the time were 
utilizing the Program-Related Investment tool at scale. In its initial concept, 
ProVenEx attempted different investment strategies. It functioned both as a 
venture capitalist, investing directly in new businesses that seemed likely to 
produce both investment and social returns, and as a fund of funds. 
By 2002, ProVenEx had been operating for a sufficient number of years 
so that it was able to evaluate its performance and draw lessons to inform 
its investment strategy. In many cases, the Foundation was investing 
in businesses or organizations in highly challenging sectors of the 
marketplace. The Foundation also lacked a sufficient number of dedicated 
staff with the financial and managerial 
backgrounds to evaluate and monitor its direct 
investments. Having learned these lessons, 
the Foundation revised ProVenEx’s investment 
strategy to make investments through 
intermediaries—financial institutions and 
funds—rather than directly into businesses. 
These intermediaries had the expertise, 
experience, and human resources to identify, 
evaluate, and invest in new businesses. In 
working with these intermediaries, the 
Foundation could leverage its greatest skills and 
expertise as a catalyst or convener. Additionally, 
the Foundation learned that not all of its 
programs were conducive to investment, and 
that it needed to be more selective regarding the 
sectors where it made investments. ProVenEx 
1984
Combining its longtime interests in 
agriculture and molecular biology, the 
Rockefeller Foundation creates a new 
research program focused on bio-
technology for rice and other crops. 
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C reating an innovative organization is not easy. Sustaining one over a century is very rare. Hundreds of thousands of pages have been  
written by management gurus and academics offering  
advice to CEOs and boards of directors. Still, the path or 
the recipe seems obscure as organizations are shaped by 
the chemistries of personalities and the ways in which 
people in an organization are able to respond to the  
world around them.
One of the reasons innovation is murky is because 
there are different kinds. Innovation is not the same as 
invention. The inventor applies knowledge to make a light 
bulb or develop a new genetically modified seed. While 
it is still possible for the inventor to work alone (though 
they rarely do), the innovator never does. The innovator 
transforms the way things are done—sometimes by 
deploying new inventions, other times by leading people 
to simply do things differently. Innovation is therefore 
always a social process. 
 Adaptive innovation is incremental, a process of 
continuous improvement along a chosen path. It often 
results from monitoring and integrating the improve-
ments in the field. Highly organized institutional cultures 
can be extremely effective with incremental innovation. 
How do we sustain an 
innovative culture?
Fundamental or disruptive innovation is much trickier. 
It requires the ability and the will to abandon the world 
as you know it, maybe even a world in which you have 
been very successful, to follow a new path within a new 
paradigm. It requires the will to swim upstream, often for 
a very long time, while those around either do not see 
the need or the feasibility of the path you have chosen. 
This can be especially difficult when the human capital 
of the organization has been created for one paradigm, 
and the next paradigm demands a different set of skills. 
Innovators must be patient and value the lessons learned 
from failure. 
Because innovation is a social process, it is often 
deeply rooted in organizations and complex social 
networks. Unlike bureaucratic organizations, which are 
primarily driven by internal rules and feedback, innovative 
organizations are porous, maintaining strong external net-
works that provide a constant source of new information. 
As Harvard professor Clayton Christensen has explained, 
organizations that aspire to fundamental innovation not 
only are attuned to their best customers or clients but 
also are scanning the outer reaches of their environment 
for trends and needs that may not be apparent today, but 
which may be critical in the future. With this feedback, 
innovative organizations must be able to respond to 
customers, clients, critics, and competitors.
In the earliest years of the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
trustees and staff were already attuned to the problem 
of sustaining innovation. But even before the Foundation 
reached its five-year anniversary, some feared it was 
already losing the battle.
How do we sustain an innovative culture?
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detailing their travels, meetings, conversations, and 
impressions of the people and communities they 
visited. Handwritten or dictated, these entries were 
typed by secretaries. Carbon copies were shared 
with other staff who had a need to know about 
these contacts. 
These systems of information-sharing were designed to fight against 
the tendency for programmatic divisions to wall themselves off from the 
rest of the organization. From the earliest days of the Foundation, staff and 
trustees recognized that most of the world’s problems were multifaceted 
and situated within complex social, environmental, political, and economic 
systems. Although they were sometimes criticized for strategies that failed 
to encompass a holistic approach to a problem, it was not because of a lack of 
concern. Over and over in the history of the Foundation, officers and trustees 
worried over how to promote interdisciplinarity.  
A n E arly Warning
W hen he became president of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1917, only four years after the charter was ratified, George Vincent was warned that the culture of the board was already entrenched and isolated. He was urged to 
remain flexible and opportunistic. Vincent may have been the first Rockefeller 
Foundation president to receive this advice. He was certainly not the last.
Throughout the history of the Foundation, the culture of the organization 
has been deeply affected by decisions regarding program and strategy. Heavy 
investments in field operations during the heyday of the International 
Health Division, the period of the Green Revolution, or the Education for 
Development Program necessitated large organizations and, at times, a 
bureaucratic culture. Within the grantmaking entities of the Foundation, 
however—and into the latter decades when the Foundation’s strategies 
focused on convening, collaborating and catalyzing change—the organization 
was smaller and, at times, more nimble. 
Internally, the culture was shaped by the organization’s values. Ideas 
were constantly tested. Information was gathered from around the world. A 
massive library catalog system included index cards for grantees as well as 
contacts in universities, government, laboratories, and communities in cities, 
towns, and villages from Montreal to Melbourne and New York to New Delhi. 
It was a tremendously literary culture. Officers were required to keep diaries 
Outreach programs by field staff in the early 
hookworm campaign in Alabama and other 
states in the American South set the pattern  
for field staff work in health and agriculture  
for decades. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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prevent further outbreaks. The 
Rockefeller Foundation staffer, 
having worked himself or herself 
out of a job, was then available to 
be assigned elsewhere. Given this 
operational staff, it was essential for 
the Foundation to recruit dedicated 
professionals willing to make a career 
of the work. Most were medical 
doctors or sanitary engineers. The 
staff also included entomologists, 
biologists, statisticians, and nurses. 
As Foundation officer Joyce Moock 
pointed out, “Ironically, this precision 
group of technical personnel was 
headed by a former professor of 
philosophy”—Wickliffe Rose.
Former senior vice president 
Kenneth Prewitt once wrote that the 
small group of pioneers associated 
with Rockefeller philanthropies 
in these early years had “to invent 
what it meant to be an officer and a 
trustee in this new thing they called 
‘business-like giving.’” Although 
much of what they invented became a model for 
later foundations and generations of philanthropic 
leaders, the archives of the Foundation reflect  
abiding self-doubt and insecurity. In 1995,  
Prewitt summarized these fears when he told 
the trustees that the greatest threat facing the 
Foundation was “restlessness.” 
Crisis and R eorganization
John D. Rockefeller Jr. was worried. He feared that after only a dozen years in operation the Rockefeller Foundation was growing stale. “Any human institution tends to get into a rut, to confuse motion with progress, and  
 to exalt machinery and organization above work and objectives,” he wrote 
to Raymond Fosdick in 1925. “This is certainly true in the business world, and 
The culture was also affected by the networks in 
which the Foundation operated. For program officers 
who traveled from university to university, visiting 
scientists in their labs or scholars in their studies, the 
values and culture of academic communities shaped 
their perspectives as Rockefeller Foundation employees. 
The prevalence of guests with advanced degrees led the 
director of the Division of Natural Sciences to write a 
handbook for staff called “How Do You Do, Dr. X?” (See 
Chapter VII.)
In the early years, much of the work of the Rockefeller Foundation 
was carried on by the International Health Board. The IHB was organized 
with military efficiency on the “shock troop” principle. In the fight against 
hookworm or yellow fever, highly trained and experienced members of the 
staff were used to try and contain the spread of disease. Once the disease 
(or its vectors) was contained, local health officials would be trained to 
Grants and fellowships from the 
International Education Board 
(IEB) helped connect European 
and American physicists in 
the 1920s. With funds from 
the IEB, Albert Einstein hired 
a mathematician to help solve 
“the riddle of quantum theory.” 
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Wickliffe Rose directed the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission and later the International 
Health Board. An early member of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s board, Rose believed 
the Foundation’s greatest contributions to 
humanity would be in the development and 
dissemination of knowledge.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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“The right persons can work under any system and get results.” Roger Greene, 
the head of the China Medical Board, expressed a similar sentiment: “The 
maintaining of such coordination and control depends much less on the 
form of the organization than on the attitude of the officers.” Alan Gregg, 
who worked in the Division of Medical Education, asserted that the work of 
the Rockefeller philanthropies could not easily be divided into disciplines. 
“Rather than adjust our organization to cope with problems as they occur 
(and, be it noted that our field is the World and the variety very great), we cut 
and trim opportunities to fit the narrow and apparently inelastic limits of 
Divisional or Board policy.”
Nevertheless, Florence Read went on to provide an interesting analysis of 
alternative structures. From her point of view, the trustees’ and president’s 
need for outside expertise justified the creation of separate boards or 
advisory committees for each program. But these boards ought to serve at the 
convenience of the organization and be abolished when they are no longer 
useful. She recommended a structure that 
would include an executive committee 
for each program made up of outside 
experts, with one trustee and the president 
of the foundation on the committee as 
well. Wilson G. Smillie, who worked for 
the International Health Board, offered 
a similar suggestion, a committee of 
technical advisors: “men of broad vision, 
highest attainment, and also possessing 
highly technical knowledge of the theory 
and practice of Public Health” who would 
work with the president and the executive 
committee of the Rockefeller Foundation 
to determine the policies of the IHB. 
Others in the organization expressed 
frustration with the ways in which the 
structure impeded communication. Mary 
Beard, who was the IHB’s associate director 
for nursing but reported to Edwin Embree, 
the director of the Division of Studies, 
complained that nursing education was deeply tied to 
medical education in general as well as public health, 
yet she did not have permission to communicate directly 
with the directors of the GEB, the IHB, or the Division 
it is equally true in philanthropy…. It is not necessary for 
me to tell you that there is nothing sacred or inviolate 
about any type of organization. Machinery and personnel 
are merely the instruments by which objectives are 
reached, and unless we keep ourselves clear-eyed and 
fresh and keep the machinery elastic, we run the risk  
of dry-rot.” 
Junior went on to add: “If these Foundations are 
going to fulfill the high purposes that the Founder had in 
mind for them—indeed, if they are to escape the decay 
which seems eventually to attach itself to all human 
institutions—they must be subjected to constant, critical 
scrutiny, and their directors and officers must be ready at 
all times to redefine their aims, recognize their technique, 
and scrap existing machinery in favor of something that 
is better.”
President George Vincent was also concerned. In the 
mid-1920s, the Foundation was like a holding company 
in which each executive ran his own organization, but 
appealed to the central administration for resources. 
Conflicts over resources abounded. 
At times Vincent found himself playing referee, often 
with uncertain authority, as other long-time Rockefeller 
leaders like Rose and Beardsley Ruml jousted over turf. 
At other times he felt totally ignored as these powerful 
staffers exercised their own prerogatives.
In February 1926, Vincent convinced the trustees 
that they should establish a committee to review the 
organization’s structure and recommend alternatives. 
The committee had three members: John G. Agar, Simon 
Flexner, and Raymond B. Fosdick. Fosdick soon became 
the leader of this threesome.
As they began their work, Fosdick invited members of 
the board and staff to comment on the current structure. 
The comments ranged widely, but shed light on the 
culture and structure of the Foundation at the time. They 
also would reverberate for decades.
Executive secretary Florence Read, for example, did 
not see a problem with structure. Like many people, she 
saw the issue as one of individuals and personalities: 
As executive secretary, Florence Read 
helped direct the far-flung operations of 
the International Health Division in the 
early 1920s. Read left the IHD in 1927 to 
become president of Spelman College.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Mary Beard was associate director of the 
International Health Division from 1924 
to 1938. She exerted a guiding influence 
over the development of the IHD’s 
nursing programs around the world.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Economist and statistician Beardsley 
Ruml directed the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM), a 
philanthropy established by John D. 
Rockefeller in memory of his wife.  
In 1928, LSRM was absorbed by  
the Rockefeller Foundation.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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and with special bylaws indicating the functions and duties of these boards, 
cooperation is purely a matter of personal, not official, relations. If a director 
wishes to cooperate it is the easiest thing in the world; if he does not wish 
to cooperate this again is quite as easy.” He proposed abolishing the IHB and 
CMB boards. 
Coming from almost the opposite perspective, Edwin Embree, who ran 
the catchall Division of Studies, suggested that rather than consolidating the 
Rockefeller philanthropies into one organization, they should be even further 
decentralized with the creation of four organizations, each with its own board 
and, implicitly, claims on the resources of the endowment. Under this plan, 
the IHB, a Medical Education Board, and a General International Education 
Board would carry forward the core of the foundation’s ongoing work more 
broadly in public health, medical education, medical science, and education. 
Freed from having to supervise these operations, the fourth organization, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, would be much more focused on innovation. Thus 
the Foundation would be the most experimental entity in the Rockefeller 
pantheon. When things did not work, programs could be shut down. If they 
proved successful, they could be moved to one of the other organizations to 
manage ongoing operations and development.
As all of these voices chimed in on the discussion, many Rockefeller 
insiders searched among relevant institutional models. Some compared the 
Foundation to a university, where a president was accustomed to dealing with 
specialists in fields in which he had no professional expertise. Others looked 
nervously to government or business. 
Often the debate was characterized as a conflict between centralization 
and decentralization. Junior suggested that a centralized structure under a 
visionary leader would have fewer tendencies to become rigid. Roger Greene 
asked whether a centralized organization would “tend to a greater rigidity 
in policy, and make less likely the development of original and productive 
ideas by the men in charge than under the present plan of separate boards…. I 
should think that a consolidation of all the boards might develop precisely the 
administrative hierarchy that Mr. Rockefeller seems to fear.”
The committee established by the board to review the organization’s 
structure had to synthesize all of these perspectives and make a decision 
for the long run. On November 5, 1926, the committee explained, “The 
Foundation originally was not, and could not have been, put together as a 
completely developed piece of machinery.” It had inherited older entities—
the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, for example. New fields of service 
had been added, including the China Medical Board and the Division 
of Medical Education. The Foundation had experimented in a variety of 
Richard Pearce was chosen in 1919 to 
be the director of the newly created 
Division of Medical Education.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
of Medical Education. This lack of easy communication 
impeded the process of bringing back from the field 
information that would inform strategy and policymaking.
Roger Greene was more emphatic about the need to 
clarify lines of authority. He believed that in the current 
situation, three factors undermined the president’s control: 1) his heavy 
public speaking schedule, which meant he was often unavailable to 
department heads; 2) the lack of a number two to the president (previously 
assigned to the “secretary” of the Foundation, Jerome Greene and later Edwin 
Embree); and 3) the diminished powers of the executive committee, making 
the president dependent on meetings of the full board to move issues forward 
and, at the same time, making full board meetings even more overloaded  
for the board. 
Richard Pearce, the director of the Medical Division, wanted to strengthen 
the office of the president. “Perhaps the most important change of all is 
to give the President of the Foundation a real job. At present, with two 
subsidiary boards with independent groups of trustees, independent budgets 
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Frederick Russell (second from left), 
director of the International Health 
Division, and Edwin Embree (third 
from left) with Polish dignitaries 
in 1920. Russell expanded the 
administration of the IHD and 
introduced a more disciplined 
structure for research and  
public health administration.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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The postwar era demanded that the 
Rockefeller Foundation adjust to a new 
role in the world. Large government 
organizations (the National Science 
Foundation, National Institutes of 
Health, Atomic Energy Commission, 
and others) emerged with far greater 
resources directed toward public health 
and scientific research. In addition, the 
Rockefeller Foundation was no longer 
the largest philanthropic organization 
in the United States, having been 
surpassed by the Ford Foundation. 
With 319 employees in New York and 
in the field in 1957, the trustees worried 
that the culture of the organization 
would not be able to adjust to new 
circumstances. “Old personnel with 
old patterns of thought and techniques 
tend to persist,” a trustee report noted 
about organizations in general. “So do 
patterns of organization, for obsolete  
and near-obsolete purposes.”
The board’s Five-Year Review Committee in 1958 looked 
closely at the ways in which the culture of the Foundation 
was adapting to changed circumstances. They noted that, 
given the pressures of day-to-day work, it was difficult 
for program officers to step back and see the forest for 
the trees. They discussed sabbaticals and other initiatives 
designed to give important time to gain perspective. The 
recommendation reflected a continuing tendency to see program officers 
as “first-rate scholars and first-rate administrators of scholarly affairs.” “A 
Foundation officer should have done something, accomplished some things of 
the mind—scholarly or other—which bring him the respect of the circles in 
which he must operate as a Foundation officer. Otherwise, he is not up to his 
position of power.”
It is interesting that even as the trustees expressed concern about the 
culture’s ability to adapt, they praised the Foundation’s leadership for 
maintaining continuity with the past. Retired officers had been asked to come 
back as consultants on particular projects. 
loosely related fields gathered together under the Division of Studies. “In 
all this development there has been little attention given to the necessity of 
a centralized, coordinated administration…. The consequence of this lack 
of uniformity has been confusion—confusion in the field where our fine 
distinctions in organization and function are frankly not understood,  
and confusion in the home office where we have built up a complicated 
system of procedure and bookkeeping to match our complex situation.”  
The committee recommended consolidation.
The committee also concluded that the president had functioned mostly 
as an arbitrator among the Rockefeller interests. “The idea of the President’s 
office as an instrument by which the Foundation not only kept in touch with 
its present work and promoted its symmetrical growth, but also surveyed 
the possibilities of new work, has not been fully developed.” As a result, “The 
function of general oversight, of general planning, of thinking in world terms 
from the standpoint of the Rockefeller Foundation as a whole, has been too 
largely neglected.” The committee recommended that the president serve as 
the true chief executive of the foundation, “responsible to the Trustees not 
only for the administration of its affairs and the execution of the projects 
which they have approved, but for the investigation of new fields of activity 
and the coordination of these new fields into a united program.” The board 
voted in 1928 to adopt the committee’s recommendations in concept and 
directed that the details of the reorganization be worked out for the board’s 
final approval.
Scientists and Academicians
Years of deliberation on the issue of structure and culture, however, were quickly undermined by events. The onset of the Great Depression brought new pressure on the Foundation to help relieve 
suffering rather than focus on “the advancement of knowledge.” According 
to Waldemar Nielsen, a noted author on the subject of philanthropy, the staff 
of the Foundation seemed unable to respond, despite the urging of the board. 
President Max Mason’s inability to lead the Foundation’s response to the crisis 
only seemed to undermine the board’s confidence in him. Moreover, although 
the International Health Division was moved more deliberately under the 
control of the president and the board of trustees, it continued to operate with 
a great deal of independence under its director Frederick Russell. Although 
this relative autonomy frustrated Mason at times, as it had George Vincent, it 
also allowed the IHD to sustain the culture and operations that had made it 
successful through the end of World War II. 
Like his father, John D. Rockefeller 
3rd dedicated much of his life to 
philanthropy. As chairman of the 
Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 
until 1971, he provided critical  
support for the Foundation’s 
population initiatives and the 
Conquest of Hunger program.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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Alan Gregg once suggested that three things were 
critical to an effective organizational culture: “From the 
past, shared experiences; in the present, beliefs generally 
agreed upon; and for the future, hopes and desires held  
in common.”
Concerns about the flexibility of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s culture and program did not go away. Congressional 
investigations in the 1960s seemed to confirm a sense that foundations 
operated in secret and were out of touch with the American people. When 
John Knowles became president in 1972, the zeitgeist of the age insisted 
that established and influential institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation 
were inherently staid and irrelevant. Waldemar Nielsen’s influential book 
The Big Foundations, published in 1973, crystallized these critiques. Headlines 
on reviews of his book chastised large foundations for being passive, 
conservative, uncreative, and unimaginative. Yet Nielsen also insisted  
that the Rockefeller Foundation had accumulated an “unrivaled record. 
In many ways it has been the standard against which the other ‘modern’ 
foundations have measured themselves.” With this kind of legacy, Knowles 
and the Foundation’s trustees and staff faced an overwhelming challenge 
to sustain the pace and quality of innovation within the context of a much 
different world.
Institutionally, there were other factors that created an environment for 
change. Knowles’s arrival coincided with the departure of John D. Rockefeller 
3rd from the board. Like his father, Rockefeller had played a pivotal role 
as chairman. In his farewell address to the 
Foundation, he raised challenging issues that 
echoed from earlier eras in the Foundation’s 
history. He expressed concern that trustees 
were not engaged enough with the work of the 
Foundation and the staff. He feared that the 
culture was not open to dissent. At the height  
of the youth rebellion of the late sixties and 
early seventies, he was especially concerned  
that senior staff failed to listen to their  
younger colleagues.
Knowles embraced the challenges offered 
by Nielsen and Rockefeller. He recognized 
great strengths in the Foundation’s history 
and practice. The Foundation had been able 
to anticipate major issues and draw public 
Family planning classes in Taiwan 
exemplified the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s efforts to promote 
balanced population growth around  
the world in the 1970s.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
1988
International Clinical Epidemiological 
Network (INCLEN), a project launched 
by the Rockefeller Foundation, be-
comes independent. (Steve McCurry. 
Rockefeller Foundation.)
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attention to these problems even as it worked on solutions. From Knowles’s 
perspective, examples included Kinsey’s studies of human sexuality, efforts 
to balance population growth, work in science and agriculture that made 
possible the Green Revolution, and the development of modern physics. 
Knowles noted that sustained effort had produced major victories: a 
vaccine for yellow fever, eradication of hookworm in the American South, 
the establishment of county health departments, and the expansion of 
universities in less developed countries. Above all, he believed that the quality 
of the staff, from 1913 to 1972, had been outstanding. “For all these reasons the 
Foundation enjoys a preeminent position both nationally and internationally, 
and its power for good is enormous.”
Knowles testified to the strength of the culture and the staff. In the 
Annual Report in 1974 he described the typical program officer as “both 
scholar and activist, thinker and doer” whose work “can be strengthened by 
the scrutiny and criticism of colleagues, not only within the same discipline, 
but from other disciplines as well.” Knowles stressed the advantages of the 
interdisciplinary review of grant proposals as a way to mitigate the “tunnel 
vision of the expert.” Increasing food production, Knowles suggested, 
demanded technical and scientific expertise, but it also involved problems 
that were economic, medical, political, ethical, and behavioral. Knowles 
asserted that this interdisciplinary approach “has not proved excessively 
bureaucratic or cumbersome, and it has enhanced the spirit, coherence and 
quality of our work even as the individual officer remains our prime asset.”
Knowles launched an intellectual rejuvenation initiative, inviting 
speakers to talk to the staff. In addition, recognizing that much of the 
innovative character of the Foundation in the past had derived from 
experiences in the field, a program was created to deliberately rotate staff from 
the New York offices to the field and vice versa. While these initiatives helped 
to sustain the vitality of the culture, Knowles’s sometimes mercurial process 
of decision-making, combined with absences caused by his ultimately fatal 
battle with cancer, undermined morale. 
The Burdens of History
By the early 1980s, the Rockefeller Foundation was “without question the preeminent large American foundation,” but as Waldemar Nielsen observed, it was often burdened by its record of achievement and 
by struggling to live up to the stature of its former self. As the Foundation 
adjusted to the harsh and cumulative economic realities of the 1970s, the 
Foundation’s new president, Richard Lyman, bore the cultural brunt of the 
inevitable backlash from downsizing. Survivors worried about a possible next 
round of layoffs, or advancement within a culture that seemed increasingly 
competitive, became increasingly anxious when Lyman promulgated criteria 
for promotion that seemed to place a heavy emphasis on academic-style 
achievements—publications in professional journals, for example. Lyman 
tried to set people at ease on the issue, saying it would be a “disservice both to 
the Foundation and to individual staff members to leave the impression that 
everyone must now find time, somehow, to publish like an aspiring Assistant 
Professor at Harvard or Berkeley.” But Lyman wanted staff to know that these 
kinds of achievements would be recognized. He also noted that competition 
in the culture was, to some extent, unavoidable. “I don’t see that as wholly 
undesirable,” he wrote to the Foundation’s Program Committee. “Among the 
sins often charged by the outside world against foundations in general is a 
tendency toward complacency.”
Lyman’s memo reflected his desire to both flatten the hierarchy of the 
organization and implement more formal performance reviews for staff. 
Some people in the organization felt this was destructive to the culture. 
According to one consultant’s report from 1983, the Rockefeller Foundation 
was characterized by a certain degree of “rigidity and inflexibility.” Some on 
the staff felt “that secrecy and confidentiality are overdone.” There was a low 
esprit de corps. People were concerned that administrative costs accounted for 
too much of the budget. But these feelings were subtle, operating underneath 
an overall sense of pride and competence. Insiders and outsiders frequently 
said that the Rockefeller Foundation was “alert to the needs of the world 
around, it is capable of change, and is changing.”
By the time Lyman was ready to retire, the challenges of the future  
were clear. In a report developed by consultants preparing for the search for  
a new president, the authors noted that, in many ways, the Foundation was  
a prisoner of its past success, and both staff and board were insistent that  
any future approach must preserve and build upon the Foundation’s 
traditions. The report noted that both Knowles and Lyman had suffered from 
a lack of “sustained and consensual satisfaction” from the board. Knowles 
was seen as an “intellectual dynamo” who was too disruptive to the staff 
and organization. Lyman was a “proven institutional administrator” who 
had limited experience in the most substantive areas of Foundation activity. 
Most critically, after numerous interviews, the consultants recognized a 
fundamental difference between what the staff hoped for in a new president 
and what the trustees wanted. 
Still, John D. Rockefeller Jr.’s fears of ossification lived on in the hearts and 
minds of board members through the years. Retiring from the board in 1995, 
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John Evans confessed, “I am concerned that 
we may succumb to ‘foundationitis,’ that most 
disabling disease which affects so many grant 
makers. The symptoms are losing the humility 
to listen and learn rather than to teach and 
direct; organizing the grant-making process to 
suit staff convenience and efficiency ahead of 
grantee needs; and beginning to believe that the 
money is yours rather than a public trust.” 
Evans’s concerns were those of a board 
member. In counterpoint, Kenneth Prewitt, 
the Foundation’s senior vice-president at the 
beginning of 1995, worried that the culture 
was moving too fast. Foundation president 
Peter Goldmark was seeking to encourage risk-
taking and experimentation. One of his favorite 
aphorisms was: “If you know exactly where 
you’re going, you’re not doing it fast enough.” 
But Prewitt believed that the Foundation was 
increasingly less deliberative, marking a break 
from its traditions and threatening one of the Foundation’s 
most valuable assets—its credibility. 
Prewitt argued that the Rockefeller Foundation brought 
two main assets to the practice of philanthropy—a still-
significant endowment (more than $2 billion at the time) 
and institutional credibility in the field. Money was able 
to attract and commit grantees to the processes of change. 
“Credibility, the second asset, gains access and attention 
over and beyond what the funds can buy.” Credibility, in Prewitt’s view, was 
tied to solid grantmaking. Weak grants diminished the Foundation’s financial 
resources, but also undermined the second asset, credibility. 
Prewitt believed in 1995 that the greatest danger confronting the 
Foundation was restlessness. “A foundation is constantly tempted to move on 
to the next challenge,” Prewitt told the board. He urged the trustees to avoid 
the siren song of the next new big thing, and to follow through “year after year 
with the programs you earlier invented.” Prewitt noted that human nature 
resisted patience. “Effective philanthropy is not only innovation,” he said, 
“it is sustained implementation.” Prewitt’s talk with the trustees on the eve 
of his departure from the Foundation, encouraged by Goldmark despite the 
In 1995, Alice Ilchman, a development 
economist and political scientist, 
became the first woman to chair the 
board of the Rockefeller Foundation.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.) 
philosophical differences between the two of them, offered testimony to the 
abiding intellectual rigor of the Foundation’s culture. 
Prewitt’s concerns and Evans’s anxieties were shared by many of the 
trustees in 1997 as they worked to choose a new president to succeed Peter 
Goldmark. As board chair Alice Ilchman wrote, “We, of course, want to hold 
fast to the best practice of the past, if it is still what is called a ‘usable past,’ but 
want as well to invent and embrace the approaches and forms that suit the 
altered relationships of the new era.”
The board chose Gordon Conway. When Conway became president, he 
again looked at the interrelated issues of strategy, structure, and culture. For 
years, staff and trustees had suggested that the Foundation’s greatest strengths 
and successes came from an interdisciplinary or even multidisciplinary 
approach to the problems of development. In 1995, board member John Evans 
saw the diversity of talent in the Rockefeller Foundation as the organization’s 
key source of comparative advantage.
Under Conway’s leadership, the staff returned to many of the Foundation’s 
historic strengths. There was a renewed global 
focus, a strengthened commitment to issues 
affecting the poor and vulnerable, and a return  
to investment in science with a focus on the  
root causes and initiatives that would enlist  
and leverage leaders and communities around  
the globe. 
In the effort to discern the kind of president 
the Foundation needed in the years ahead, 
the conversation had inevitably returned to 
the character of the organization’s culture; 
its relationships with partners, stakeholders 
and grantees; and the changing circumstances 
affecting the practice of philanthropy. As the 
consequences of globalization loomed even larger, 
staff and trustees realized that the Foundation 
needed a global theory of change that would 
ensure that programs were not working at cross 
purposes. Efforts to support job development 
in the United States, for example, ran the risk 
of increasing trade barriers to developing nations. The 
tremendous expansion of private wealth, fueled by the 
communications revolution, had sparked a significant 
John Evans chaired the Rockefeller 
Foundation board from 1987 to 1995. 
A Canadian physician and business 
leader, he was also president of the 
University of Toronto and founding 
director of the Population, Health and 
Nutrition Department of the World 
Bank. (George S. Zimbel.  
Rockefeller Archives Center.)
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increase in philanthropy. The number of foundations, for example, had 
increased from 44,146 in 1997 to 61,810 in 2001. Meanwhile, available dollars 
had nearly doubled, from $15.98 billion to $30.5 billion. While the Rockefeller 
Foundation had dropped to fifteenth largest among private foundations, 
however, its grants to non-U.S. organizations ranked third behind only the 
Ford and Gates foundations. Growing tensions between the Western and 
Islamic worlds, continuing expansion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, political 
instability reflected in the rise of terrorism, and increasing concern about the 
effects of climate change all reflected the changed landscape.
When staff assessed the Rockefeller Foundation’s abiding strengths 
or its comparative ability to make a difference in the lives of the poor 
and vulnerable, a number of factors came to the fore. The Rockefeller 
Foundation’s “brand”—developed over nearly a century and associated with 
so many important and successful initiatives to promote the well-being of 
humankind—continued to have enormous value, giving the Foundation 
the ability to act as a convener, to bring people together on emerging issues. 
Incorporated in that brand was a sense that the Foundation’s long-term 
commitment to science, especially in fields related to health and food security, 
inspired confidence and trust. Generations of Rockefeller fellows, or “Rocky 
Docs,” constituted a remarkable network of human capital that was a source 
of innovation in many regions of the world. The Foundation also had a 
reputation as an “honest broker.” These strengths were not necessarily unique. 
The Ford Foundation, for example, after nearly a half century of international 
work, brought some of the same strengths to its 
work on international development, as well as a 
much larger endowment. But in many places in 
the world, history mattered.
Despite the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
strengths, some staff worried about the 
organization’s future. Just as earlier generations 
feared that then-current initiatives paled by 
comparison with the past, some staffers feared 
that “We’re always trying to catch up with the 
reputation” and that the Foundation was “living 
off the works of our ancestors.” 
In 2005, when Judith Rodin came from 
the University of Pennsylvania to lead the 
Rockefeller Foundation, a new president once 
again had to face the challenge of transitioning 
the organization’s culture to a new era and new 
The Foundation also 
had a reputation as an 
“honest broker.” 
challenges. As Duke University professor Joel Fleishman reports, she had 
“clear plans for transforming the way Rockefeller did things.” She wanted to 
realign program responsibilities, remove silo walls that separated programs 
from one another, and develop new multiyear strategies. Admittedly 
impatient to put ideas into practice, she disrupted the culture of the 
organization. These changes led to significant 
staff turnover, but also opened opportunities for 
new senior leadership with a fresh perspective 
and mentoring for junior staff.
Rodin also placed renewed emphasis on the 
Foundation’s role as a catalyst and convener. The 
Bellagio Conference Center in Northern Italy, which had been an important 
venue for major collaborative projects in the past, became a key asset in 
the Foundation’s programmatic portfolio. Rodin pushed the staff to pursue 
partnerships with other foundations and NGOs. 
Like their peers in earlier eras, the staff and grantees continued to see 
the Rockefeller Foundation as an innovative organization. The level of 
employee commitment to the mission of the organization far surpassed the 
average among other philanthropic organizations. Undoubtedly, some of 
that passion and pride derived from the cultural legacy of the institution. 
The record of past accomplishments could be intimidating, but to those 
struggling to promote the well-being of humankind in the face of seemingly 
insurmountable problems, it could also be an inspiration. 
1992
Forum for African Women 
Educationalists (FAWE) is born 
following a conference organized  
by the Rockefeller Foundation.  
FAWE seeks to promote gender 
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M oney enables foundations to do good. Like families, corporations, and governments, foundations have to manage their money 
to achieve their goals. Time is a major factor. Does the 
donor or the foundation’s board want to see the money 
spent within a specified period, or do they want the 
foundation to continue to do good forever? 
Whether they choose a limited life or perpetuity, 
trustees must be able to manage the foundation’s assets 
to meet the appropriate time horizon. The tension be-
tween present and future needs is substantial, especially 
during wars, disasters, or crises. But the tension can also 
be felt during times of great opportunity. 
Arguments have been made against the idea of per-
petuity. Some believe that each generation should take 
care of the philanthropic needs of its own time. Given the 
uncertainty of the future, donors should favor grantmak-
ing today. Resisting perpetuity is the only way to ensure 
fidelity to the donor’s intent. 
The arguments in favor of perpetuity are equally com-
pelling. The long life of a perpetual foundation enables 
it to mount a multigenerational attack on intransigent 
problems—in science (searching for a cure for cancer, for 
example) or in society (the elimination of racism or war). 
Perpetual organizations are more apt to invest in the de-
velopment of basic knowledge. Short-lived organizations, 
Should the work  
continue forever?
anxious to see an immediate impact, may be interested 
only in the application of knowledge.
Regardless of the time horizon, as they seek to man-
age their resources, trustees have often been constrained 
by their founders. The assets of many American founda-
tions in the first half of the twentieth century included 
stocks or bonds related to the founders’ entrepreneurial 
initiatives. For the entrepreneur, this arrangement offered 
substantial advantages—shares held by the founder’s 
charities were often used to maintain voting control in 
the business. Policymakers in Rockefeller’s time and later, 
however, expressed concern that corporate goals would 
compromise the charitable purposes of the foundation. 
Moreover, legal precedent required trustees to follow the 
“prudent man” rule to ensure that the value of the foun-
dation’s endowment would be protected. In some circles, 
this meant that assets should be converted to cash or 
diversified. Founders who believed in their entrepreneur-
ial offspring often did not want to see the securities they 
provided to their foundations liquidated, and they resisted 
diversification. The 1969 Tax Reform Act clarified this 
situation by prohibiting private foundations from owning 
more than a small percentage of a for-profit business. 
For many board members, these issues of investing 
and financial management sometimes seemed a distrac-
tion from the more important work of philanthropy. 
But periodic financial crises have a way of reminding a 
foundation’s board and staff that the foundation’s work 
depends fundamentally on the assets it has available. 
One former Rockefeller Foundation staffer learned this 
lesson the hard way when the Great Depression reminded 
everyone that markets do not always rise to the future.
Should the work continue forever?
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Rockefeller Memorial, to join the board of the Rosenwald 
Fund. Although Fosdick declined, Ruml agreed. In 1932, 
Embree hoped that this shared vision would be enough to 
help solve a very big problem.
The Rosenwald Fund was essentially bankrupt. On the 
eve of the Great Depression, Julius Rosenwald had had such 
confidence in Sears that the company’s stock accounted for 
nearly all of the Rosenwald Fund’s assets. When the stock market  
crashed in October 1929, the value of Sears’s shares—and of the fund’s 
assets—plummeted. 
At first, Embree and the trustees were not worried. They hoped the market 
would turn around. They had seen this kind of plunge before. In 1921, for 
example, the value of Sears’s shares had fallen from $243 to $54.5. But the 
stock had recovered. In 1929, the trustees were so optimistic that this would 
happen again that, a month after the crash, the board committed more than 
$1.4 million to twenty new projects.
By June 1932, however, the optimism had faded. Sears was selling for $10 
a share. On paper, the value of the Rosenwald Fund had fallen by 95 percent 
since September 1929. Meanwhile, the fund had made promises to all sorts 
of educational institutions that totaled millions of dollars. Embree hoped he 
could convince the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation to loan 
The Consequences of Overconfidence
E dwin Embree arrived with his hat in his hand. Only four years earlier, the handsome Yale graduate had quit his job at the Rockefeller Foundation to become the head of the Julius Rosenwald Fund in Chicago. With assets valued at nearly $35 million by 
September 1929, the Rosenwald Fund had become one of the ten richest 
private foundations in the United States. Most important for Embree, the 
founder, Julius Rosenwald, the man who made Sears, Roebuck into one of the 
greatest retail companies in the nation, was not afraid to take risks. 
With Rosenwald’s enthusiastic support, Embree had expanded the fund’s 
massive education program for rural African Americans in the South. With 
board approval, he developed programs to support medical education and 
training of public health nurses in the African American community. The 
fund pledged millions to black colleges including Tuskegee, Hampton, 
Howard, Fisk, Atlanta, and Dillard universities. It also provided support for 
various Chicago institutions as well as the Urban League and the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund. 
Much of this work paralleled efforts by the Rockefeller philanthropies, and 
there were opportunities for collaboration. Julius Rosenwald served on the 
board of the Rockefeller Foundation. Rockefeller’s General Education Board 
provided funding to many of the same black colleges. Embree had also invited 
Raymond Fosdick and Beardsley Ruml, the former head of the Laura Spelman 
Edwin Embree (left) was president 
of the Rosenwald Fund during the 
Depression. Embree had moved  
to the Fund in 1927 after ten  
years on the staff of the  
Rockefeller Foundation.  
(Rockefeller Archives Center.)
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on to the next generation to distribute.” Gates shared this view. “It is generally 
held by students of civilization that endowments or charitable and religious 
agencies early outlive their usefulness and then tend to become hindrances 
rather than helps in the progress of civilization. The charities of one 
generation are not the proper charities of the next generation.” 
The charter of the General Education Board contained a provision that 
called for its eventual termination. Similar provisions were incorporated into 
the charter of the International Education Board, making this organization, 
in the words of Wickliffe Rose, “a bird of passage” or an entity created to deal 
with its own moment in history.
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Gates and Junior were rigid on 
this point. As Senior once remarked, “Perpetuity is a pretty long time.” The 
Rockefeller Foundation might exist for many generations before it finally 
spent its endowment. Gates, for example, believed that the broad mission of 
the Rockefeller Foundation gave the board the flexibility to respond to the 
needs of new generations. “The unique distinction and the peculiar value of 
the Rockefeller Foundation may prove to be in two qualities—its universality 
and its deathlessness. It may adapt itself from decade to decade and from 
century to century to the changing needs of the times.” Unlike past charitable 
endowments, which were controlled by a dead hand from the grave, the 
Rockefeller Foundation would be guided by a living hand.
World War I forced the Foundation to wrestle with the idea of spending 
its principal. Europe was devastated. Widespread food shortages were 
accompanied by lethal epidemics of Spanish flu and tuberculosis. The 
the fund enough money to get by until the stock market turned around. It was 
a desperate move, with consequences that would affect the future of all three 
organizations and the field of philanthropy. It would also raise fundamental 
questions about whether the Rockefeller Foundation should exist in 
perpetuity and how it should manage its assets.
The View at the Beginning
I n 1913, no one believed that the Rockefeller Foundation would last forever. With one of his earliest gifts, John D. Rockefeller Sr. had written to the trustees: “This gift is made for the general corporate purposes of 
the Foundation, and the principal as well as the income may be used in your 
discretion for any of the corporate purposes of the Foundation.” In Congress, 
during Rockefeller’s unsuccessful effort to win a federal charter, senators had 
insisted that the Foundation spend itself out of existence by a certain date or 
turn over its assets to the government, and Rockefeller and his advisors were 
willing to agree to these terms. Indeed, in 1910, after Senior had committed 
$50 million to establish the Rockefeller Foundation, John D. Rockefeller Jr. 
suggested to Frederick Gates that the entire sum should be spent within 
twenty-five years. “Why should not each generation support its own 
philanthropies and education to the extent that the money of philanthropic 
people can be wisely given away? Beyond that it would be better to be passed 
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organization Vincent imagined would need a very small 
staff and rely on the temporary employment of outside 
experts to perform due diligence on grantees.
Others on the board were ambivalent about this idea 
of spending from the corpus, and particularly anxious 
that the board seemed to have no real clear policy on the 
matter. In 1928, staff member Edmund Day, director for 
the Social Sciences, suggested to George Vincent that the 
important thing was for the board to make a policy. The 
issue should not come up on a project-by-project basis.
The debate over the issue of endowments and the larger concept of 
perpetuity became more focused in the spring of 1929, when Julius Rosenwald 
wrote an article for the Atlantic Monthly titled “Principles of Public Giving.” 
Rosenwald had long opposed the idea of “the never-ending endowment.” As 
he told members of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
in 1913, “Permanent endowment tends to lessen the amount available for 
immediate needs; and our immediate needs are too plain and too urgent 
trustees were pressured by governments and charities to provide relief. The 
Foundation did help with food relief and public health initiatives, and some 
in the Foundation wanted to do more. Edwin Embree, who in February 1920 
worked for the Foundation’s president, George Vincent, suggested: “Surely we 
shall not face in many generations a world emergency which will approach 
in its importance that which confronts civilization in Europe. Should we not 
without servitude to tradition give every possible help in our power to this 
situation?” With an eye to the future but feeling the burden of the immediate 
need, Vincent and the board agreed. They spent from principal to help. 
In fact, the Rockefeller philanthropies showed little reluctance during 
the first half-century to spend from endowment. Some leaders believed this 
was the right thing to do. In 1927, for example, as members of Rockefeller’s 
inner circle wrestled with fundamental issues of organization and program, 
Frederick Gates sent a series of memoranda advocating the “disendowment” 
of the GEB. He wanted to give the institution’s remaining funds to eight major 
universities: Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, Yale, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, 
Washington University, and Princeton. Raymond Fosdick responded in a 
letter to Junior, asserting that “the desirability of spending from principal 
whenever worthy objects appear—regardless of whether any sums remain for 
the next generation”—was always an option. But Gates’s proposal “strikes me 
as fantastic,” Fosdick wrote, especially given the amount of money that had 
already been poured into the endowments and operations of these institutions 
and even state schools. “The amounts of money involved in college and 
university education are now so enormous,” he said, “that the sums which we 
have at our disposal are relatively insignificant, 
and on a quantitative basis could scarcely affect 
the situation one way or the other.”
President George Vincent also outlined 
a scenario for liquidating the assets of the 
Rockefeller Foundation within a certain period 
of time. He believed such a plan would allow 
the Foundation to avoid having to recruit 
and manage a large permanent staff. Under 
his plan, the Foundation would function as a 
wholesale grantmaking institution giving gifts 
to major entities that would carry forward the 
Foundation’s philanthropic goals. These entities 
might include national research councils, the 
League of Nations Health Section, national 
health societies, or universities. The kind of 
Julius Rosenwald, the CEO of Sears, 
Roebuck and Company, created the 
Julius Rosenwald Fund and served as a 
trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
When Sears' stock plunged during the 
Depression, the Rosenwald Fund asked 
the Rockefeller Foundation to help the 
Fund cover pledges to grantees. (Library 
of Congress, Prints & Photographs)
2006
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa launches with lead support from 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. (Jonas 
Bendiksen. Rockefeller Foundation.)
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had been given the widest discretion, such as with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, they ought to have the power to 
spend principal. Vincent suggested this should apply to 
the growing number of community trusts [foundations] 
as well. Vincent hedged his thinking when it came to 
educational institutions, where income from permanent 
endowments ought to be used for ongoing operations. As 
long as “trustees are wise,” he said, they should be trusted 
to decide for the future as well as the present. In any case, 
if the trustees are not wise, “nothing can protect it [the foundation] against 
decay and disaster.”
Not everyone at the Rockefeller Foundation was eager to join with 
Rosenwald. Edward Capps, the director of the Humanities program, noted that 
in times of financial crisis like the Civil War, permanent endowments played 
a key role in keeping philanthropic organizations alive. Many colleges and 
universities had gone out of existence during the Civil War, Capps pointed 
out, because of a lack of tuition-paying students. Others, including the 
University of Virginia, were so severely damaged that it took decades for them 
to recover. Princeton had survived because of its permanent endowment.  
“My impression is that if boards of trustees had been allowed to encroach 
upon endowment funds they would not have withstood these crises as well  
as they did.” 
Capps’s gentle rebuttal could hardly have been more prescient, as Embree 
and the trustees of the Rosenwald Fund soon discovered. As noted earlier, the 
stock market crash reduced the value of the Rosenwald Fund by 95 percent. 
This enormous drop was readily apparent to the public and to institutions 
that had been promised grants by the fund. For the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the financial hit was less apparent because the Foundation reported the 
book value of its assets, not the market value based on changing share prices. 
Nevertheless, the drop was significant, which made the Foundation’s meeting 
with Edwin Embree all the more awkward. 
By the time Embree came to the Rockefeller Foundation on June 7, 1932, 
the Rosenwald Fund’s resources were so diminished that the fund could not 
make good on its pledges to a number of institutions. Embree was hoping 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation would help out. 
Thomas Appleget, the Rockefeller Foundation’s vice president, said the GEB’s 
trustees and general counsel were convinced that another foundation could 
not provide temporary help to the Rosenwald Fund. Such an act “would be 
neither politic nor broadly legal.” 
to allow us to do the work of future generations.” Rosenwald stuck by his 
convictions when he created the Julius Rosenwald Fund, stipulating that 
the fund’s trustees had to spend it out of existence within twenty-five years 
after Rosenwald’s death. His argument had two main elements: the tendency 
among organizations to become bureaucratic rather than innovative over 
time, and the belief that future generations should be responsible for the 
needs of their own time. 
An evangelist for his ideas, Rosenwald was eager for comments on 
his article from the Rockefeller Foundation. George Vincent agreed with 
Rosenwald’s stance. “The case against them [permanent endowments] has 
been proved over and over again,” he wrote. Even in cases where the trustees 
Thomas Appleget (far right) was an 
administrator at Brown University before 
joining Junior's staff in 1925. He became 
a vice president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and administered the 
fellowship and grants-in-aid programs, 
as well as the Refugee Scholar program. 
After retiring in 1949, he returned  
to Brown University.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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investment management practices illustrated how important the offices of 
the Rockefeller family remained to the basic operations of the Foundation and 
to the other Rockefeller philanthropies.
Investment Policy
John D. Rockefeller gave the trustees remarkable freedom when it came to investment management, although for decades they did little with this freedom. With one of his earliest gifts to the Foundation, Rockefeller  
 wrote to the trustees: 
It is more convenient for me to provide funds for the 
Foundation by a gift of these specific securities rather than 
by a gift of cash, and I believe the securities have intrinsic 
and permanent value which would justify you in retaining 
them as investments, but in order to relieve you from any 
uncertainty or embarrassment with regard to them, I desire 
to state specifically that you are under no obligation to 
retain any of these investments, but are at liberty to dispose 
of them and change the form of investment whenever in 
your judgment it seems wise to do so. 
The idea of investment diversification was an accepted practice even in 
1910. The Washington Post, for example, reported speculation, soon after the 
Rockefeller Foundation charter bill was submitted to Congress, that the  
soon-to-be-created Foundation would gradually liquidate its shares in 
Standard Oil in favor of more conservative securities as was “proper” for trust 
funds, savings banks, and insurance companies. This assumption sparked 
concerns on Wall Street that the Foundation would flood the market with  
Standard Oil stock. 
There were political pressures for diversification as well. During the 
Senate hearings, some members expressed concern that the Foundation’s 
assets would include a large share of Standard Oil stock and that the 
Foundation might be a subterfuge for Rockefeller’s business interests. Echoing 
these concerns, the Department of Justice asked the Foundation in April 
1915 to provide a statement explaining who actually voted proxies on the 
Foundation’s stock.
Surprisingly, the board did little to diversify the Foundation’s assets 
during the first half-century of its existence or to shift control away from 
the Rockefeller family offices. The board established a finance committee to 
The Foundation’s general counsel, Thomas Debevoise, 
was even more emphatic in meetings with Appleget. 
According to Debevoise, the Foundation and the GEB 
“could not appropriate, underwrite or loan funds to 
another foundation.” Either entity could, however, 
consider making appropriations to institutions “which 
might be injured in view of the Rosenwald Fund failure.” 
Grants provided by the Rockefeller Foundation should fit 
the Foundation’s existing programs. 
In the end, Embree did not walk away empty-handed. The GEB 
appropriated $200,000 for institutions that had been hurt by the collapse of 
the Rosenwald Fund. As agreed, these were institutions that fit within the 
GEB’s program. The grants were made for one year only, with no commitment 
for future funding. They were also made with the understanding that if the 
Rosenwald Fund’s fortunes turned, and it was able to meet its obligations, 
funds provided by the GEB would be repaid.
Although the GEB made these grants, Debevoise asserted that the 
trustees of the Rosenwald Fund bore “considerable responsibility” for failing 
to sell Sears stock before the price collapsed. If he knew the details of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s investment program, Embree may have taken 
offense at Debevoise’s comments. The Rockefeller Foundation’s trustees had 
not been any more prudent in their management of the Foundation’s assets. 
They too had done little to diversify the assets given to the Foundation by the 
founder. In some sense they were simply luckier. Moreover, the Foundation’s 
7,000 $5.8B in  1964
$266M in  1961




























































By 1929 the Rockefeller Foundation had 
received all of the founder's gifts along 
with the assets of the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial. Since that time, 
the value of the assets (shown here in 
millions in constant 2011 dollars) has 
been affected by market fluctuations 
and, to a lesser extent, by spending 
from principal. (Data provided by the 
Rockefeller Foundation.)
Chapter Eleven: Perpetuity 289288 Beyond Charity
manage its investments, but in reality the 
Foundation’s assets were managed by staff 
in the family’s offices at 26 Broadway who 
operated a single treasurer’s office that 
oversaw finances for all of the Rockefeller 
philanthropies. Expenses for running the 
treasurer’s office were apportioned among 
the several boards.
In the early years, the day-to-
day responsibility for managing the 
Foundation’s assets fell to Louis Guerineau 
Myers, who served as the treasurer of the 
General Education Board, the Rockefeller 
Institute for Medical Research, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. After the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was 
created, Myers became the treasurer for 
that institution as well. A lean, silver-
haired native of Bayonne, New Jersey, and 
a connoisseur of antique furniture and 
pewter, Myers had been associated with 
businessman and philanthropist George 
Foster Peabody, who served on the board 
and as treasurer of the General Education 
Board in 1905. Myers became assistant 
treasurer of the GEB in 1909. He took direction from the 
finance committee, which in 1922 consisted of three men: 
John D. Rockefeller Jr., Raymond Fosdick, and Frederick 
Strauss. Myers was also guided by Bertram Cutler, who 
managed much of the work in Junior’s office. 
For the most part, Myers’s management of the 
portfolio was reactive. About 80 percent of the original portfolio had been 
invested in stocks, with the remaining 20 percent invested in corporate bonds. 
During World War I, the Foundation bought government war bonds and 
increased its share of government securities to almost a third of the portfolio. 
After the war, these issues were sold and government bonds again accounted 
for less than ten percent.
The effects of the crash of the stock market and the onset of the 
Depression on the Rockefeller Foundation were not immediately apparent 
to the public or even to insiders at the Foundation, because the Foundation’s 
In 1928 Jerome Greene returned to the 
Rockefeller Foundation as a member 
of the board of trustees. He urged the 
board to take greater responsibility for 
the management of the Foundation's 
assets. (Rockefeller Archive Center.)
annual report failed to present a transparent view of the status of the 
endowment. In December 1931, Roger Greene, the head of the China Medical 
Board, wrote to suggest that there should be more information on investments 
in the report. The treasurer’s statement should show how the portfolio was 
diversified, and give information on the return on investment from various 
forms of investment. Rather than report only the book value of its holdings, 
Greene thought it should report their market value. Greene also thought  
the Foundation should disclose the purchase and sale of various assets  
and equities. 
Max Mason, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, wrote back to 
say that the day-to-day investments were made by the finance committee, 
which included men who were experts in investing. Sharing information 
about their transactions would likely lead to second-guessing by those who 
were less competent and to distortions in the mind of the public. Mason also 
recognized that the Foundation's assets did not reflect a theoretical strategy for 
prudent investing. “As you know, most theories as to investment include the 
recommendation of a thoroughly diversified list. In our case we cannot say 
that our list is thoroughly diversified.” In fact, the portfolio had changed little 
since the assets had been given by Rockefeller. 
In 1932, about sixty percent of the Foundation’s 
total assets was in stocks. Stocks and bonds 
associated with the pre-breakup assets of Standard 
Oil made up more than 70 percent of the total. 
The rest of the Rockefeller money—some $72.3 
million—was invested in bonds, about 15 percent 
of which could be traced to the pre-breakup assets 
of Standard Oil. Explaining the Foundation’s 
investment policy, Mason wrote: “What we have 
done still seems to have been the only thing 
to have done. We have bought or sold when it 
seemed opportune. Not having had, therefore, 
the chance to pursue a theoretical policy we can 
naturally have none to state.”
The Rockefeller Foundation’s investment 
management policies also showed how 
interwoven the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
philanthropies remained, even after the 1929 
reorganization. In May 1932, “the Finance Committee 
of the Foundation, Board and Institute” met and decided 
to instruct the treasurer not to lend money to highly 
From his office at 26 Broadway, Louis 
G. Myers managed the assets of various 
Rockefeller philanthropies including 
the Rockefeller Institute for Medical 
Research, the General Education 
Board, and the Rockefeller Foundation.  
(Rockefeller Archive Center.)
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leveraged stock market speculators (using call loans) and instead to invest 
available cash in government securities. In the spring of 1933, with inflation 
on the horizon and significant cash balances in the accounts of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the GEB, the Rockefeller Institute, the Spelman Fund, the IEB,  
and the CMB, Fosdick expressed concern to Junior that something needed 
to be done. The two agreed to a meeting of the members of the finance 
committees of each organization, some of whom served on several of the 
Rockefeller boards. 
Jerome Greene, who was now a member of the Rockefeller Foundation 
board, was frustrated by the situation. After Louis Myers died in 1932, Greene 
suggested that the Foundation rethink the role of the treasurer. In the past, he 
said, the treasurer’s role had been regarded as “substantially like that of the 
cashier of a bank who is responsible for the integrity of the accounts.” With 
Myers’s death, and with all Rockefeller-funded philanthropies looking to 
disassociate from the family offices at 26 Broadway, Greene believed the time 
had come to appoint “a prominent member of the financial community who 
would have more to do with finance than the late Treasurer.” 
“It is true that the various Boards get a high-class investment service from 
Mr. Rockefeller’s office,” Greene later wrote to Raymond Fosdick, “but there is 
something about that relationship which in the long run seems to me to be 
neither in the best interest of the Boards or of Mr. Rockefeller himself. I say 
this although I appreciate the wholly unselfish purpose which has actuated 
Mr. Rockefeller and also the fact that the portfolios of the various boards, 
having been so largely predetermined by Mr. Rockefeller’s gifts of securities, 
could doubtless be managed more easily and efficiently by persons previously 
familiar with them.” 
Greene’s advice went unheeded. Myers’s assistant and Junior’s college 
friend, Lefferts Dashiell, was promoted to the position. But Greene did not 
give up. In 1935, in a confidential memo challenging the autonomy of the 
board (see chapter IV), he again highlighted the need for a finance committee 
and treasurer independent of the Rockefeller family offices. The Davis 
Committee, created in response to Greene’s memo, agreed with his concerns 
and recommended changes to strengthen the Foundation’s board and bring 
independence to the office of its treasurer. But in practice, little changed.
When Dashiell died in office in 1938, Greene urged Fosdick, who was  
now president of the Foundation, to recruit a major figure from Wall Street. 
But again the treasurer’s assistant—Edward Robinson—was promoted.  
The treasurer’s office continued to manage the portfolios of multiple 
Rockefeller philanthropies. 
The debate over how the Rockefeller Foundation and other private 
philanthropies managed their assets was renewed in the fall of 1938 when 
reporter Horace Coon published Money to Burn, the first serious investigative 
look at private foundations. Among other things, Coon charged that the 
Foundation had never been subjected to an “independent outside audit.” 
Treasurer Robinson dismissed this claim. The Foundation’s books were 
audited every year, he said, and a statement to that effect was published in 
each annual report. “If the meaning is that there is no audit of the policy of 
appropriations,” Robinson wrote to Foundation president Fosdick, “that is an 
entirely different matter and not one for me to discuss.” 
Coon also criticized the Foundation for reporting only the book or ledger 
values of the Foundation’s assets, which considerably understated the value 
of the Foundation’s resources. Robinson confessed that he did not know why 
the Foundation followed this practice, especially since prices for nearly all of 
the stocks and bonds listed in the portfolio were listed on public exchanges. 
Robinson would later make several recommendations for policy changes 
based on the criticism in Coon’s book: the Foundation should provide market 
values for assets, keep records of all security transactions, including write-
downs, and explain why it carried a large uninvested cash balance.
In an era with few large mutual funds or pension funds Rockefeller and 
Carnegie drew attention from investors eager to survey their investment 
strategies. In 1942, the American Investors Union looked at the Foundation’s 
portfolio and noted that it continued to be “heavily over-balanced on the 
side of oil stocks and bonds” and characterized by a “lack of diversification.” 
In contrast to the Carnegie Corporation, which had more than 60 percent 
of its assets invested in government bonds, the Rockefeller Foundation 
had suffered from its investments in stocks and bonds (especially in non-
petroleum related industries). As a result, the Foundation had taken a 
“shellacking” in the market. Readers could draw a clear conclusion that the 
Foundation’s investment managers had been unwilling to take losses and get 
out when they should have, and had otherwise failed to exercise appropriate 
oversight. Internally, the Foundation’s treasury officials found no fault with 
the American Investors Union’s presentation of the facts, although it is not 
clear what immediate impact the American Investors Union critique had on 
investment management.
A year later Chairman Walter Stewart was worried. An economist and 
head of the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton, Stewart was “shocked 
at the casual way in which trustees undertake to manage the investment 
of money.” The Foundation had not been greatly harmed in the past, but 
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he worried about the future. In a handwritten note 
to Fosdick, he conceded that two of the most active 
members of the finance committee “are men of such 
prestige in the financial world and manage such large 
institutions as to establish a presumption in favor of 
their knowledge and wisdom.” But Stewart was not 
impressed. He felt the Foundation needed more focused 
expert advice. “Our present arrangement is distinctly 
third rate.” Stewart also noted that unlike other 
officers, the Foundation’s treasurer had to contend with 
board expertise and, understandably, found it hard to 
challenge the advice of the committee members. 
Fosdick concurred with Stewart. He confessed: 
“In the days when I served as a regular member of the 
Finance Committee the same air of casualness prevailed. 
Thus far, I think the success of our finances is due more 
to sheer luck than anything else, i.e., the fact that oils 
have always been good. But at a time of crisis like this, I 
am not at all convinced that this type of policy is going 
to see us through.”
But no transformation of the Foundation’s investment strategy resulted 
from this exchange. In March 1945, Stewart was unhappy that the finance 
committee did not meet on a regular schedule and that, when it did meet, 
there was usually no agenda. “We meet at luncheon and after pleasant general 
conversation,” he wrote, “we spend some time reviewing the list [of securities] 
and deciding whether particular securities should be sold.” The meetings 
left little time for discussions of strategy. “Giving money away wisely may 
be a more difficult art than the preservation of capital,” he conceded, “but in 
present circumstance I believe our investment position also requires orderly 
and deliberate consideration.”
Part of the problem with investment management was structural. In 
1945, Fosdick noted that the treasurer reported to the board and not to the 
president. When Chester Barnard succeeded Fosdick as president, he made 
it clear that as a personnel matter he would supervise both the comptroller 
and the treasurer. Barnard also set out to strengthen the board’s role in 
investment management. In a letter to John Dickey, a board member and 
the president of Dartmouth College, he wrote that the finance committee 
“does not function satisfactorily.” It no longer included any member who was 
“personally authoritatively informed about securities in detail” and had only 
one financier—Winthrop Aldrich, who was the head of Chase National Bank. 
Management guru Chester Barnard 
became president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 1948. At the time, the 
Rockefeller Foundation had 244 
employees in New York and in field 
offices around the world. (Puigney. 
Rockefeller Archive Center.)
Barnard made it a priority to recruit someone to the board who would have 
this expertise. 
Still, the Foundation’s investment management remained very passive. 
When the board finally agreed to hire an outside investment counselor in 
1948, the man picked for the job, John Bridgwood, a vice president at Chase, 
noted that “in spite of its size the composition of the present portfolio is such 
that the number of items to be followed is relatively small.” But Bridgwood 
made few changes. In 1954, Business Week reported that shares of Standard Oil 
of New Jersey still accounted for half of the Foundation’s assets. In 1963, when 
assistant treasurer Theodore R. Frye wrote a short history of the Foundation’s 
investment policy, he reported that except to appoint a finance committee and 
empower it with the ability “to make and change investments,” the board had 
no policy or overall investment strategy. “The Finance Committee’s judgment 
in exercising these powers has never been restricted by any formalized 
statement of policy in charter, by-laws, board minutes, or elsewhere.”  
He claimed that the Foundation had pursued a policy of diversification over 
the years, but this claim was exaggerated. In fact, the Foundation had shifted 
to an even greater reliance on a small group of equities, which  
made up 85.99 percent of the portfolio in 1963. In the early 1930s, for example, 
corporate bonds accounted for up to 40 percent of 
the portfolio. By 1963, they accounted for only 2 
percent. Preferred stocks, which made up more than 10 
percent of the total at one time, had been completely 
eliminated. Government securities accounted for less 
than ten percent of the portfolio (except during World 
War II). At the beginning of 1962, the Foundation 
owned stock in just thirty-eight companies, including 
5.932 million shares of Standard Oil, which accounted 
for a huge percentage of the total portfolio. 
The Rockefeller Foundation was not the only private 
foundation whose portfolio was still structured around 
the founder’s gifts. Until 1956, the Ford Foundation 
owned 88 percent of Ford Motor Company’s stock. The 
Foundation’s income derived almost exclusively from 
the company’s dividends. That year, the Foundation 
sold 22 percent of its Ford stock in the first public offering 
of Ford shares. To further diversify their assets, the Ford 
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation agreed in 
1962 and 1963 to exchange a total of $14,362,000 in 
securities—Standard Oil of New Jersey for Ford Motor 
Walter Stewart, a renowned  
economist and director of the Institute  
for Advanced Study at Princeton, 
succeeded John D. Rockefeller Jr.  
as chairman of the Foundation  
in 1943. (Alfred Eisenstaedt,  
Rockefeller Archives Center.)
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Company—to allow both entities to restructure their portfolios. These 
transactions helped make Ford Motor Company the largest single non-oil 
corporate equity in the Foundation’s portfolio by 1966 (worth $25.9 million). 
Nevertheless, as late as 1966, oil stocks still accounted for $486 million of a 
nearly $815 million portfolio.
A Str ategy for the L ong H aul
For years, the lack of definition in the investment program reflected continuing uncertainty over the future of the Foundation. There was a trend toward investing for permanence, but no definite policy. 
After debating the issue on one occasion in 1936, board member James 
Angell, the president of Yale University, wrote to Junior to say that it was 
“extremely important that [the Foundation] should husband its resources, 
so far as concerns capital, that it may be in the strongest position to assist 
at least in the salvaging of the most important human undertakings which 
may be threatened with destruction.” Angell noted that he had never agreed 
with Rosenwald that endowments were wrong. But he may have been most 
interested in having the Foundation and the GEB help build the endowments 
of institutions such as Yale.
Responding to Angell in 1936, Junior equivocated on the issue of 
perpetuity. By 1939, however, he was much less inclined to see the Foundation 
dip into principal to finance current operations. He suggested that current 
operations and grants be limited to the Foundation’s cash and cash-equivalent 
investments, plus an amount equal to 10 percent of the market value of 
the balance of the portfolio. Raymond Fosdick reluctantly agreed. Yet at 
the December 1939 trustees meeting in Williamsburg, the board passed 
three resolutions on financial policy, including one that suggested that the 
principal fund should be exhausted within a period that might be as short as 
forty years.
Ambivalence on the issue continued during the war. Trustee Owen 
D. Young, the broadcasting executive who founded Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA),  wrote to Raymond Fosdick in 1943: “When I sat on your 
Board, I was inclined to be liberal with the expenditure of capital funds, 
even though it brought the Foundation to an end in a relatively short period. 
Now, with the changed condition of the world and the great need during 
the years ahead for relatively small grants [for penicillin and Chinese mass 
education] which may bring extraordinary results, I am inclined to feel that 
the maintenance of this pool of aid and its experienced personnel should be 
jealously safeguarded to insure perpetuation.”
A majority of board members in 1946, however, did 
not agree with Young. Polled by a special committee of 
the board, the majority believed that the board should 
adopt a plan to terminate the Foundation within twenty-
five years. All the trustees were willing to dip into the 
Foundation’s principal fund “if opportunities develop for 
meeting needs and wants of importance and urgency.” 
With the end of World War II, those opportunities 
seemed readily apparent. Accordingly, at the December meeting in 1946,  
the board authorized the treasurer to draw from principal “whenever and  
as often as there shall not be sufficient funds” in the Foundation’s 
appropriations accounts. 
John D. Rockefeller Jr. personally 
financed much of the restoration of 
Colonial Williamsburg. While he was 
chairman, the Rockefeller Foundation's 
board frequently held its annual 
meeting in the Council Chamber of the 
Capitol building. (F.S. Lincoln. Colonial 
Williamsburg Foundation.)
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Very quickly, however, it became clear that this kind of policy imposed 
little or no discipline on the organization. Barnard characterized it as “pretty 
wide open” or, as he wrote to the officers, “so wide open as to encourage all the 
extravagance and carelessness that man could dream of.” Barnard announced 
that he would generally disapprove of expenditures from principal unless 
“they are very clearly justified as of more than ordinary promise or except as 
they represent important opportunities not often afforded.” 
But eight years later a new president, Dean Rusk, announced that the 
Foundation would spend up to $5 million a year for five years from its 
corpus to finance increased activity in underdeveloped nations in the 
third world, so that it would not have to reduce spending for research and 
training in advanced countries to afford this initiative. Rusk asserted that 
the opportunities were great and that “the impressive increase in the market 
value of the Foundation’s holdings” provided an unusual opportunity to dip 
into principal. Indeed, between 1940 and 1955 the market value of securities 
in the Foundation’s portfolio rose from $141 million to $557 million, erasing 
the losses incurred after the stock market crash of 1929—even accounting for 
inflation. Rusk suggested that the “welfare of mankind” would be far more 
dependent in the future on “what happens now in the countries of Asia, 
Africa, the Middle east, and Latin America.”
As late as 1963, the board still had no restriction on spending capital. A 
report created by the treasurer’s office noted that, since the creation of the 
Foundation, the board had spent just over $82 million from principal, on 
the way to overall spending of $763.6 million. 
Although the board engaged in an extended 
discussion of the issue of spending from capital 
in April, 1964, the board concluded that “while 
liquidation of the Foundation at any definite 
date was not contemplated, the Trustees 
should feel free to use principal from time to 
time in any amount necessary to respond to 
opportunities of major importance for the well-
being of mankind.” While the Foundation’s 
endowment was benefiting from healthy 
returns, the trustees could afford to dip into 
capital, but they noted that “the matter should 
be reviewed frequently in the light of changing 
financial conditions and world needs.”
Passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the 
financial crisis of the 1970s, new accounting 
rules, and changes taking place in the investment world—along with a 
retrospective look at the success of Chase’s investment advisors—finally 
led the Rockefeller Foundation to adopt a fundamentally new investment 
management strategy in the mid-1970s. Implementing new recommendations 
from the accounting profession, the Foundation abandoned the use of ledger 
or book values for its securities in 1973, reporting market value instead. 
The change was significant. It raised the reported value of the Foundation’s 
Principal Fund from just under $300 million in January 1972 to nearly  
$778.7 million. 
The apparent good news on the balance sheet, however, would not be 
matched by the reality of market performance in the 1970s. Like most other 
investors in the era, the Foundation experienced a major drop in the value of 
its investments. By the end of 1974, the value of the Principal Fund had fallen 
to $574 million. Although the markets began to recover, the nominal value 
of the fund did not reach the January 1, 1972, level until the end of 1979. In 
the meantime, with inflation rampant, the purchasing power of those assets 
declined significantly.
Disappointments in the stock market were exacerbated by transitions in 
the management of the Foundation’s assets. A study by the treasurer’s office in 
1971 had produced an unsettling insight. Although the Foundation was still 
heavily invested in oil stocks, its efforts at diversification had not produced 
better long-term growth for the endowment. In fact, cash reinvested from the 
sale of oil stocks had not produced returns equal to what the oil stocks would 
have produced. 
The finance committee’s answer was to broaden its sources for investment 
advice and management. The committee assigned assets worth approximately 
$200 million to four equity fund managers. At this time, the Foundation’s 
endowment was worth about $840 million. Almost all of it—96 percent—was 
allocated to the stocks of just forty-four companies. The remaining 4 percent 
was in fixed-income investments. With this shift in investment strategy, the 
Foundation also reconfigured the role of the treasurer’s office in a way that 
finally reflected Jerome Greene’s vision. The treasurer’s office now became 
responsible for monitoring the outside fund managers. It also took over the 
short-term management of the portfolio, relieving the finance committee 
from this responsibility. And it initiated a stock-lending program. 
Gradually, the outsourcing of fund management continued. In October 
1973, another $75 million was placed with two bond fund managers. In 1976, 
for the first time, the finance committee contracted with outside investment 
managers to handle portions of the Foundation’s portfolio. Meanwhile, it 
continued to retain Chase to handle “the remainder of the account.” According 
2005
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the 
Rockefeller Foundation commits more 
than $7 million to recovery efforts 
and long-range planning focused on 
building resilience. (Jonas Bendiksen. 
Rockefeller Foundation.)
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to the minutes of the board, “This dual system provides the advantage of a 
comparison between portfolio management by advance approval on the one 
hand, and by ratification of transactions effected by investment managers on 
the other.” 
Unfortunately, these changes occurred under abysmal market conditions. 
In 1977, “alarmed by the decline in the real 
value of the portfolio and the implications 
of this for the Foundation’s future,” the 
finance committee commissioned a 
study by Wells Fargo Bank. The study 
highlighted the need for the Foundation 
to rationalize the investment process and 
reduce its role in active management of 
the endowment even further. In 1980, 
this system was expanded from two 
fully discretionary equity managers to 
four, while the number of outside bond 
managers remained the same at two. 
By this time the Foundation had also 
established investment guidelines for diversification and levels of risk. 
Despite all these initiatives, when former Stanford University president 
Richard Lyman came to New York to lead the Rockefeller Foundation in 
1980, he expressed his concern that the Foundation was “spending itself out 
of existence.” As asset values declined significantly in the mid-1970s, the 
Foundation had generally maintained its level of appropriations by spending 
out of principal. Lyman slashed spending for operations by $3.5 million a 
year and, after Congress reduced the minimum payout required of private 
foundations, Lyman cut the grantmaking budget as well. 
Fortunately for Lyman and the Foundation, the stock market boomed 
in the mid-1980s. Under the leadership of trustee James Wolfensohn, who 
headed the investment committee, the Foundation continued its move 
toward outside investment management. By April 1982, virtually the entire 
portfolio had been given over to outside managers. Over the next five to six 
years, the endowment was diversified from three asset classes to six. For the 
first time in the Foundation’s history, it was not managed by the Foundation’s 
own treasury office or Rockefeller office insiders. Instead, the treasurer’s 
office focused on establishing investment policies, identifying investment 
advisors, monitoring the performance of those advisors, and controlling 
the risks associated with the portfolio. The role of the treasurer’s office 
was transformed “from one limited to the passive execution of decisions 
originating in the Committee to that of prime mover in originating 
strategies and setting the investment agenda.” Meanwhile, according to the 
Treasurer’s Office, the role of the finance committee shifted from “direct 
responsibility for managing the endowment to that of policy setting and 
oversight.” In effect, by the late 1980s, Jerome Greene’s vision had been 
realized—albeit half a century later.
The changes, combined with a burst of good years in the stock market, 
led to a tremendous rise in the value of Foundation assets. Between 1982 
and 1989, they increased from roughly $850 million to nearly $1.5 billion 
(in constant 1994 dollars). By the mid-1990s, the portfolio was managed 
by seventy external investment advisors handling marketable and non-
marketable securities.
The professionalization of the treasury function (which was paralleled 
in other parts of the nonprofit world), led to a more disciplined process of 
forecasting and budgeting. By the mid-1990s, the finance committee regularly 
established asset allocation guidelines and performance targets. Investment 
objectives were driven by two clear goals: “to provide resources for the 
Foundation to continue spending at current program levels and to maintain 
the purchasing power of the assets into the foreseeable future.” 
For the moment, the question of perpetuity had been put aside, replaced 
with the concept of a “foreseeable future.” When a new financial crisis hit in 
2008, eroding the value of the Foundation’s endowment, a new generation 
of trustees was forced to confront the question of perpetuity and consider 
spending and investment management in light of the future. This time, 
however, the investment strategies and the commitment to the foreseeable 
future were in place.
“…when former Stanford 
University president Richard 
Lyman came to New York 
to lead the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 1980, he ex-
pressed his concern that the 
Foundation was ‘spending 
itself out of existence.’”
Philanthropy and  
the Financial Crisis of 2008
When the financial crisis hammered the 
world’s financial markets in 2008, the 
Rockefeller Foundation and many philan-
thropic organizations once again faced a 
dilemma. With major declines in the value of 
their endowments, they could cut spending 
and grants to preserve the value of their 
endowments. Or they could maintain their 
spending to meet the increasing needs of 
their grantees during the financial crisis, 
knowing they would erode the long-term 
value of their assets.
In June, 2009 President Rodin and her 
staff organized a special board study session 
to confront this question of stewardship. 
Reading from John D. Rockefeller’s gift docu-
ment, General Counsel Shari Patrick shed 
light on the founder’s intent in establishing 
the Foundation, including an analysis of his 
attitude toward perpetuity. Chief Investment 
Officer Donna Dean outlined the factors that 
influenced the Foundation’s annual projec-
tions for charitable expenditures.
After the presentation, many board mem-
bers, like their predecessors, were awed by 
the extraordinary flexibility that the founder 
had given to the trustees. But if some in the 
room were hoping, after nearly a hundred 
years, for some resolution of the question of 
perpetuity, they were disappointed. Like ear-
lier trustees, the members expressed general 
support for the concept of perpetuity, but 
they retained for themselves and their 
successors the right and the responsibility 
to decide in the moment whether the needs 
and opportunities of the present outweighed 
the prospects for the future.
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Working alone late at night in a laboratory or collectively in the fields of a demonstration farm, Rockefeller Foundation grantees have been engaged in a massive effort to improve the well-being of humanity by developing new knowledge 
or new ways to address human needs. Over the course of a century, hundreds 
of thousands of individuals around the globe have shared in this innovative 
work. The Rockefeller Foundation’s contribution has been to provide 
resources to further this collective effort and to help make the connections 
that lead from one inspired idea to the next. 
This graphic timeline captures the spirit of that innovative process, but 
reflects only a microcosm of the achievements of the Foundation’s grantees 
and staff across many disciplines.
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A few years before he established the Rockefeller Foundation, John D. Rockefeller Sr. observed: “Today the whole machinery of benevolence is conducted upon more or less haphazard 
principles.” He and his son and Frederick Gates believed that the 
business of philanthropy could be organized far more effectively. 
Just as his most profound innovations in the business of 
petroleum had been in the organization of its work, Rockefeller 
proposed to further the transformation of the practice of 
philanthropy by creating a new kind of institution. In the 
language of his day, he called it a “benevolent trust.” Today we 
call it a private foundation. 
Rockefeller was clear that the process of creating this new 
institution belonged to many people. Other donors were already 
stepping forward. With these new institutions, he hoped, 
philanthropists would “look the facts in the face; they will 
applaud and sustain the effective workers and institutions; and 
they will uplift the intelligent standard of good work in helping 
all the people chiefly to help themselves.”
Rockefeller was humble enough to know that he could 
not forecast the future of this new institution. “When it is 
eventually worked out, as it will be in some form, and probably 
in a better one than we can now forecast,” he said, “how worthy 
it will be of the best efforts of our ablest men!” 
Over the next century, as Rockefeller predicted, there was 
indeed a revolution in the practice of philanthropy. Moving 
beyond charity, the new institutions devoted resources to 
understanding the root causes of problems ranging from 
disease to malnutrition and illiteracy. Using science and the 
scientific method, practitioners at the Rockefeller Foundation 
Conclusion
“Long before the advent of the personal 
computer or social networks, Foundation 
staff used these cards to keep track of 
the connections the Foundation had 
made with people who had ideas and 
problems to be solved.”
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and elsewhere developed new technologies—from medicines 
to hybridized seeds—to promote the well-being of humankind. 
Long before the field developed the concept of a “portfolio 
approach” to philanthropy, the Foundation addressed problems 
in health, agriculture, and education simultaneously to 
increase the odds of achieving a breakthrough. The Rockefeller 
Foundation learned by doing, sending staff into the field to 
work with local officials and indigenous communities to tackle 
overwhelming problems. Often their accomplishments fell far 
short of their aspirations. 
As with all innovative organizations, the strengths of the 
Rockefeller Foundation as it has evolved over a century are 
anchored in paradox. Focused on developing systems for grant 
management and avoiding “scatteration,” the Foundation 
remained remarkably flexible and opportunistic. Committed 
to a practice of wholesale philanthropy that sought to impact 
systems of benevolence ranging from the American Red Cross 
to national scientific research councils, the Foundation often 
enabled profound innovation by distributing small but timely 
grants. Endowed with resources that allowed it to pursue its 
mission single-handedly in its earliest days, the Foundation 
recognized that success was dependent on collaboration with 
governments, other philanthropists, and, above all, the recipients 
of the Foundation’s grants.
The process of innovation depended on the evolution of 
practice. The board of trustees had to come to understand its 
role as well as its duty to represent the broad public that the 
Foundation sought to serve. They also had to come to terms with 
the future, recognizing a responsibility to pass on to the next 
generation the resources to continue the organization’s work. 
Foundation presidents had to nurture the intellectual curiosity 
and idealism that attracted staff to the mission while keeping 
the organization focused on pragmatic solutions to the most 
intractable problems. Staff, like Rockefeller, often besieged 
by grant seekers, had to constantly listen and absorb as they 
traveled the world visiting individuals and institutions, each 
convinced that they were on the threshold of making a real and 
permanent difference in the world.
This process of listening and of building networks has 
been the cornerstone of the innovative framework that the 
Rockefeller Foundation developed. On the 19th floor of the 
Foundation’s offices on Fifth Avenue in New York, an artifact of 
a bygone era provides silent testimony to this practice. Tens of 
thousands of index cards fill the drawers of an old oak library 
catalog. Each card records the name of a grantee or a contact. 
Long before the advent of the personal computer or social 
networks, Foundation staff used these cards to keep track of the 
connections the Foundation had made with people who had 
ideas and problems to be solved. 
Today, as Foundation staff work on smartphones, tablets, and 
laptops, they continue to update the paper cards in the catalog, 
as if to demonstrate that not everything in the Foundation’s 
history or practice can be digitized. In the sweep of a century, 
the relationships represented by the cards reflect the enduring 
legacy and the ongoing strength of the Foundation’s practice. As 
the pace of global collaboration continues to accelerate, those 
relationships drive the continuing process of philanthropic 
innovation in Africa, Asia and the rest of the world. Like the 
founder, Rockefeller Foundation staff and partners understand 
that the future of philanthropy lies beyond the imagination, but 
it is and will be worthy of the best efforts of all of humankind.
Conclusion
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Beyond Charity is part of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Centennial initiative. 
Members of the Rockefeller Foundation’s staff were deeply involved with the 
development of this book. Dr. Judith Rodin helped to inspire the concept. 
Michael Myers, with the close and capable assistance of Carolyn Bancroft, 
provided critical guidance and encouragement. Robert Bykofsky, Elizabeth 
Pena and the staff in Records Management helped identify and access current 
and historical materials that tell the story. Kathy Gomez collected spectacular 
photographs highlighting the Foundation’s recent work. In the General 
Counsel’s office, Shari Patrick and Erica Guyer provided legal guidance and 
feedback. Meanwhile, a number of individuals read and provided helpful 
comments on some or all of the manuscript including Margot Brandenburg, 
Charlanne Burke, Neill Coleman, Donna Dean, Brinda Ganguly, Heather 
Grady, Justina Lai and Gary Toenniessen. 
At the Rockefeller Archives Center (RAC) in Tarrytown, New York, 
President Jack Meyers and Vice President James Allen Smith went out of 
their way to make our team feel welcome. Historians Teresa Iacobelli and 
Barbara Shubinski shared much of the research they have done for RAC’s own 
centennial project. Michele Hiltzik, Tom Rosenbaum and the other archivists 
on staff helped find materials and were infinitely patient as we struggled with 
100 years of acronyms and filing systems. Meyers, Smith and Shubinski all 
read early versions of this work. I am especially grateful to Rosenbaum for his 
careful reading of the penultimate draft.
Members of the team from Teneo Strategy, the Foundation’s strategic 
partner on the Centennial, were intimately involved with this book from day 
one. Andy Maas drove the bus, Max Dworin kept us on the road and Michael 
Coakley made sure we had fuel in the tank. Tom Shea provided commentary. 
Working with this team has been a pleasure.  
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Abou t This  Book
The creation of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913 was in itself a marked innovation 
in the development of modern philanthropy. Foundation staff, trustees and grantees 
had to learn by doing. The topical chapters in Beyond Charity explore the evolution 
of the Foundation’s practice from the board room to the field office. For professionals 
or volunteers entering the field of philanthropy, each chapter offers an opening essay 
that highlights abiding issues in the field. The vivid stories and fascinating characters 
that illuminate these themes make the history come to life. 
The Roc kefeller  Fou ndation Centennial  Series
Published in sequence throughout the Rockefeller Foundation’s centennial year in 2013, 
the six books in this series provide important case studies for people around the world 
who are working “to promote the well-being of humankind.” Three books highlight 
lessons learned in the fields of agriculture, health and philanthropy. Three others 
explore the Foundation’s work in Africa, Thailand and the United States. As a package, 
the books offer readers unique insights into the evolution of modern philanthropy.
Abou t the  Roc kefeller  Foundation
The Rockefeller Foundation is committed to achieving equitable growth by expanding 
opportunity for more people in more places worldwide, and building resilience by 
helping them prepare for, withstand, and emerge stronger from acute shocks and 
chronic stresses. Throughout its history, the Rockefeller Foundation has supported 
the ingenuity of innovative thinkers and actors by providing the resources, networks, 
convening power, and technologies to move innovation from idea to impact. From 
funding an unknown scholar named Albert Einstein to accelerating the impact 
investing industry, the Foundation has a long tradition of enhancing the impact of 
individuals, institutions and organizations working to change the world. In today’s 
dynamic and interconnected world the Rockefeller Foundation has a unique ability 
to address the challenges facing humankind through a 100-year legacy of innovation, 
intervention, and the influence to shape agendas and inform decision making. 
